Strategic Allocation of Irrevocable and Durable Benefits

Bibliographic Data

ID6229772
AuthorsAnderson Frey (0000-0003-0021-5004, University of Rochester, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume66
Issue2
Pages451-467
Publication date2022-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12581
OpenAlexW3115518576
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited36

The logic behind redistribution theories is that incumbents target benefits to build and sustain linkages with voters. However, a recent literature shows that some benefits can have a countervailing effect in environments plagued by clientelism: by permanently boosting voters' incomes, irrevocable and durable benefits might reduce their dependence on incumbents. This article explains how parties strategically allocate these benefits when trading off the income effect relative to the standard electoral rewards of redistribution. The theory highlights a previously unstudied rationale to target opposition areas: to weaken voters' dependence on machines. The framework is tested with administrative data on the allocation of cisterns by state governments across Brazilian semi‐arid municipalities, where clientelism is rampant. States favor areas governed by copartisans, but only where local clientelistic mobilization is weak. Where it is strong, states favor municipalities led by the opposition, while avoiding their own local strongholds

Business · Clientelism · Democracy · Economics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Redistribution (election · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Social Policy and Reform Studies

Tools

Open DOI