Amnon Rapoport
Biographic Data
| ID | 3628216 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Amnon Rapoport |
| GIVEN NAMES | Amnon |
| FAMILY NAME | Rapoport |
| SIGNATURE | RAPOPORT A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Arizona |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1508-0771 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 42 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 218 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 42 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1969 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
Progressive stopping heuristics that excel in individual and competitive sequential search
We study the performance of heuristics relative to the performance of optimal solutions in the rich domain of sequential search, where the decision to stop the search depends only on the applicant’s relative rank. Considering multiple variants of the secretary problem, that vary from one another in their formulation and method of solution, we find that descriptive heuristics perform well only when the optimal solution prescribes a single threshol…
Package deals in multi‐issue bilateral bargaining
This manuscript proposes a novel mechanism of multi‐issue bilateral bargaining under incomplete information. A single seller and single buyer negotiate the prices of multiple items by submitting offers and counteroffers in which the items are traded as a package deal. Trade occurs if the sum of the individual profits across all items is non‐negative. We experimentally compare a simultaneous protocol, where the two sets of price offers are submitt…
Experimental comparison of two multiple-stage contest designs with asymmetric players
We compare experimentally two contest designs. In the between-group design (BGD), cohorts compete with one another in stage 1 and a single cohort is then advance to stage 2. In stage 2, members of this cohort compete for a single prize. In the within-group design (WGD), the order of the competition is reversed. Our findings support the theoretical conclusion that the WGD is superior to BGD in generating more expenditure. They also show that if th…
Public good provision in inter‐team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit‐sharing rule
A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free…
Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemmas over a Finite Horizon: An Experimental Study
Volunteer's dilemmas that evolve over time are presented and modeled as noncooperative n-person games in extensive form with symmetric players, discrete time, finite horizon, and complete information. Volunteering is costly, thereby giving rise to free riding. Reflecting on the observation that in many naturally occurring social dilemmas it is beneficial to volunteer earlier than later, the model assumes that the payoff to the volunteer and the (…
Experimental studies of sequential selection and assignment with relative ranks
We study a class of sequential selection and assignment problems in which a decision maker (DM) must sequentially assign applicants to positions with the objective of minimizing expected cost. In modeling this class of problems, we assume that on each period the DM is only informed of the rank of the present applicant relative to the applicants that she previously observed and assigned. We first present the optimal decision policy that we subsequ…
Navigating congested networks with variable demand: Experimental evidence
Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints
Asymmetric Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking: Comparison of Two Contest Structures
Population Learning of Cooperative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game
We consider mixed populations (N 1/4 21) of genuine (humans) and arti.cial (robots) agents repeatedly interacting in small groups whose composition is changed randomly from round to round. Our purpose is to study the spread of cooperative or non-cooperative behavior over time in populations playing a 3-person centipede game by manipulating the behavior of the robots (cooperative vs. noncooperative) and their proportion in the population. Our resu…
Revocable commitments to public goods provision under the real‐time protocol of play
Using the real‐time protocol of play—a relatively new experimental mechanism in which the order of play and timing of decisions are determined endogenously —we investigate voluntary contributions to the provision of pure public goods. We consider the case where the good is binary, players are asymmetric, communication is prohibited, and all‐or‐none contributions to the public good can be withdrawn at any time during the round of play. Our results…
Optimal stopping behavior with relative ranks: The secretary problem with unknown population size
We examine multi-period observation and selection problems with an unknown number of applicants in which applicants are interviewed one at a time on each period, recall of applicants that were interviewed and rejected is not possible, the decision on each period to reject or accept an applicant is based on relative ranks, and the objective is to maximize the probability of accepting the top-ranked applicant. We propose and then assess the efficie…
Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining
Subjective randomization in one‐and two‐person games
Following the study by Rapoport and Budescu (1992), two experiments are reported whose main purpose is to compare the generation of random sequences in one‐ and two‐person games. The first experiment addresses the generation of trinary series in two‐person zerosum games with asymmetric players. The second examines the generation of binary series using a between‐subjects design, and compares the cognitive processes operating in one‐ and two‐person…
An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference
Six single- or multi-winner voting procedures are compared to one another in terms of the outcomes of thirty-seven real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations and non-profit-making organizations. The six procedures examined are two versions of plurality voting (PV), approval voting (AV), the Borda-count (BR), the alternative and repeated alternative vote (ALV–RAL) and the single transferable vote (STV). …
Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution
Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco‐operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show tha…
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset
Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions
Efficacy in small electorates under plurality and approval voting
Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players
Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff w…
Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: The Sequential Contribution Mechanism
Groups of five players participated in a social dilemma game in which each player receives a monetary endowment and then chooses whether to contribute it to a monetary public good. The good is provided to all group members if at least three contributions are made; it is not provided, otherwise. Experiment 1 showed that the simultaneous protocol of play—where decisions are made privately and anonymously—is significantly less effective in solving t…
Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An Experimental Study
Two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 × 4 × 4 factorial design: scenario (postponing a receipt, postponing a payment, expediting a receipt, expediting a payment), time delay (0.5, 1, 2, and 4 years), and size of cashflow ($40, $200, $1000, and $5000). Individual discount rates were inferred from the responses, and then used to test compet…
Within- and between-group communication in intergroup competition for public goods
Solving Public Good Problems in Competition Between Equal and Unequal Size Groups
Forty-eight groups participated once in an intergroup conflict in which two groups of equal or unequal size competed for the provision of step-level (binary) public goods. The study included a two-factorial design with preplay communication versus no preplay communication defining one dimension, and equal group size versus unequal group size defining the other. The decision to contribute or not toward the provision of the good was made privately …
Intergroup competition for public goods: Effects of unequal resources and relative group size
Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: The Sequential Contribution Mechanism
Groups of five players participated in a social dilemma game in which each player receives a monetary endowment and then chooses whether to contribute it to a monetary public good. The good is provided to all group members if at least three contributions are made; it is not provided, otherwise. Experiment 1 showed that the simultaneous protocol of play—where decisions are made privately and anonymously—is significantly less effective in solving t…
When three is not always two against one: Coalitions in experimental three-person cooperative games
Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm
Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) reported the results of a series of experiments in which n subjects each receive a monetary endowment and then may choose privately whether to contribute it to a monetary public good; the good is supplied if a prespecified numberm < nof contributions or more is made. Decision policies maximizing expected value are derived for this experimental paradigm under three different assumptions about the expectations…
Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution
Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco‐operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show tha…
Tacit co-operation in three-alternative non-cooperative voting games: A new model of sophisticated behaviour under the plurality procedure
Solving Public Good Problems in Competition Between Equal and Unequal Size Groups
Forty-eight groups participated once in an intergroup conflict in which two groups of equal or unequal size competed for the provision of step-level (binary) public goods. The study included a two-factorial design with preplay communication versus no preplay communication defining one dimension, and equal group size versus unequal group size defining the other. The decision to contribute or not toward the provision of the good was made privately …
Intergroup competition for the provision of step‐level public goods: Effects of preplay communication
Thirty‐two groups of three subjects each participated once in an intergroup public goods game (IPG) in which two groups compete for the provision of step‐level public goods. Half of the groups were allowed to discuss the conflict before their members decided privately and anonymously whether to contribute their endowments to their group benefit, and half were not given this opportunity. The results show that preplay group discussion enhances the …
Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of inequality in resources
Dans le cadre d'un jeu de dilemme concernant 12 groupes de 5 joueurs sont examines les determinants des choix de donner ses gains monetaires pour contribuer a un gain collectif
Within- and between-group communication in intergroup competition for public goods
Intergroup competition for public goods: Effects of unequal resources and relative group size
An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference
Six single- or multi-winner voting procedures are compared to one another in terms of the outcomes of thirty-seven real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations and non-profit-making organizations. The six procedures examined are two versions of plurality voting (PV), approval voting (AV), the Borda-count (BR), the alternative and repeated alternative vote (ALV–RAL) and the single transferable vote (STV). …
Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players
Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff w…
Asymmetric Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking: Comparison of Two Contest Structures
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset
Immediately after the election to the tenth Israeli parliament (Knesset), 21 students of political science, 24 Knesset members, and seven parliamentary correspondents were each asked (a) to assess the political power ratios of the 10 parties represented in the Knesset and (b) to judge the ideological similarity between them. As ascertained by Saaty's analytic hierarchy scaling technique, the power ratio judgments proved sufficiently consistent to…
Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints
Proportional representation: An empirical evaluation of single-stage, non-ranked voting procedures
Dominated, Connected, and Tight Coalitions in the Israeli Knesset
Public good provision in inter‐team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit‐sharing rule
A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free…
Revocable commitments to public goods provision under the real‐time protocol of play
Using the real‐time protocol of play—a relatively new experimental mechanism in which the order of play and timing of decisions are determined endogenously —we investigate voluntary contributions to the provision of pure public goods. We consider the case where the good is binary, players are asymmetric, communication is prohibited, and all‐or‐none contributions to the public good can be withdrawn at any time during the round of play. Our results…
The Influence of structural relationships on coalition formation in four‐person apex games
Eight quartets of subjects each played eight different versions of a 4‐person apex game twice, in a computer‐controlled coalition formation experiment. The eight games were cast into a 2 × 2 factorial mold in which (i) the central apex player was either weak or strong in terms of the outcomes available to Apex coalitions, and (ii) the outcomes to players not in coalitions varied, such that the outside opportunities of the Base players were not ne…
Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemmas over a Finite Horizon: An Experimental Study
Volunteer's dilemmas that evolve over time are presented and modeled as noncooperative n-person games in extensive form with symmetric players, discrete time, finite horizon, and complete information. Volunteering is costly, thereby giving rise to free riding. Reflecting on the observation that in many naturally occurring social dilemmas it is beneficial to volunteer earlier than later, the model assumes that the payoff to the volunteer and the (…
Experimental studies of sequential selection and assignment with relative ranks
We study a class of sequential selection and assignment problems in which a decision maker (DM) must sequentially assign applicants to positions with the objective of minimizing expected cost. In modeling this class of problems, we assume that on each period the DM is only informed of the rank of the present applicant relative to the applicants that she previously observed and assigned. We first present the optimal decision policy that we subsequ…
Efficacy in small electorates under plurality and approval voting
The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts
A descriptive model is presented for n‐person negotiable conflicts represented by games in characteristic function form. It measures the power of a coalition by a generalized cooperative standard of fairness (Maschler, 1963a), which requires the independent estimation of a single parameter. Stability in allocating payoff within a coalition is achieved by equalizing the differences between a player's payoff and his power for all members of the coa…
Quota vs positional power in four-person apex games
Reply to Dr. Harris' Comments on My Comments
More comment on the resolution of the paradox: meta-game—Prisoner's Dilemma game is presented
Decisions of Timing in Conflict Situations of Unequal Power Between Opponents
Games of timing constitute a subclass of two-person, zero-sum, infinite games, where the problem facing each player is not what course of action to take, but rather when to take a prespecified action. The present study is an extension of previous research on games of timing with complete information (noisy duels) and equal accuracy functions, to noisy duels with unequal accuracy functions. The game-theoretic solution of this class of games, which…
When three is not always two against one: Coalitions in experimental three-person cooperative games
The Influence of structural relationships on coalition formation in four‐person apex games
Eight quartets of subjects each played eight different versions of a 4‐person apex game twice, in a computer‐controlled coalition formation experiment. The eight games were cast into a 2 × 2 factorial mold in which (i) the central apex player was either weak or strong in terms of the outcomes available to Apex coalitions, and (ii) the outcomes to players not in coalitions varied, such that the outside opportunities of the Base players were not ne…
Coalition formation in the triad when two are weak and one is strong
Quota vs positional power in four-person apex games
The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts
A descriptive model is presented for n‐person negotiable conflicts represented by games in characteristic function form. It measures the power of a coalition by a generalized cooperative standard of fairness (Maschler, 1963a), which requires the independent estimation of a single parameter. Stability in allocating payoff within a coalition is achieved by equalizing the differences between a player's payoff and his power for all members of the coa…
Variability in payoff disbursement in coalition formation experiments
Results from 680 plays, gathered in four different 3‐person characteristic function game experiments, are summarized to show that there is considerable inter‐group variability in payoff disbursement in coalition formation experiments that does not decrease with practice. This Variability is inconsistent with models predicting unique payoff vectors, one for each coalition structure. Data from a 3‐person game experiment by Komorita and Kravitz are …
A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model
The equal division kernel and the α‐power solution are two recently proposed theories of coalition formation in n‐person characteristic function games with sidepayments. A closed form solution for payoff disbursement is derived from the α‐power model for n‐person games with only 1, n‐1, and n‐person permissible coalitions and no weak players. It is shown that for this class of games, which are frequently employed to experimentally test theories o…
Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm
Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) reported the results of a series of experiments in which n subjects each receive a monetary endowment and then may choose privately whether to contribute it to a monetary public good; the good is supplied if a prespecified numberm < nof contributions or more is made. Decision policies maximizing expected value are derived for this experimental paradigm under three different assumptions about the expectations…
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset
Immediately after the election to the tenth Israeli parliament (Knesset), 21 students of political science, 24 Knesset members, and seven parliamentary correspondents were each asked (a) to assess the political power ratios of the 10 parties represented in the Knesset and (b) to judge the ideological similarity between them. As ascertained by Saaty's analytic hierarchy scaling technique, the power ratio judgments proved sufficiently consistent to…
Dominated, Connected, and Tight Coalitions in the Israeli Knesset
Selection of portfolios with risky and riskless assets: Experimental tests of two expected utility models
Proportional representation: An empirical evaluation of single-stage, non-ranked voting procedures
Intergroup competition for the provision of step‐level public goods: Effects of preplay communication
Thirty‐two groups of three subjects each participated once in an intergroup public goods game (IPG) in which two groups compete for the provision of step‐level public goods. Half of the groups were allowed to discuss the conflict before their members decided privately and anonymously whether to contribute their endowments to their group benefit, and half were not given this opportunity. The results show that preplay group discussion enhances the …
Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of inequality in resources
Dans le cadre d'un jeu de dilemme concernant 12 groupes de 5 joueurs sont examines les determinants des choix de donner ses gains monetaires pour contribuer a un gain collectif
Tacit co-operation in three-alternative non-cooperative voting games: A new model of sophisticated behaviour under the plurality procedure
Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An Experimental Study
Two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 × 4 × 4 factorial design: scenario (postponing a receipt, postponing a payment, expediting a receipt, expediting a payment), time delay (0.5, 1, 2, and 4 years), and size of cashflow ($40, $200, $1000, and $5000). Individual discount rates were inferred from the responses, and then used to test compet…
Within- and between-group communication in intergroup competition for public goods
Solving Public Good Problems in Competition Between Equal and Unequal Size Groups
Forty-eight groups participated once in an intergroup conflict in which two groups of equal or unequal size competed for the provision of step-level (binary) public goods. The study included a two-factorial design with preplay communication versus no preplay communication defining one dimension, and equal group size versus unequal group size defining the other. The decision to contribute or not toward the provision of the good was made privately …
Intergroup competition for public goods: Effects of unequal resources and relative group size
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset
Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions
Efficacy in small electorates under plurality and approval voting
Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players
Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff w…
Economics (32 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (28 works) · Microeconomics (26 works) · Computer Science (24 works) · Mathematics (22 works) · Psychology (20 works) · Mathematical economics (17 works) · Political science (17 works) · Game Theory and Applications (15 works) · Social Psychology (15 works)