Xingmiu Liao

Biographic Data

ID3675281
NAMEXingmiu Liao
GIVEN NAMESXingmiu
FAMILY NAMELiao
SIGNATURELIAO X
AFFILIATIONSSun Yat-sen University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS62
AUTHOR COUNT10
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2016
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX5

  • Party-Led Digitalization

    Open AccessXingmiu Liao, Jinxu Zhao et al.ARTICLEChinese Political Science Review2025Cited by: 4References: 8

  • Fast Track Promotion for Grassroots Cadres

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.ARTICLEIssues & Studies2022References: 11

    Although the “selected graduate” (xuandiaosheng) system is not new, Xi Jinping has changed it substantially since he came to power. This paper introduces the concept of the “promotion ladder” to describe how low-ranking cadres must wait longer for promotion than do mid- and high-ranking cadres. This promotion ladder often leads to low-ranking cadres hitting a ceiling in their careers. For this reason, section-level cadres need a fast track that w…

  • A Mechanism of Coded Communication

    Open AccessW H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.ARTICLEModern China2021Cited by: 1References: 11

    Studies of the official media of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long focused on interpretations of political propaganda. In this article, we propose another model—the “secret code communication” model. We find that the main audience for some of the official media consists not of members of the public but rather cadres. The China Central Television (CCTV) program Xinwen Lianbo is a typical example. The program operates according to a very …

  • Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.ARTICLEThe China Journal2020Cited by: 7References: 3

    On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC…

  • Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation

    Open AccessW H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.ARTICLEChina Information2020Cited by: 17References: 22

    This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of 'institutionalized mobilization', we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and …

  • Penetrating the Grassroots

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.ARTICLEProblems of Post-Communism2019Cited by: 5References: 12

    Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical…

  • The Impending Rise of the “Tsinghua Clique

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.ARTICLEJournal of Contemporary China2019Cited by: 9

    The Tsinghua clique is highly influential in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics. But in the past, alumni from other elite universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, also occupied positions as senior cadres, so Tsinghua did not have any more influence than they did. However, since 2002, Tsinghua University has developed a ‘cultivation/transfer’ system whereby the school, in a purposeful, calculating, and organi…

  • Managing Irregular Petitions in China

    Open AccessXingmiu Liao, Wen‐hsuan TsaiARTICLEJournal of East Asian Studies2018Cited by: 8References: 10

    This paper uses Province A and City T as case studies to explore the strategies used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for managing citizens’ “irregular letters and visits” (irregular petitions) and the logic behind them. We believe that the local officials use both “hard” and “soft” measures to exercise control over these activities. The soft measures include persuasion and negotiation aimed at getting petitioners to abandon their irregular p…

  • The Authority, Functions, and Political Intrigues of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.ARTICLEThe China Journal2018Cited by: 3References: 2

    The General Office of the Party Central Committee is the core staff organization through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises power internally. This article discusses the attributes of the General Office’s directors and its important constituent departments, which include the Secretarial Bureau, Letters and Visits Bureau, Research Office, Security Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Confidential Communication Bureau, and Departmental Affairs Mana…

  • Concentrating Power to Accomplish Big Things

    W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.ARTICLEJournal of Contemporary China2016Cited by: 8

    This article discusses the operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pishi system from the perspective of decision making. As an authoritarian regime, the CCP ‘concentrates power to accomplish big things’, demonstrating the extent of the CCP’s state capacity. This article argues that, through a wide range of documentation, the CCP provides leaders with a channel for resource accumulation, to issue pishi (written directives). Next, mishu (se…