Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12518643 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Xingmiu Liao (corresponding author), W H Tsai (0000-0003-4803-6953), Wen‐hsuan Tsai |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Pages | 29-50 |
| Publication date | 2020-05-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The China Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1324-9347 • E-ISSN: 1835-8535 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/708610 |
| OpenAlex | W3026256251 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 14 |
On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC, and it scrutinizes cases of corruption and malfeasance in coordination with relevant departments. The most important aspects of this process are “placing a case on file” (li’an) and “detention” (liuzhi). This article seeks to throw light on the CDI’s investigation process through extensive fieldwork carried out in County J
China · Commission · Political science · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |