Pierre Jacob

Biographic Data

ID3681125
NAMEPierre Jacob
GIVEN NAMESPierre
FAMILY NAMEJacob
SIGNATUREJACOB P
AFFILIATIONSInstitut Jean Nicod
ORCID0000-0002-3126-6966
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS43
TOTAL CITATIONS13
AUTHOR COUNT43
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1974
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX2

  • Is mindreading a gadget

    Open AccessPierre Jacob, Thom Scott‐phillip et al.ARTICLESynthese2021Cited by: 2References: 82

  • Jules Vuillemin et la triple controverse entre Carnap et Quine

    Pierre JacobARTICLERevue de Synthèse2020

    Jules Vuillemin était un philosophe érudit et savant ; il entretenait avec la philosophie analytique de son temps une relation étroite, mais rendue énigmatique par sa fidélité au principe de l'inséparabilité entre la philosophie et l'histoire de la philosophie hérité de l'historien de la philosophie, Martial Gueroult. La question principale que je me pose ici est de savoir quelle était l'attitude exacte de Vuillemin à l'égard de la triple controv…

  • Meaning, intentionality and communication

    Pierre JacobCHAPTERSemantics - Foundations, History…2019

    This chapter probes the connections between the metaphysics of meaning and the investigation of human communication. It first argues that contemporary philosophy of mind has inherited most of its metaphysical questions from Brentano's puzzling definition of intentionality. Then it examines how intentionality came to occupy the forefront of pragmatics in three steps. (1) By investigating speech acts, Austin and ordinary language philosophers pione…

  • Mental Representations

    Open AccessPierre JacobOTHERThe International Encyclopedia of…2018

    All cultural information is mentally represented information but not all mentally represented information is cultural. Cultural information is information that has been repeatedly metarepresented in the minds of members of a human population distributed across space and time. A metarepresentation is a representation of the content of another representation. But what is a representation in the first place? How can one thing stand for another or fo…

  • Solving the Puzzle about Early Belief‐Ascription

    Open AccessKatharina A Helming, Brent Strickland et al.ARTICLEMind & Language2016

    Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited‐response false‐belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false‐belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early‐belief understanding. The latter view (unlike the former) assumes that failure at elicited‐response false‐belief tasks need not reflect the inability to understand false be…

  • Beyond Empathy for Pain

    Open AccessFrédérique de Vignemont, Pierre JacobARTICLEPhilosophy of Science2016References: 21

    Here we address four objections raised by Julien Deonna, John Michael, and Francesca Fardo against a recent account of empathy for pain (by Frédérique de Vignemont and Tania Singer and Vignemont and Pierre Jacob). First, to what extent must the empathizer share her target’s affective state? Second, how can one interpret neuroscientific findings on vicarious pain in light of recent results challenging the notion of a pain matrix? Third, can one of…

  • How from action-mirroring to intention-ascription

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEConsciousness and Cognition2013

  • Embodying the Mind by Extending It

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEReview of Philosophy and Psychology2012

  • On Doing Things Intentionally

    Open AccessFlorian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux et al.ARTICLEMind & Language2012

    Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb ‘intentionally’. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb ‘intentionally’ has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data …

  • Sharing and Ascribing Goals

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEMind & Language2012

    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal‐ascription by human infants: the shared‐intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non‐human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary …

  • What Is It like to Feel Another's Pain

    Open AccessFrédérique de Vignemont, Pierre JacobARTICLEPhilosophy of Science2012Cited by: 9References: 34

    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our …

  • Meaning, intentionality and communication

    Pierre JacobCHAPTERSemantics2011

  • The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEReview of Philosophy and Psychology2011

  • The Scope and Limits of Enactive Approaches to Visual Experience

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEPerception2008

    I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf of the so-called 'enactive' approach to visual experience. Secondly, I explain why the enactive view of visual experience is hard to square with the evidence in favour of the two-visual-systems model of human vision. Finally, I explore one possible way to develop the 'pre-emptive perception' framework and explain why, contrary to first appearances,…

  • What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEMind & Language2008

    According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third‐person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent’s brain and this resonance process retrodictively generates a representation of the agent’s intention from a perception of her movement. In this paper, I…

  • The tuning-fork model of human social cognition

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEConsciousness and Cognition2008

  • Précis de L’Intentionnalité, problèmes de philosophie de l’esprit

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEPhilosophiques2007

  • Neurones miroir, résonance et cognition sociale

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEPsychologie Française2007

  • Gender‐specific differences in the psychosocial adjustment of parents of a child with duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) ‐ Two points of view for a shared experience

    Open AccessEva Tomiak, Eva M Tomiak et al.ARTICLEQualitative Research Journal2007Cited by: 1References: 4

    Research was conducted on parents’ experience of caring for a child living with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). The focus of this research was on the key psychological aspects of the process of adjustment to the illness of their child (family and spousal relationship, daily life, emotions, career, spirituality, and coping strategies). There was evidence throughout the study of gender‐specific differences in constructing the different aspects o…

  • Reply to Our Critics

    Open AccessPierre Jacob, Marc JeannerodARTICLEDialogue2007

    Ratte for reading and criticizing our book. Interestingly, their three sets of comments (to which we shall respond in order) reflect three very different standpoints on both vision and the science of vision. 1. Reply to Tim Schroeder Tim Schroeder is a very sympathetic reader indeed. He raises two queries, both of which are well taken and go deep to the heart of our framework. His first question is about the scope and limits of our endorsement of…

  • Précis of Ways of Seeing

    Open AccessPierre Jacob, Marc JeannerodARTICLEDialogue2007

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  • Portées et limites des théories énactives de l’expérience visuelle

    Pierre JacobARTICLEIntellectica Revue de l…2006

    La version de la conception énactive de l’expérience visuelle développée dans son livre Action in Perception par le philosophe Alva Noë est une importante contribution à l’étude de la perception visuelle. Mon but ici est d’effectuer un examen critique de cette conception. D’abord, contrairement à l’interprétation énactiviste, je soutiens que les travaux expérimentaux sur la cécité au changement ne démontrent pas l’inexistence de représentations v…

  • Sur le contenu de l’expérience visuelle (On the Content of Visual Experience)

    Pierre JacobARTICLEIntellectica Revue de l…2006

    Jacob Pierre. Sur le contenu de l’expérience visuelle (On the Content of Visual Experience). In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°43, 2006/1. Internalisme / externalisme. pp. 117-123

  • The Languages of the Brain

    Nathaniel Alpert, Nalini Ambady et al.BOOKLanguages of the Brain2002

  • Some Problems for Recductive Physicalism

    Open AccessPierre JacobARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2002Cited by: 1