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Jingyuan Qian

Biographic Data

ID3685300
NAMEJingyuan Qian
GIVEN NAMESJingyuan
FAMILY NAMEQian
SIGNATUREQIAN J
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Chicago
ORCID0000-0001-8871-6393
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS5
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • The Anxiety of Embedded Officials

    Open Access•Jingyuan Qian, Jie Qian et al.•ARTICLE•Studies in Comparative…•2026•References: 35

  • Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation in State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes

    Jingyuan Qian, Steve Bai•ARTICLE•Comparative Politics•2024•Cited by: 4•References: 15

    In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our th…

  • Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign

    Open Access•Jingyuan Qian•ARTICLE•Contemporary Sociology A Journal…•2024

  • Historical Ethnic Conflicts and the Rise of Islamophobia in Modern China

    Jingyuan Qian•ARTICLE•Ethnopolitics•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 7

    In this paper, I show that narratives of historical conflicts between the Han Chinese and Muslims have been deployed to justify anti-Muslim sentiment and practices in modern and contemporary Northwest China. My study analyses Han Chinese narratives during and after the Northwest Muslim Rebellion—the largest ethnic conflict in nineteenth-century China. The historical narratives about the rebellion have been passed down inter-generationally and hav…

  • Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation in State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes

    Jingyuan Qian, Steve Bai•ARTICLE•Comparative Politics•2024•Cited by: 4•References: 15

    In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our th…

  • Historical Ethnic Conflicts and the Rise of Islamophobia in Modern China

    Jingyuan Qian•ARTICLE•Ethnopolitics•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 7

    In this paper, I show that narratives of historical conflicts between the Han Chinese and Muslims have been deployed to justify anti-Muslim sentiment and practices in modern and contemporary Northwest China. My study analyses Han Chinese narratives during and after the Northwest Muslim Rebellion—the largest ethnic conflict in nineteenth-century China. The historical narratives about the rebellion have been passed down inter-generationally and hav…

  • Historical Ethnic Conflicts and the Rise of Islamophobia in Modern China

    Jingyuan Qian•ARTICLE•Ethnopolitics•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 7

    In this paper, I show that narratives of historical conflicts between the Han Chinese and Muslims have been deployed to justify anti-Muslim sentiment and practices in modern and contemporary Northwest China. My study analyses Han Chinese narratives during and after the Northwest Muslim Rebellion—the largest ethnic conflict in nineteenth-century China. The historical narratives about the rebellion have been passed down inter-generationally and hav…

  • Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation in State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes

    Jingyuan Qian, Steve Bai•ARTICLE•Comparative Politics•2024•Cited by: 4•References: 15

    In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our th…

  • Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign

    Open Access•Jingyuan Qian•ARTICLE•Contemporary Sociology A Journal…•2024

  • The Anxiety of Embedded Officials

    Open Access•Jingyuan Qian, Jie Qian et al.•ARTICLE•Studies in Comparative…•2026•References: 35

Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Art (2 works) · Bureaucracy (2 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (2 works) · Compliance (psychology (2 works) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (2 works) · Literature (2 works)

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