Marcus André Melo
Biographic Data
| ID | 3694319 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marcus André Melo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marcus André |
| FAMILY NAME | Melo |
| SIGNATURE | MELO M A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4608-089X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 27 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 293 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 27 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
Why some elected autocrats fail: Democratic vulnerability in Latin America
The literature on democratic backsliding offers conflicting assessments of democratic vulnerability. A central source of this disagreement is the failure to distinguish between illiberal rhetoric and illiberal attempts, on the one hand, and democratic erosion and democratic breakdown, on the other. Building on this distinction, we argue that democratic vulnerability to illiberal actions by elected leaders depends primarily on two factors: the inh…
Why Didn't Brazilian Democracy Die
Brazil, for many scholars and pundits, showcased the risk of democratic breakdown with the election of a far-right populist like Jair Bolsonaro. Against pessimistic expectations, however, not only has Brazilian democracy survived but politics has returned to business as usual. What can explain this supposedly unanticipated outcome? This article provides an analytical assessment of this this puzzle and offers an alternative explanation. We argue t…
Congruent We Govern: Cost of Governance in Multiparty Presidentialism
The received wisdom on executive–legislative relations in multiparty presidential systems is that the size of the president's majority in Congress is the key factor explaining governance patterns, particularly the president's legislative success. However, in many cases presidents enjoying a nominal majority have been unable to pass legislation and have faced institutional instability. The article departs from a conventional definition of divided …
Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil
Governments face a fundamental tradeoff between regulatory independence and control. Attempts of interference have the effect of reducing the system's level of commitment and credibility. On the other hand, an administration runs the risk that the autonomy delegated to regulators might be used to pursue outcomes that may harm their interests. This tradeoff is particularly relevant when there is an alternation of power with the arrival of a new po…
Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil
We show that Brazilian voters strongly sanction malfeasant mayors when presented with hypothetical scenarios but take no action when given the same information about their own mayor. Partnering with the State Accounts Court of Pernambuco, we conducted a field experiment during the 2016 municipal elections in which the treatment group received information about official wrongdoing by their mayor. The treatment has no effect on self‐reported voting…
Recensão Os Anos de Ouro: Ensaios sobre a Democracia no Brasil
.
Latin America’s New Turbulence: Crisis and Integrity in Brazil
Public anger at revelations of widespread corruption, along with the rising cost of coalition politics, has brought Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff to the brink of impeachment. Yet the crisis has also revealed the strength of the country’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions
The Political Cost of Corruption: Scandals, Campaign Finance, and Reelection in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
While corruption is widely disapproved of, some corrupt politicians continue to win elections. We tackle this paradox by examining the effects of malfeasance scandals in politicians’ behavior. In particular, we focus on their campaign finance strategies and career choices. We explore these issues empirically with an original dataset that includes all lower-house members of Congress (MCs) in Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Although tainted incumbents te…
Reelecting Corrupt Incumbents in Exchange for Public Goods: Rouba mas faz in Brazil
This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter information on incumbent misconduct. Using a new data set on mayoral elections (2000 and 2004) in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, we specify econometric models to test the hypothesis that incumbents' performance in delivering p…
Why do some governments resort to ‘creative accounting’ but not others? Fiscal governance in the Brazilian federation
This paper investigates the determinants of compliance with fiscal rules. Using information from 27 Brazilian state governments, the paper shows that the level of political competition and the degree of political autonomy of the fiscal watchdogs explain the extent of creative accounting in the Brazilian federation. Despite hard budget constraints imposed by the much-acclaimed Fiscal Responsibility Law, state governors retain the strategic ability…
"Mudança constitucional no Brasil, dos debates sobre regras de emendamento na constituinte à "megapolítica
Este artigo discute o padrão de mudança constitucional dos últimos 25 anos: altas taxas de emendamento e mudança endógena movida pela judicialização de questões políticas de alta visibilidade. O texto argumenta que a taxa de mudança no texto de nossa carta constitucional é indicador pobre de ativismo constitucional: a mudança constitucional de fundo tem acontecido no padrão de alta visibilidade da megapolítica. Esse padrão pode ser explicado pela…
The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism
The common wisdom is that when presidential political systems coincide with multiparty systems the result is gridlock; parties squabble and presidents are not able to stitch together the majorities they need to move forward with the business of governing. Latin America’s presidential systems were supposed to have been a disaster. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, presidentialism and multipartism seem to work rather well. E pur se muov…
Delegation Dilemmas: Coalition Size, Electoral Risk, and Regulatory Governance in New Democracies
This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty‐coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context‐specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief ex…
The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives: Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Reports
Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities ar…
Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions
This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile…
Strong Presidents, Robust Democracies? Separation of Powers and Rule of Law in Latin America
The received wisdom on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was that countries where presidents enjoyed strong constitutional powers and where multiparty coalitions prevailed would be doomed to instability and institutional crises, while countries boasting weak presidents and strong parties were expected to consolidate democratic rule. After almost two decades, it is now widely acknowledged that this prediction failed. Recent re-conceptualization…
O viés majoritário na política comparada: Responsabilização, Desenho Institucional E Qualidade Democrática
Este artigo examina as principais contribuições contemporâneas da literatura de política comparada e discute o viés majoritário existente nas contribuições recentes em torno da questão da qualidade da democracia. Esse viés manifesta-se de duas formas principais. Em primeiro lugar, pela redução da discussão da qualidade da democracia à questão da responsabilização (accountability) - conceito que está enraizado profundamente no ideal normativo majo…
Institutional Weakness and the Puzzle of Argentina's Low Taxation
Current explanations of taxation levels have identified a host of factors, such as levels of economic development and GDP per capita, tax handles, tax morale, and political regimes. But none of them can account for Argentina's exceptionalism. Using a "transaction cost politics" approach and the case of Brazil for comparison, this article argues that the key to explaining low taxation in Argentina is political instability. Systemic instability aff…
Deliberative Democracy and Local Governance: Towards a New Agenda
Over the last decade scholars of urban governance and deliberative democracy have produced large literatures. Theorists of deliberative democracy have conceptualized the normative implications of 'deliberation' and explored real-world decision-making arrangements that approximate those ideals. Scholars of urban governance have theorized and explored the outcomes of different institutional arrangements for the governance of cities and regions. Whe…
O sucesso inesperado das reformas de segunda geração: Federalismo, Reformas Constitucionais E Política Social
The paper argues that unlike the predictions of the literature on second-generation reforms, there occurred an important change in the pattern of social policy during the Cardoso years, with the attendant improvement in social indicators. The budgetary process has been increasingly and extensively hardwired; inter-governmental relations have undergone extensive restructuring; and the line ministries in the social area have been insulated from coa…
O leviatã brasileiro e a esfinge argentina: Os Determinantes Institucionais Da Política Tributária
Este artigo examina as trajetórias divergentes da Argentina e do Brasil no que diz respeito à capacidade tributária e à capacidade de promover reformas no sistema tributário. O autor procura explicar não só por que a carga tributária no Brasil é significativamente mais alta do que a da Argentina, mas também por que o Brasil teve mais capacidade de reformar o sistema tributário no período posterior ao regime autoritário. Defende, ademais, o argume…
The brazilian leviathan and the argentinean sphinx: The Institutional Determinants of the Tax Policy
Escolha institucional e a difusão dos paradigmas de política: O Brasil e a segunda onda de reformas previdenciárias
Dans cet article, on examine des approches actuelles sur les changementsinstitutionnels et les innovations dans les politiques publiques, sous l ́anglesurtout de leurs processus de diffusion internationale. Bien qu ́on y trouveune convergence en raison de la mondialisation et du rôle croissant desinstitutions internationales, i l y a une tendance á soulignerl ́homogénéisation et á abandonner l ́hétérogénéité des réponses nationales áces influence…
Republicanismo, liberalismo e racionalidade
Discute-se o conceito de racionalidade presente em três vertentes da teoria democrática contemporânea: republicanismo, liberalismo e escolha racional. A análise concentra-se no republicanismo, para examinar seus microfundamentos e estabelecer por contraste suas diferenças com as demais
A política da ação regulatória: Responsabilização, Credibilidade E Delegação
Delegação e responsabilização são dois pólos de uma tensão irresolvida no funcionamento das sociedades democráticas. Instituições que adquirem um papel cada vez mais importante nessas sociedades, como as agências regulatórias e os bancos centrais, exigem autonomia decisória para seu funcionamento efetivo. No entanto, a delegação implica crescente déficit democrático e insuficiente responsabilização dos seus dirigentes. O artigo discute a questão …
Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil
We show that Brazilian voters strongly sanction malfeasant mayors when presented with hypothetical scenarios but take no action when given the same information about their own mayor. Partnering with the State Accounts Court of Pernambuco, we conducted a field experiment during the 2016 municipal elections in which the treatment group received information about official wrongdoing by their mayor. The treatment has no effect on self‐reported voting…
The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism
The common wisdom is that when presidential political systems coincide with multiparty systems the result is gridlock; parties squabble and presidents are not able to stitch together the majorities they need to move forward with the business of governing. Latin America’s presidential systems were supposed to have been a disaster. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, presidentialism and multipartism seem to work rather well. E pur se muov…
Deliberative Democracy and Local Governance: Towards a New Agenda
Over the last decade scholars of urban governance and deliberative democracy have produced large literatures. Theorists of deliberative democracy have conceptualized the normative implications of 'deliberation' and explored real-world decision-making arrangements that approximate those ideals. Scholars of urban governance have theorized and explored the outcomes of different institutional arrangements for the governance of cities and regions. Whe…
Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions
This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile…
O sucesso inesperado das reformas de segunda geração: Federalismo, Reformas Constitucionais E Política Social
The paper argues that unlike the predictions of the literature on second-generation reforms, there occurred an important change in the pattern of social policy during the Cardoso years, with the attendant improvement in social indicators. The budgetary process has been increasingly and extensively hardwired; inter-governmental relations have undergone extensive restructuring; and the line ministries in the social area have been insulated from coa…
The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives: Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Reports
Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities ar…
Latin America’s New Turbulence: Crisis and Integrity in Brazil
Public anger at revelations of widespread corruption, along with the rising cost of coalition politics, has brought Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff to the brink of impeachment. Yet the crisis has also revealed the strength of the country’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions
Delegation Dilemmas: Coalition Size, Electoral Risk, and Regulatory Governance in New Democracies
This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty‐coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context‐specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief ex…
Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil
Governments face a fundamental tradeoff between regulatory independence and control. Attempts of interference have the effect of reducing the system's level of commitment and credibility. On the other hand, an administration runs the risk that the autonomy delegated to regulators might be used to pursue outcomes that may harm their interests. This tradeoff is particularly relevant when there is an alternation of power with the arrival of a new po…
O viés majoritário na política comparada: Responsabilização, Desenho Institucional E Qualidade Democrática
Este artigo examina as principais contribuições contemporâneas da literatura de política comparada e discute o viés majoritário existente nas contribuições recentes em torno da questão da qualidade da democracia. Esse viés manifesta-se de duas formas principais. Em primeiro lugar, pela redução da discussão da qualidade da democracia à questão da responsabilização (accountability) - conceito que está enraizado profundamente no ideal normativo majo…
Why Didn't Brazilian Democracy Die
Brazil, for many scholars and pundits, showcased the risk of democratic breakdown with the election of a far-right populist like Jair Bolsonaro. Against pessimistic expectations, however, not only has Brazilian democracy survived but politics has returned to business as usual. What can explain this supposedly unanticipated outcome? This article provides an analytical assessment of this this puzzle and offers an alternative explanation. We argue t…
The Political Cost of Corruption: Scandals, Campaign Finance, and Reelection in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
While corruption is widely disapproved of, some corrupt politicians continue to win elections. We tackle this paradox by examining the effects of malfeasance scandals in politicians’ behavior. In particular, we focus on their campaign finance strategies and career choices. We explore these issues empirically with an original dataset that includes all lower-house members of Congress (MCs) in Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Although tainted incumbents te…
Escolha institucional e a difusão dos paradigmas de política: O Brasil e a segunda onda de reformas previdenciárias
Dans cet article, on examine des approches actuelles sur les changementsinstitutionnels et les innovations dans les politiques publiques, sous l ́anglesurtout de leurs processus de diffusion internationale. Bien qu ́on y trouveune convergence en raison de la mondialisation et du rôle croissant desinstitutions internationales, i l y a une tendance á soulignerl ́homogénéisation et á abandonner l ́hétérogénéité des réponses nationales áces influence…
Congruent We Govern: Cost of Governance in Multiparty Presidentialism
The received wisdom on executive–legislative relations in multiparty presidential systems is that the size of the president's majority in Congress is the key factor explaining governance patterns, particularly the president's legislative success. However, in many cases presidents enjoying a nominal majority have been unable to pass legislation and have faced institutional instability. The article departs from a conventional definition of divided …
Why do some governments resort to ‘creative accounting’ but not others? Fiscal governance in the Brazilian federation
This paper investigates the determinants of compliance with fiscal rules. Using information from 27 Brazilian state governments, the paper shows that the level of political competition and the degree of political autonomy of the fiscal watchdogs explain the extent of creative accounting in the Brazilian federation. Despite hard budget constraints imposed by the much-acclaimed Fiscal Responsibility Law, state governors retain the strategic ability…
Strong Presidents, Robust Democracies? Separation of Powers and Rule of Law in Latin America
The received wisdom on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was that countries where presidents enjoyed strong constitutional powers and where multiparty coalitions prevailed would be doomed to instability and institutional crises, while countries boasting weak presidents and strong parties were expected to consolidate democratic rule. After almost two decades, it is now widely acknowledged that this prediction failed. Recent re-conceptualization…
Republicanismo, liberalismo e racionalidade
Discute-se o conceito de racionalidade presente em três vertentes da teoria democrática contemporânea: republicanismo, liberalismo e escolha racional. A análise concentra-se no republicanismo, para examinar seus microfundamentos e estabelecer por contraste suas diferenças com as demais
A política da ação regulatória: Responsabilização, Credibilidade E Delegação
Delegação e responsabilização são dois pólos de uma tensão irresolvida no funcionamento das sociedades democráticas. Instituições que adquirem um papel cada vez mais importante nessas sociedades, como as agências regulatórias e os bancos centrais, exigem autonomia decisória para seu funcionamento efetivo. No entanto, a delegação implica crescente déficit democrático e insuficiente responsabilização dos seus dirigentes. O artigo discute a questão …
Institutional Weakness and the Puzzle of Argentina's Low Taxation
Current explanations of taxation levels have identified a host of factors, such as levels of economic development and GDP per capita, tax handles, tax morale, and political regimes. But none of them can account for Argentina's exceptionalism. Using a "transaction cost politics" approach and the case of Brazil for comparison, this article argues that the key to explaining low taxation in Argentina is political instability. Systemic instability aff…
A Política da Reforma Tributária: Federalismo e Mudança Constitucional
O artigo explora analiticamente as especificidades do processo decisório das reformas tributárias e discute, com referência às iniciativas recentes de reforma constitucional no campo tributário, os interesses em jogo e o padrão de interação política entre eles nessa arena específica, caracterizada como apresentando grande complexidade técnica e média visibilidade política, e tendo como atores fundamentais elites burocráticas e os governadores. O …
"Mudança constitucional no Brasil, dos debates sobre regras de emendamento na constituinte à "megapolítica
Este artigo discute o padrão de mudança constitucional dos últimos 25 anos: altas taxas de emendamento e mudança endógena movida pela judicialização de questões políticas de alta visibilidade. O texto argumenta que a taxa de mudança no texto de nossa carta constitucional é indicador pobre de ativismo constitucional: a mudança constitucional de fundo tem acontecido no padrão de alta visibilidade da megapolítica. Esse padrão pode ser explicado pela…
O leviatã brasileiro e a esfinge argentina: Os Determinantes Institucionais Da Política Tributária
Este artigo examina as trajetórias divergentes da Argentina e do Brasil no que diz respeito à capacidade tributária e à capacidade de promover reformas no sistema tributário. O autor procura explicar não só por que a carga tributária no Brasil é significativamente mais alta do que a da Argentina, mas também por que o Brasil teve mais capacidade de reformar o sistema tributário no período posterior ao regime autoritário. Defende, ademais, o argume…
A Política da Reforma Tributária: Federalismo e Mudança Constitucional
O artigo explora analiticamente as especificidades do processo decisório das reformas tributárias e discute, com referência às iniciativas recentes de reforma constitucional no campo tributário, os interesses em jogo e o padrão de interação política entre eles nessa arena específica, caracterizada como apresentando grande complexidade técnica e média visibilidade política, e tendo como atores fundamentais elites burocráticas e os governadores. O …
Crise, reforma do Estado e governabilidade
A política da ação regulatória: Responsabilização, Credibilidade E Delegação
Delegação e responsabilização são dois pólos de uma tensão irresolvida no funcionamento das sociedades democráticas. Instituições que adquirem um papel cada vez mais importante nessas sociedades, como as agências regulatórias e os bancos centrais, exigem autonomia decisória para seu funcionamento efetivo. No entanto, a delegação implica crescente déficit democrático e insuficiente responsabilização dos seus dirigentes. O artigo discute a questão …
Republicanismo, liberalismo e racionalidade
Discute-se o conceito de racionalidade presente em três vertentes da teoria democrática contemporânea: republicanismo, liberalismo e escolha racional. A análise concentra-se no republicanismo, para examinar seus microfundamentos e estabelecer por contraste suas diferenças com as demais
Escolha institucional e a difusão dos paradigmas de política: O Brasil e a segunda onda de reformas previdenciárias
Dans cet article, on examine des approches actuelles sur les changementsinstitutionnels et les innovations dans les politiques publiques, sous l ́anglesurtout de leurs processus de diffusion internationale. Bien qu ́on y trouveune convergence en raison de la mondialisation et du rôle croissant desinstitutions internationales, i l y a une tendance á soulignerl ́homogénéisation et á abandonner l ́hétérogénéité des réponses nationales áces influence…
O sucesso inesperado das reformas de segunda geração: Federalismo, Reformas Constitucionais E Política Social
The paper argues that unlike the predictions of the literature on second-generation reforms, there occurred an important change in the pattern of social policy during the Cardoso years, with the attendant improvement in social indicators. The budgetary process has been increasingly and extensively hardwired; inter-governmental relations have undergone extensive restructuring; and the line ministries in the social area have been insulated from coa…
O leviatã brasileiro e a esfinge argentina: Os Determinantes Institucionais Da Política Tributária
Este artigo examina as trajetórias divergentes da Argentina e do Brasil no que diz respeito à capacidade tributária e à capacidade de promover reformas no sistema tributário. O autor procura explicar não só por que a carga tributária no Brasil é significativamente mais alta do que a da Argentina, mas também por que o Brasil teve mais capacidade de reformar o sistema tributário no período posterior ao regime autoritário. Defende, ademais, o argume…
The brazilian leviathan and the argentinean sphinx: The Institutional Determinants of the Tax Policy
Deliberative Democracy and Local Governance: Towards a New Agenda
Over the last decade scholars of urban governance and deliberative democracy have produced large literatures. Theorists of deliberative democracy have conceptualized the normative implications of 'deliberation' and explored real-world decision-making arrangements that approximate those ideals. Scholars of urban governance have theorized and explored the outcomes of different institutional arrangements for the governance of cities and regions. Whe…
O viés majoritário na política comparada: Responsabilização, Desenho Institucional E Qualidade Democrática
Este artigo examina as principais contribuições contemporâneas da literatura de política comparada e discute o viés majoritário existente nas contribuições recentes em torno da questão da qualidade da democracia. Esse viés manifesta-se de duas formas principais. Em primeiro lugar, pela redução da discussão da qualidade da democracia à questão da responsabilização (accountability) - conceito que está enraizado profundamente no ideal normativo majo…
Institutional Weakness and the Puzzle of Argentina's Low Taxation
Current explanations of taxation levels have identified a host of factors, such as levels of economic development and GDP per capita, tax handles, tax morale, and political regimes. But none of them can account for Argentina's exceptionalism. Using a "transaction cost politics" approach and the case of Brazil for comparison, this article argues that the key to explaining low taxation in Argentina is political instability. Systemic instability aff…
The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives: Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Reports
Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities ar…
Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions
This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile…
Strong Presidents, Robust Democracies? Separation of Powers and Rule of Law in Latin America
The received wisdom on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was that countries where presidents enjoyed strong constitutional powers and where multiparty coalitions prevailed would be doomed to instability and institutional crises, while countries boasting weak presidents and strong parties were expected to consolidate democratic rule. After almost two decades, it is now widely acknowledged that this prediction failed. Recent re-conceptualization…
Delegation Dilemmas: Coalition Size, Electoral Risk, and Regulatory Governance in New Democracies
This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty‐coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context‐specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief ex…
The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism
The common wisdom is that when presidential political systems coincide with multiparty systems the result is gridlock; parties squabble and presidents are not able to stitch together the majorities they need to move forward with the business of governing. Latin America’s presidential systems were supposed to have been a disaster. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, presidentialism and multipartism seem to work rather well. E pur se muov…
"Mudança constitucional no Brasil, dos debates sobre regras de emendamento na constituinte à "megapolítica
Este artigo discute o padrão de mudança constitucional dos últimos 25 anos: altas taxas de emendamento e mudança endógena movida pela judicialização de questões políticas de alta visibilidade. O texto argumenta que a taxa de mudança no texto de nossa carta constitucional é indicador pobre de ativismo constitucional: a mudança constitucional de fundo tem acontecido no padrão de alta visibilidade da megapolítica. Esse padrão pode ser explicado pela…
Why do some governments resort to ‘creative accounting’ but not others? Fiscal governance in the Brazilian federation
This paper investigates the determinants of compliance with fiscal rules. Using information from 27 Brazilian state governments, the paper shows that the level of political competition and the degree of political autonomy of the fiscal watchdogs explain the extent of creative accounting in the Brazilian federation. Despite hard budget constraints imposed by the much-acclaimed Fiscal Responsibility Law, state governors retain the strategic ability…
Reelecting Corrupt Incumbents in Exchange for Public Goods: Rouba mas faz in Brazil
This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter information on incumbent misconduct. Using a new data set on mayoral elections (2000 and 2004) in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, we specify econometric models to test the hypothesis that incumbents' performance in delivering p…
Latin America’s New Turbulence: Crisis and Integrity in Brazil
Public anger at revelations of widespread corruption, along with the rising cost of coalition politics, has brought Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff to the brink of impeachment. Yet the crisis has also revealed the strength of the country’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions
The Political Cost of Corruption: Scandals, Campaign Finance, and Reelection in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
While corruption is widely disapproved of, some corrupt politicians continue to win elections. We tackle this paradox by examining the effects of malfeasance scandals in politicians’ behavior. In particular, we focus on their campaign finance strategies and career choices. We explore these issues empirically with an original dataset that includes all lower-house members of Congress (MCs) in Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Although tainted incumbents te…
Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil
Governments face a fundamental tradeoff between regulatory independence and control. Attempts of interference have the effect of reducing the system's level of commitment and credibility. On the other hand, an administration runs the risk that the autonomy delegated to regulators might be used to pursue outcomes that may harm their interests. This tradeoff is particularly relevant when there is an alternation of power with the arrival of a new po…
Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil
We show that Brazilian voters strongly sanction malfeasant mayors when presented with hypothetical scenarios but take no action when given the same information about their own mayor. Partnering with the State Accounts Court of Pernambuco, we conducted a field experiment during the 2016 municipal elections in which the treatment group received information about official wrongdoing by their mayor. The treatment has no effect on self‐reported voting…
Recensão Os Anos de Ouro: Ensaios sobre a Democracia no Brasil
.
Congruent We Govern: Cost of Governance in Multiparty Presidentialism
The received wisdom on executive–legislative relations in multiparty presidential systems is that the size of the president's majority in Congress is the key factor explaining governance patterns, particularly the president's legislative success. However, in many cases presidents enjoying a nominal majority have been unable to pass legislation and have faced institutional instability. The article departs from a conventional definition of divided …
Political science (25 works) · Law (15 works) · Politics (14 works) · Economics (13 works) · Law (11 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (10 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (7 works) · Democracy (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works)