The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives

Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Reports

Bibliographic Data

ID6340948
AuthorsCarlos Pereira (0000-0002-4116-3602, Michigan State University, East Lansing and São Paulo School of Economics-FGV, Brazil), Marcus André Melo (0000-0002-4608-089X, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco), Carlos Mauricio Figueiredo (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco), Carlos M S Figueiredo (0000-0002-4484-4411, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco)
Year2009
Volume62
Issue4
Pages731-744
Publication date2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912908320664
OpenAlexW2894173654
LanguageEN
Citations received28
References cited24

Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities are less likely to be re-elected when this information is released in the electoral year only. Although citizens hold mayors accountable for bad behavior, they do not do so to the point of discouraging misbehavior

Business · Economic rent · Economics · Incentive · Language change · Microeconomics · Offset (computer science · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Rent-seeking · Corruption and Economic Development · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub