Carlos M S Figueiredo
Biographic Data
| ID | 4418704 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Carlos M S Figueiredo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Carlos M S |
| FAMILY NAME | Figueiredo |
| SIGNATURE | FIGUEIREDO C M S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4484-4411 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives: Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Reports
Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities ar…
Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions
This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile…
Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions
This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile…
The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives: Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Reports
Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities ar…
The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives: Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Reports
Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities ar…
Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions
This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile…
Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Language change (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Accountability (1 works)