Carl Matheson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3698636 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Carl Matheson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Carl |
| FAMILY NAME | Matheson |
| SIGNATURE | MATHESON C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manitoba |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Who's Afraid of Conceptual Art
Journal Article Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art? Get access Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art? Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens Routledge. 2010. pp. 152. £65.00 (hbk) £17.99 (pbk). Carl Matheson Carl Matheson University of Manitoba [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 53, Issue 3, July 2013, Pages 369–373, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ays039 …
Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism
Julian Dodd has recently objected to musical perdurantism—the view that a musical work is a fusion of performances—on the grounds that it entails that one cannot hear all of a musical work and that a musical work can have temporal parts that belong to different ontological categories. We defend musical perdurantism from both objections
Fine Individuation
Journal Article Fine Individuation Get access Carl Matheson, Carl Matheson Carl Matheson, Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada R3T 2N2 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Ben Caplan Ben Caplan Ben Caplan, Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesth…
Imagination and Emotion
Theorists in the philosophy of art and philosophy of psychology are converging on the view that imagining is a distinct propositional attitude. When one imagines that P (while engaging with a fiction, daydreaming, contemplating, etc.), one tokens a representation that P, and this representation plays the functional role that is distinctive of imagining. In particular, this representation plays a role that is distinct from the role of belief, but …
Defending Musical Perdurantism
If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete …
Observational Adequacy as distinct from the Truth about Observables
Consciousness and Synchronic Identity
The question “What makes a group of simultaneous experiences the experiences of a single person?” has been nearly ignored in the philosophical literature for the past few decades. The most common answer (e.g., Parfit 1984) to this much neglected question is “Two simultaneous experiences belong to a single person if there is a common consciousness or awareness of them.” However, consciousness and awareness are difficult concepts to analyze, so tha…
Defending Musical Perdurantism
If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete …
Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism
Julian Dodd has recently objected to musical perdurantism—the view that a musical work is a fusion of performances—on the grounds that it entails that one cannot hear all of a musical work and that a musical work can have temporal parts that belong to different ontological categories. We defend musical perdurantism from both objections
Consciousness and Synchronic Identity
The question “What makes a group of simultaneous experiences the experiences of a single person?” has been nearly ignored in the philosophical literature for the past few decades. The most common answer (e.g., Parfit 1984) to this much neglected question is “Two simultaneous experiences belong to a single person if there is a common consciousness or awareness of them.” However, consciousness and awareness are difficult concepts to analyze, so tha…
Observational Adequacy as distinct from the Truth about Observables
Imagination and Emotion
Theorists in the philosophy of art and philosophy of psychology are converging on the view that imagining is a distinct propositional attitude. When one imagines that P (while engaging with a fiction, daydreaming, contemplating, etc.), one tokens a representation that P, and this representation plays the functional role that is distinctive of imagining. In particular, this representation plays a role that is distinct from the role of belief, but …
Defending Musical Perdurantism
If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete …
Fine Individuation
Journal Article Fine Individuation Get access Carl Matheson, Carl Matheson Carl Matheson, Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada R3T 2N2 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Ben Caplan Ben Caplan Ben Caplan, Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesth…
Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism
Julian Dodd has recently objected to musical perdurantism—the view that a musical work is a fusion of performances—on the grounds that it entails that one cannot hear all of a musical work and that a musical work can have temporal parts that belong to different ontological categories. We defend musical perdurantism from both objections
Who's Afraid of Conceptual Art
Journal Article Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art? Get access Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art? Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens Routledge. 2010. pp. 152. £65.00 (hbk) £17.99 (pbk). Carl Matheson Carl Matheson University of Manitoba [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 53, Issue 3, July 2013, Pages 369–373, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ays039 …
Philosophy (5 works) · Aesthetics (4 works) · Art (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Art history (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works)