Hilla Jacobson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3698693 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hilla Jacobson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hilla |
| FAMILY NAME | Jacobson |
| SIGNATURE | JACOBSON H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6310-7073 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
On the Very Idea of Valenced Perception
Tradition contrasts “cold” (sense) perception with “hot” emotion and affect. Against this backdrop, it has recently been argued that perceptual experiences have another fundamental phenomenal aspect, beyond their sensory aspects—perception in all sense-modalities is (at least often) intrinsically valenced. Roughly, its phenomenal character is inherently pleasant or unpleasant, feeling good or bad to some degree. Yet, the revolutionary notion of I…
Valence in perception
The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention
The Role of Valence in Perception
Attempts to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences have so far largely focused on their sensory aspects. The first aim of this article is to support the claim that (perceptual) phenomenal character has another, significant, aspect—the phenomenal realm is suffused with valence. What it’s like to undergo perceptual experiences—from pains to supposedly “neutral” visual experiences—standardly feels good or bad to some degree. …
Not Only a Messenger
The main goal of this paper is to present a theory of the most salient aspect of the phenomenal character of pain – namely, the painfulness of pain or its negative affective quality. This task involves developing an account of the evaluative structure of pain, according to which painfulness is constituted by a (subjectively) frustrated (first‐order) conative attitude that is directed towards the bodily condition the obtaining of which the pain re…
Against Strong Cognitivism
According to 'strong cognitivism', all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down …
Against Strong Cognitivism
According to the view we may term “strong cognitivism”, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. The main concern of this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. The central argument to this effect i…
Killing the Messenger
Journal Article Killing the Messenger: Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain Get access Hilla Jacobson Hilla Jacobson Ben‐Gurion University of the Negev Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 252, July 2013, Pages 509–519, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12029 Published: 18 June 2013
Killing the Messenger
Journal Article Killing the Messenger: Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain Get access Hilla Jacobson Hilla Jacobson Ben‐Gurion University of the Negev Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 252, July 2013, Pages 509–519, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12029 Published: 18 June 2013
Not Only a Messenger
The main goal of this paper is to present a theory of the most salient aspect of the phenomenal character of pain – namely, the painfulness of pain or its negative affective quality. This task involves developing an account of the evaluative structure of pain, according to which painfulness is constituted by a (subjectively) frustrated (first‐order) conative attitude that is directed towards the bodily condition the obtaining of which the pain re…
The Role of Valence in Perception
Attempts to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences have so far largely focused on their sensory aspects. The first aim of this article is to support the claim that (perceptual) phenomenal character has another, significant, aspect—the phenomenal realm is suffused with valence. What it’s like to undergo perceptual experiences—from pains to supposedly “neutral” visual experiences—standardly feels good or bad to some degree. …
The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention
Against Strong Cognitivism
According to the view we may term “strong cognitivism”, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. The main concern of this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. The central argument to this effect i…
Killing the Messenger
Journal Article Killing the Messenger: Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain Get access Hilla Jacobson Hilla Jacobson Ben‐Gurion University of the Negev Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 252, July 2013, Pages 509–519, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12029 Published: 18 June 2013
Against Strong Cognitivism
According to the view we may term “strong cognitivism”, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. The main concern of this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. The central argument to this effect i…
Against Strong Cognitivism
According to 'strong cognitivism', all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down …
Not Only a Messenger
The main goal of this paper is to present a theory of the most salient aspect of the phenomenal character of pain – namely, the painfulness of pain or its negative affective quality. This task involves developing an account of the evaluative structure of pain, according to which painfulness is constituted by a (subjectively) frustrated (first‐order) conative attitude that is directed towards the bodily condition the obtaining of which the pain re…
The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention
The Role of Valence in Perception
Attempts to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences have so far largely focused on their sensory aspects. The first aim of this article is to support the claim that (perceptual) phenomenal character has another, significant, aspect—the phenomenal realm is suffused with valence. What it’s like to undergo perceptual experiences—from pains to supposedly “neutral” visual experiences—standardly feels good or bad to some degree. …
Valence in perception
On the Very Idea of Valenced Perception
Tradition contrasts “cold” (sense) perception with “hot” emotion and affect. Against this backdrop, it has recently been argued that perceptual experiences have another fundamental phenomenal aspect, beyond their sensory aspects—perception in all sense-modalities is (at least often) intrinsically valenced. Roughly, its phenomenal character is inherently pleasant or unpleasant, feeling good or bad to some degree. Yet, the revolutionary notion of I…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Perception (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Cognition (3 works) · Neuroscience (3 works) · Phenomenon (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Visual perception and processing mechanisms (3 works)