Against Strong Cognitivism
An Argument from Caring
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3888967 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hilla Jacobson (0000-0001-6310-7073, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 139-158 |
| Publication date | 2015-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217314001012 |
| OpenAlex | W2330361226 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 27 |
According to 'strong cognitivism', all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down one that proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of caring and derives a conclusion regarding the (motivational and normative) nature of more basic mental phenomena-particular desires
Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Cognition · Cognitivism (psychology) · Epistemology · Normative · Phenomenon · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Emotion
The Authority of Reason
Ii.—what Is an Emotion ?
The Importance of What We Care About
Internal and External Reasons
Free Agency
Necessity, Volition, and Love
Authority and Estrangement
What We Owe to Each Other
The Morality of Freedom
Essays on Actions and Events
Reasons and Persons
The Possibility of Altruism
The Normative Significance of Desires
The Authority of Desire
Against Strong Cognitivism
Freedom of the Individual
Upheavals of Thought
Killing the Messenger
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |