Andrew Samuel
Biographic Data
| ID | 3713907 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Samuel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Samuel |
| SIGNATURE | SAMUEL A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Loyola University Maryland |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8059-3365 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Anti‐Corruption Policies for Surprise Inspections
Regulators utilize surprise inspections to facilitate firms' regulatory compliance. Surprise inspections are valuable because they catch non‐compliant firms “off‐guard,” preventing them from hiding incriminating evidence. However, surprise inspections encourage tip‐offs, wherein a firm pays an informant to warn them about an upcoming inspection, thereby allowing the firm to conceal incriminating evidence. We study the relationship between tipping…
Myopic CEOs and Product Safety (Re)design
Before products are released into a market, regulators require the product's designs to be evaluated for safety standards either by an external or internal evaluator. Failing these standards requires product redesign. This paper theoretically analyzes the effectiveness of internal versus external evaluators in the presence of myopic CEOs who determine the product's safety level. We show that CEOs' first-mover advantage incentivizes them to design…
The evolution of the common law with strategic litigants
Cartel formation and detection
Race, ethnicity, poverty and the social determinants of the coronavirus divide
These results document differential pandemic impact in counties with more residents who are Black, Hispanic or Native American, highlighting the roles of residential racial segregation and other forms of discrimination. Factors including economic opportunities, occupational risk, public transit and housing conditions should be addressed in pandemic-related public health strategies to mitigate disparities across counties for the current pandemic a…
Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers
This paper offers a novel explanation for extortion, which is the practice of demanding payments from compliant agents by law‐enforcement officers. Namely, that extortion occurs due to the officer's incompetence, where the competence level is endogenous. Because competence improves enforcement, extortion affects deterrence directly by weakening agents' incentive to be compliant and indirectly by affecting officers' incentives to become competent.…
Self‐reporting and Market Structure
Many regulators utilize self‐reporting, that is, wrongdoers reporting their own crimes to the authority, to enforce regulations in a variety of market contexts. This paper studies the effectiveness of self‐reporting within the context of an oligopoly. We identify two important consequences of implementing self‐reporting (relative to no‐reporting) for a welfare‐maximizing regulator. First, if the regulator can control only the audit probability an…
Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement
Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some ben…
Notes on the Open Letter on Jung and ‘Africans’ published in the British Journal of Psychotherapy, November 2018
Andrew Samuels in conversation with Angie Voela
Fair Trade,” Market Failures, and (the Absence of) Institutions
This paper presents an analysis of Fair Trade using a general equilibrium model of an economy where externalities are present and where the institutional or legal framework needed to regulate these externalities may be weak. Weak institutions and externalities are common in the developing world, where Fair Trade is targeted, making perfect competition models inappropriate measures of the value of Fair Trade. Members of Fair Trade cooperatives are…
Economics, psychotherapy and politics
The paper explores the application of ideas derived from psychotherapy to questions of economic and social policy. It is argued that disputes concerning human nature underlie many debates on economic theory. Class is reviewed from internal and emotional perspectives. Psychological obstacles to the achievement of economic inequality are explored and ways of overcoming them critically discussed. Particular attention is paid to the operation of econ…
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
This paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance. The firm may offer a bribe to pre‐empt the inspection. Corruption is unfeasible in the one‐shot game because of inspector hold‐up. In an infinitely repeated game, we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy. In this model, the most likely bribe‐givers are not the firms that benef…
Muriel Dimen Interviewed by Andrew Samuels in the Context of the Publication of Her Book Sexuality, Intimacy, Power
Samuels interviewed Dimen in lieu of a book review for her Sexuality, Intimacy, Power. The interview was unstructured and dialogical and covered the following main topics: (a) professional issues in the field of psychoanalysis such as the relation of theory to practice and reflections on the nature and content of trainings in psychoanalysis; (b) issues in the broad areas of sexuality and gender including the question of moral relativism with resp…
Socially Responsible Roles of Professional Ethics
The remit of the apparatus of professional ethics in the field of psychotherapy can be appropriately expanded so as to make the profession more socially responsible and thereby contribute to the ‘protection of the public’ that is said to be the main purpose of statutory regulation. Using ideas culled from the sociology of the professions, political theory and ethical discourse, it is proposed that ethical psychotherapy cannot take place if its ov…
Psychotherapists and Counselors for Social Responsibility (UK)
The Hidden Politics of Healing
American Imago - Volume 59, Number 4, Winter 2002
Politics on the Couch
The Political Psyche
The professionalization of Carl G. Jung's analytical psychology clubs
This paper addresses (1) the history of a cluster of unusual institutions-analytical psychology clubs--which started in 1916 and by 1934 had become established in many of the countries in the world in which there was interest in the analytical psychology of Carl G. Jung; (2) the conflicts involved in trying to unite the relatively informal earlier "Jung Clubs" with the more formal societies being established by the increasing numbers of professio…
The political psyche
Replies to an international questionnaire on political material brought into the clinical setting by clients of psychotherapists and analysts
(1993). Replies to an international questionnaire on political material brought into the clinical setting by clients of psychotherapists and analysts. International Review of Sociology: Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 6-64
Fair Trade,” Market Failures, and (the Absence of) Institutions
This paper presents an analysis of Fair Trade using a general equilibrium model of an economy where externalities are present and where the institutional or legal framework needed to regulate these externalities may be weak. Weak institutions and externalities are common in the developing world, where Fair Trade is targeted, making perfect competition models inappropriate measures of the value of Fair Trade. Members of Fair Trade cooperatives are…
Economics, psychotherapy and politics
The paper explores the application of ideas derived from psychotherapy to questions of economic and social policy. It is argued that disputes concerning human nature underlie many debates on economic theory. Class is reviewed from internal and emotional perspectives. Psychological obstacles to the achievement of economic inequality are explored and ways of overcoming them critically discussed. Particular attention is paid to the operation of econ…
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
This paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance. The firm may offer a bribe to pre‐empt the inspection. Corruption is unfeasible in the one‐shot game because of inspector hold‐up. In an infinitely repeated game, we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy. In this model, the most likely bribe‐givers are not the firms that benef…
The political psyche
Replies to an international questionnaire on political material brought into the clinical setting by clients of psychotherapists and analysts
(1993). Replies to an international questionnaire on political material brought into the clinical setting by clients of psychotherapists and analysts. International Review of Sociology: Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 6-64
The professionalization of Carl G. Jung's analytical psychology clubs
This paper addresses (1) the history of a cluster of unusual institutions-analytical psychology clubs--which started in 1916 and by 1934 had become established in many of the countries in the world in which there was interest in the analytical psychology of Carl G. Jung; (2) the conflicts involved in trying to unite the relatively informal earlier "Jung Clubs" with the more formal societies being established by the increasing numbers of professio…
The Political Psyche
Politics on the Couch
The Hidden Politics of Healing
American Imago - Volume 59, Number 4, Winter 2002
Psychotherapists and Counselors for Social Responsibility (UK)
Socially Responsible Roles of Professional Ethics
The remit of the apparatus of professional ethics in the field of psychotherapy can be appropriately expanded so as to make the profession more socially responsible and thereby contribute to the ‘protection of the public’ that is said to be the main purpose of statutory regulation. Using ideas culled from the sociology of the professions, political theory and ethical discourse, it is proposed that ethical psychotherapy cannot take place if its ov…
Muriel Dimen Interviewed by Andrew Samuels in the Context of the Publication of Her Book Sexuality, Intimacy, Power
Samuels interviewed Dimen in lieu of a book review for her Sexuality, Intimacy, Power. The interview was unstructured and dialogical and covered the following main topics: (a) professional issues in the field of psychoanalysis such as the relation of theory to practice and reflections on the nature and content of trainings in psychoanalysis; (b) issues in the broad areas of sexuality and gender including the question of moral relativism with resp…
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
This paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance. The firm may offer a bribe to pre‐empt the inspection. Corruption is unfeasible in the one‐shot game because of inspector hold‐up. In an infinitely repeated game, we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy. In this model, the most likely bribe‐givers are not the firms that benef…
Fair Trade,” Market Failures, and (the Absence of) Institutions
This paper presents an analysis of Fair Trade using a general equilibrium model of an economy where externalities are present and where the institutional or legal framework needed to regulate these externalities may be weak. Weak institutions and externalities are common in the developing world, where Fair Trade is targeted, making perfect competition models inappropriate measures of the value of Fair Trade. Members of Fair Trade cooperatives are…
Economics, psychotherapy and politics
The paper explores the application of ideas derived from psychotherapy to questions of economic and social policy. It is argued that disputes concerning human nature underlie many debates on economic theory. Class is reviewed from internal and emotional perspectives. Psychological obstacles to the achievement of economic inequality are explored and ways of overcoming them critically discussed. Particular attention is paid to the operation of econ…
Notes on the Open Letter on Jung and ‘Africans’ published in the British Journal of Psychotherapy, November 2018
Andrew Samuels in conversation with Angie Voela
Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement
Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some ben…
Race, ethnicity, poverty and the social determinants of the coronavirus divide
These results document differential pandemic impact in counties with more residents who are Black, Hispanic or Native American, highlighting the roles of residential racial segregation and other forms of discrimination. Factors including economic opportunities, occupational risk, public transit and housing conditions should be addressed in pandemic-related public health strategies to mitigate disparities across counties for the current pandemic a…
Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers
This paper offers a novel explanation for extortion, which is the practice of demanding payments from compliant agents by law‐enforcement officers. Namely, that extortion occurs due to the officer's incompetence, where the competence level is endogenous. Because competence improves enforcement, extortion affects deterrence directly by weakening agents' incentive to be compliant and indirectly by affecting officers' incentives to become competent.…
Self‐reporting and Market Structure
Many regulators utilize self‐reporting, that is, wrongdoers reporting their own crimes to the authority, to enforce regulations in a variety of market contexts. This paper studies the effectiveness of self‐reporting within the context of an oligopoly. We identify two important consequences of implementing self‐reporting (relative to no‐reporting) for a welfare‐maximizing regulator. First, if the regulator can control only the audit probability an…
Cartel formation and detection
Myopic CEOs and Product Safety (Re)design
Before products are released into a market, regulators require the product's designs to be evaluated for safety standards either by an external or internal evaluator. Failing these standards requires product redesign. This paper theoretically analyzes the effectiveness of internal versus external evaluators in the presence of myopic CEOs who determine the product's safety level. We show that CEOs' first-mover advantage incentivizes them to design…
The evolution of the common law with strategic litigants
Anti‐Corruption Policies for Surprise Inspections
Regulators utilize surprise inspections to facilitate firms' regulatory compliance. Surprise inspections are valuable because they catch non‐compliant firms “off‐guard,” preventing them from hiding incriminating evidence. However, surprise inspections encourage tip‐offs, wherein a firm pays an informant to warn them about an upcoming inspection, thereby allowing the firm to conceal incriminating evidence. We study the relationship between tipping…
Psychology (11 works) · Law (10 works) · Political science (10 works) · Economics (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (6 works) · Psychoanalysis (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works)