Gerald Lang
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3784085 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Gerald Lang |
| PRENOMES | Gerald |
| SOBRENOME | Lang |
| ASSINATURA | LANG G |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0033-7802 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 24 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 22 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 23 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1970 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Starting and Stopping Wars
If a warring side may fight in pursuit of an aim up to some proportionality‐respecting limit, then an important question is whether that side is morally required to stop fighting when it reaches that limit, despite not yet having attained its aim. The ‘Quota View’ answers this question affirmatively, while other views hold that the fighting may continue just as long as the projected future losses fall within certain limits. I criticize some of th…
‘Defensive Escalations’
Defence cases with an escalatory structure, in which the levels of violence between aggressor and defender start out as minor and then become major, even lethal, raise sharp problems for defence theory, and for our understanding of the conditions of defence: proportionality, necessity, and imminence. It is argued here that defenders are not morally required to withdraw from participation in these cases, and that defensive escalations do not offen…
How Resilient is the War Contract
In War By Agreement , Yitzhak Benbaji and Daniel Statman argue that the morality of war can be governed by a freely accepted agreement over the principles that apply to it. This war contract supersedes the application of the principles of everyday morality to war, thus defying ‘revisionist’ approaches to war, and it upholds a recognizable version of traditional just war theory. This article argues for three claims. First, the contractarian appara…
Strokes of Luck
Strokes of Luck offers a large-scale treatment of the role of luck in our judgements about blameworthiness and responsibility, in moral philosophy, and in principles of distributive justice, in political philosophy. It takes an 'anti-anti-luckist' stance on these matters, and is opposed to the influential 'anti-luckist' views which hold that judgements of blameworthiness, or distributive relations, should be adjusted to annul or neutralize differ…
Gauguin’s lucky escape
‘The Gauguin case’ section will outline his central case, the Gauguin case, and note some of its important features. In Williams’ simplified version of the story, a budding painter, Gauguin, abandons his family to pursue his artistic dreams in Tahiti. Gauguin’s decision to abandon his family is justified by the non-moral value of what he goes on to achieve. The Self-Realization Interpretation gets a number of things importantly right. It obviousl…
Rawlsian Incentives and the Freedom Objection
In a hugely significant and much discussed series of writings, G. A. Cohen attacks John Rawls's “justice as fairness” for permitting morally arbitrary inequalities. On Cohen's view, these inequalities are at odds with the egalitarian ethos that ought, by Rawls's own lights, to govern the attitudes and actions of agents in a Rawlsian society.1 One potential reply which Cohen canvasses on behalf of Rawlsians, and then proceeds to attack, is the “Fr…
Owning Up
The concept of responsibility is frequently discussed in Ronald Dworkin's important book Justice for Hedgehogs.11 Hereinafter JfH. In an evaluative system with the holistic character of Dworkin's, ...
How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism
Imagine a two‐person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y , producing an income gap between them of Y . Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y , since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the B…
Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism
The ‘standard interpretation’ of John Taurek’s argument in ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ imputes two theses to him: first, ‘numbers scepticism’, or scepticism about the moral force of an appeal to the mere number of individuals saved in conflict cases; and second, the ‘equal greatest chances’ principle of rescue, which requires that every individual has an equal chance of being rescued. The standard interpretation is criticized here on a number of …
In Defense of Batman
No abstract
Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar
Scalar utilitarianism, a form of utilitarianism advocated by Alastair Norcross, retains utilitarianism's evaluative commitments while dispensing with utilitarianism's deontic commitments, or its commitment to the existence or significance of moral duties, obligations and requirements. This article disputes the effectiveness of the arguments that have been used to defend scalar utilitarianism. It is contended that Norcross's central ‘Persuasion Ar…
Luck, Value, and Commitment
This collection comprises 11 essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Leading philosophers explore Williams's work on systematic moral theory moral luck, 'internalism', epistemology and intuitionism, and equality.
Luck Value And Commitment Themes From The Ethics Of Bernard Williams
This collection comprises 11 essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Leading philosophers explore Williams's work on systematic moral theory moral luck, 'internalism', epistemology and intuitionism, and equality
What's the Matter? Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters
In the Preface to this enormous work, Derek Parfit makes a reference to Sidgwick's ‘great, drab book’ The Methods of Ethics (xxxiii). The juxtaposition of adjectives is amusing and oddly endearing; for Parfit, Sidgwick's drabness is not in any serious competition with his greatness. Parfit's two-volume book is not drab – though it can be exhausting – and, although it is probably too early to tell for sure, it also shows certain signs of greatness…
Invigilating Republican Liberty
Republican liberty, as recently defended by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, characterises liberty in terms of the absence of domination, instead of, or in addition to, the absence of interference, as favoured by Berlin-style negative liberty. This article considers several claims made on behalf of republican liberty, particularly in Pettit's and Skinner's recent writings, and finds them wanting. No relevant moral or political concern expressed…
Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard
In this article, I appeal to the phenomenon of moral hazard in order to explain how at least some of the inequalities permitted by Luck Egalitarianism can be given an alternative, more plausible grounding than that which is supplied by Luck Egalitarianism. This alternative grounding robs Luck Egalitarianism of a potentially significant source of intuitive support whilst enabling conditional welfare policies to survive the attacks on them made by …
Consequentialism, Cluelessness, and Indifference
The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
Recent discussion of Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value, which analyses the value of X in terms of agents' reasons for having certain pro-attitudes or contra-attitudes towards X , has generated the ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem (WKR problem): this is the problem, for the buck-passing view, of being able to acknowledge that there may be good reasons for attributing final value to X that have nothing to do with the final value that X actual…
Fairness in life and Death Cases
A Dilemma for Objective Act-Utilitarianism
Act-utilitarianism comes in two standard varieties: ‘subjective’ act-utilitarianism, which tells agents to attempt to maximize utility directly, and ‘objective’ act-utilitarianism, which permits agents to use non-utilitarian decision-making procedures. This article argues that objective actutilitarianism is exposed to a dilemma. On one horn of it is the contention that objective act-utilitarianism makes inconsistent claims about the rightness of …
Horses on Camera
Youth in America Today
Luck Egalitarianism and the See-Saw Objection
Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness
The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
Recent discussion of Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value, which analyses the value of X in terms of agents' reasons for having certain pro-attitudes or contra-attitudes towards X , has generated the ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem (WKR problem): this is the problem, for the buck-passing view, of being able to acknowledge that there may be good reasons for attributing final value to X that have nothing to do with the final value that X actual…
A Dilemma for Objective Act-Utilitarianism
Act-utilitarianism comes in two standard varieties: ‘subjective’ act-utilitarianism, which tells agents to attempt to maximize utility directly, and ‘objective’ act-utilitarianism, which permits agents to use non-utilitarian decision-making procedures. This article argues that objective actutilitarianism is exposed to a dilemma. On one horn of it is the contention that objective act-utilitarianism makes inconsistent claims about the rightness of …
Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism
The ‘standard interpretation’ of John Taurek’s argument in ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ imputes two theses to him: first, ‘numbers scepticism’, or scepticism about the moral force of an appeal to the mere number of individuals saved in conflict cases; and second, the ‘equal greatest chances’ principle of rescue, which requires that every individual has an equal chance of being rescued. The standard interpretation is criticized here on a number of …
Youth in America Today
Horses on Camera
A Dilemma for Objective Act-Utilitarianism
Act-utilitarianism comes in two standard varieties: ‘subjective’ act-utilitarianism, which tells agents to attempt to maximize utility directly, and ‘objective’ act-utilitarianism, which permits agents to use non-utilitarian decision-making procedures. This article argues that objective actutilitarianism is exposed to a dilemma. On one horn of it is the contention that objective act-utilitarianism makes inconsistent claims about the rightness of …
Fairness in life and Death Cases
Consequentialism, Cluelessness, and Indifference
The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
Recent discussion of Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value, which analyses the value of X in terms of agents' reasons for having certain pro-attitudes or contra-attitudes towards X , has generated the ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem (WKR problem): this is the problem, for the buck-passing view, of being able to acknowledge that there may be good reasons for attributing final value to X that have nothing to do with the final value that X actual…
Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard
In this article, I appeal to the phenomenon of moral hazard in order to explain how at least some of the inequalities permitted by Luck Egalitarianism can be given an alternative, more plausible grounding than that which is supplied by Luck Egalitarianism. This alternative grounding robs Luck Egalitarianism of a potentially significant source of intuitive support whilst enabling conditional welfare policies to survive the attacks on them made by …
Luck, Value, and Commitment
This collection comprises 11 essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Leading philosophers explore Williams's work on systematic moral theory moral luck, 'internalism', epistemology and intuitionism, and equality.
Luck Value And Commitment Themes From The Ethics Of Bernard Williams
This collection comprises 11 essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Leading philosophers explore Williams's work on systematic moral theory moral luck, 'internalism', epistemology and intuitionism, and equality
What's the Matter? Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters
In the Preface to this enormous work, Derek Parfit makes a reference to Sidgwick's ‘great, drab book’ The Methods of Ethics (xxxiii). The juxtaposition of adjectives is amusing and oddly endearing; for Parfit, Sidgwick's drabness is not in any serious competition with his greatness. Parfit's two-volume book is not drab – though it can be exhausting – and, although it is probably too early to tell for sure, it also shows certain signs of greatness…
Invigilating Republican Liberty
Republican liberty, as recently defended by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, characterises liberty in terms of the absence of domination, instead of, or in addition to, the absence of interference, as favoured by Berlin-style negative liberty. This article considers several claims made on behalf of republican liberty, particularly in Pettit's and Skinner's recent writings, and finds them wanting. No relevant moral or political concern expressed…
Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar
Scalar utilitarianism, a form of utilitarianism advocated by Alastair Norcross, retains utilitarianism's evaluative commitments while dispensing with utilitarianism's deontic commitments, or its commitment to the existence or significance of moral duties, obligations and requirements. This article disputes the effectiveness of the arguments that have been used to defend scalar utilitarianism. It is contended that Norcross's central ‘Persuasion Ar…
In Defense of Batman
No abstract
Owning Up
The concept of responsibility is frequently discussed in Ronald Dworkin's important book Justice for Hedgehogs.11 Hereinafter JfH. In an evaluative system with the holistic character of Dworkin's, ...
How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism
Imagine a two‐person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y , producing an income gap between them of Y . Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y , since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the B…
Numbers scepticism, equal chances and pluralism
The ‘standard interpretation’ of John Taurek’s argument in ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ imputes two theses to him: first, ‘numbers scepticism’, or scepticism about the moral force of an appeal to the mere number of individuals saved in conflict cases; and second, the ‘equal greatest chances’ principle of rescue, which requires that every individual has an equal chance of being rescued. The standard interpretation is criticized here on a number of …
Rawlsian Incentives and the Freedom Objection
In a hugely significant and much discussed series of writings, G. A. Cohen attacks John Rawls's “justice as fairness” for permitting morally arbitrary inequalities. On Cohen's view, these inequalities are at odds with the egalitarian ethos that ought, by Rawls's own lights, to govern the attitudes and actions of agents in a Rawlsian society.1 One potential reply which Cohen canvasses on behalf of Rawlsians, and then proceeds to attack, is the “Fr…
Gauguin’s lucky escape
‘The Gauguin case’ section will outline his central case, the Gauguin case, and note some of its important features. In Williams’ simplified version of the story, a budding painter, Gauguin, abandons his family to pursue his artistic dreams in Tahiti. Gauguin’s decision to abandon his family is justified by the non-moral value of what he goes on to achieve. The Self-Realization Interpretation gets a number of things importantly right. It obviousl…
Strokes of Luck
Strokes of Luck offers a large-scale treatment of the role of luck in our judgements about blameworthiness and responsibility, in moral philosophy, and in principles of distributive justice, in political philosophy. It takes an 'anti-anti-luckist' stance on these matters, and is opposed to the influential 'anti-luckist' views which hold that judgements of blameworthiness, or distributive relations, should be adjusted to annul or neutralize differ…
‘Defensive Escalations’
Defence cases with an escalatory structure, in which the levels of violence between aggressor and defender start out as minor and then become major, even lethal, raise sharp problems for defence theory, and for our understanding of the conditions of defence: proportionality, necessity, and imminence. It is argued here that defenders are not morally required to withdraw from participation in these cases, and that defensive escalations do not offen…
How Resilient is the War Contract
In War By Agreement , Yitzhak Benbaji and Daniel Statman argue that the morality of war can be governed by a freely accepted agreement over the principles that apply to it. This war contract supersedes the application of the principles of everyday morality to war, thus defying ‘revisionist’ approaches to war, and it upholds a recognizable version of traditional just war theory. This article argues for three claims. First, the contractarian appara…
Luck Egalitarianism and the See-Saw Objection
Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness
Starting and Stopping Wars
If a warring side may fight in pursuit of an aim up to some proportionality‐respecting limit, then an important question is whether that side is morally required to stop fighting when it reaches that limit, despite not yet having attained its aim. The ‘Quota View’ answers this question affirmatively, while other views hold that the fighting may continue just as long as the projected future losses fall within certain limits. I criticize some of th…
Philosophy (13 obras) · Political science (12 obras) · Epistemology (11 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (11 obras) · Law (10 obras) · Law and economics (10 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (9 obras) · Economics (8 obras) · Free Will and Agency (8 obras) · Sociology (8 obras)