Daniel Munro
Biographic Data
| ID | 3810022 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Munro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Munro |
| SIGNATURE | MUNRO D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Toronto |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4511-7037 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Artificial storytellers
Recent large language models (LLMs), such as GPT or Claude, can produce texts that look remarkably like human-authored stories. Scholarly and popular discussions often uncritically assume that these texts count as genuine stories or narratives. However, this paper steps back from this assumption to ask more fundamental, conceptual questions: When current LLMs are prompted to write stories, do the texts they output count as genuine stories? If not…
Conspiracy theories and the epistemic power of narratives
We often turn to comforting stories to distract ourselves from emotionally painful truths. This paper explores a dark side of this tendency. I argue that the way false conspiracy theories are disseminated often involves packaging them as part of narratives that offer comforting alternatives to ugly truths. Furthermore, I argue that the way these narratives arouse and resolve our emotions can be part of what causes people to believe conspiracy the…
What Good Are Knowledge Norms
Conspiracy Stories
We offer a novel analysis of conspiracy theorizing, according to which conspiracy theory communities are engaged in collective projects of storytelling. Other recent accounts start by analyzing individual conspiracy theorists’ psychologies. We argue that a more explanatorily unifying account emerges when we start by analyzing conspiracy theorizing as a social practice. This helps us better account for conspiracy theorists’ psychological heterogen…
Conspiracy theories, epistemic self-identity, and epistemic territory
Capturing the conspiracist’s imagination
Mental Imagery and the Epistemology of Testimony
Mental imagery often occurs during testimonial belief transmission: a testifier often episodically remembers or imagines a scene while describing it, while a listener often imagines that scene as it’s described to her. I argue that getting clear on imagery’s psychological roles in testimonial belief transmission has implications for some fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony. I first appeal to imagery cases to argue against a widesp…
Perceiving as knowing in the predictive mind
Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual
Visual and bodily sensational perception
Are we free to imagine what we choose
Faith, democracy, and deliberative citizenship
Integration Through Participation
Norms, Motives and Radical Democracy
Norms, Motives and Radical Democracy
Integration Through Participation
Faith, democracy, and deliberative citizenship
Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual
Visual and bodily sensational perception
Are we free to imagine what we choose
Mental Imagery and the Epistemology of Testimony
Mental imagery often occurs during testimonial belief transmission: a testifier often episodically remembers or imagines a scene while describing it, while a listener often imagines that scene as it’s described to her. I argue that getting clear on imagery’s psychological roles in testimonial belief transmission has implications for some fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony. I first appeal to imagery cases to argue against a widesp…
Perceiving as knowing in the predictive mind
Capturing the conspiracist’s imagination
Conspiracy Stories
We offer a novel analysis of conspiracy theorizing, according to which conspiracy theory communities are engaged in collective projects of storytelling. Other recent accounts start by analyzing individual conspiracy theorists’ psychologies. We argue that a more explanatorily unifying account emerges when we start by analyzing conspiracy theorizing as a social practice. This helps us better account for conspiracy theorists’ psychological heterogen…
Conspiracy theories, epistemic self-identity, and epistemic territory
Conspiracy theories and the epistemic power of narratives
We often turn to comforting stories to distract ourselves from emotionally painful truths. This paper explores a dark side of this tendency. I argue that the way false conspiracy theories are disseminated often involves packaging them as part of narratives that offer comforting alternatives to ugly truths. Furthermore, I argue that the way these narratives arouse and resolve our emotions can be part of what causes people to believe conspiracy the…
What Good Are Knowledge Norms
Artificial storytellers
Recent large language models (LLMs), such as GPT or Claude, can produce texts that look remarkably like human-authored stories. Scholarly and popular discussions often uncritically assume that these texts count as genuine stories or narratives. However, this paper steps back from this assumption to ask more fundamental, conceptual questions: When current LLMs are prompted to write stories, do the texts they output count as genuine stories? If not…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Misinformation and Its Impacts (5 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works)