Conspiracy theories and the epistemic power of narratives

Bibliographic Data

ID21592163
AuthorsDaniel Munro (0000-0003-4511-7037, York University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume38
Issue8
Pages3661-3686
Publication date2025-11-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2024.2381538
OpenAlexW4400928398
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited60

We often turn to comforting stories to distract ourselves from emotionally painful truths. This paper explores a dark side of this tendency. I argue that the way false conspiracy theories are disseminated often involves packaging them as part of narratives that offer comforting alternatives to ugly truths. Furthermore, I argue that the way these narratives arouse and resolve our emotions can be part of what causes people to believe conspiracy theories. This account helps to bring out some general implications about the power of narratives for misleading people into believing misinformation: I argue that narratives can cause intuitive judgments of truth that are especially difficult to dispel through critical reflection. I also sketch some practical implications for how the media can better frame their reports about both conspiracy theories and factual narratives

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Narrative · Sociology · Media Influence and Health · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Rhetoric and Communication Studies

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