Sophie Horowitz
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866061 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sophie Horowitz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sophie |
| FAMILY NAME | Horowitz |
| SIGNATURE | HOROWITZ S |
| AFFILIATIONS | UMass Amherst Amherst USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9646-9230 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Do credences model guesses
What are credences? Where do the numbers come from? Some have argued that they are brute and primitive; others, that they model our dispositions to bet, our comparative confidence judgments, or our all‐out beliefs. This paper explores a new answer to this question: credences model our dispositions to guess. I argue that we can think of credences this way, and then consider: should we
Dilating and contracting arbitrarily
Standard accuracy‐based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy‐based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise…
Shrinking three arguments for conditionalization
No prominent works on this page.
Shrinking three arguments for conditionalization
Dilating and contracting arbitrarily
Standard accuracy‐based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy‐based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise…
Do credences model guesses
What are credences? Where do the numbers come from? Some have argued that they are brute and primitive; others, that they model our dispositions to bet, our comparative confidence judgments, or our all‐out beliefs. This paper explores a new answer to this question: credences model our dispositions to guess. I argue that we can think of credences this way, and then consider: should we
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Algorithm (1 work) · Citation (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work) · Free Will and Agency (1 work) · Irrational number (1 work) · Library science (1 work)