Dan Marshall
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866111 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dan Marshall |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dan |
| FAMILY NAME | Marshall |
| SIGNATURE | MARSHALL D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lingnan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5763-3875 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 97 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Objectual aboutness
A de re objectual subject matter is a subject matter of the form how a1, a2 ... are, whereas a de dicto objectual subject matter is a subject matter of the form how Fs are. An objectual subject matter is either a de re or de dicto objectual subject matter. This paper provides a systematic theory of aboutness towards objectual subject matters which, if correct, illuminates both the nature of intrinsicality and the general nature of aboutness. In a…
Plate's account of intrinsicality
Jan Plate has recently proposed a highly sophisticated account of intrinsicality which, if successful, would analyse intrinsicality purely in terms of broadly logical notions. I argue that Plate's account is unsuccessful, since it falsely classifies as non-intrinsic the intuitively intrinsic property of being such that no part of one is non-self-identical
The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory
The modal theory holds that facts (properties) are identical iff they are necessarily equivalent (coextensive). One of the most prominent arguments against the modal theory is Elliot Sober’s dual-detector argument. According to this argument, the fact that some particular thing is a triangle is distinct from the necessarily equivalent fact that it is a trilateral, since it is only the former fact that causes an output of a certain machine. I argu…
A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism
When we use quantifier expressions such as ‘every’ and ‘some’, we often tacitly restrict what we are quantifying over. For example, when assertively uttering ‘Every bottle of beer is empty’, I might tacitly restrict quantification so that this sentence quantifies only over bottles in my fridge rather than over all the bottles there are. As a result, by uttering this sentence, I might assert that every bottle in my fridge is empty, rather than ass…
Intrinsicality and the classification of uninstantiable properties
Causation and fact granularity
The Varieties of Intrinsicality
Intrinsicality is a central notion in metaphysics that can do important work in many areas of philosophy. It is not widely appreciated, however, that there are in fact a number of different notions of intrinsicality, and that these different notions differ in what work they can do. This paper discusses what these notions are, describes how they are related to each other, and argues that each of them can be analysed in terms of a single notion of …
Intrinsicality and Grounding
A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theori…
Analyses of Intrinsicality without Naturalness
Over the last 30 years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don't appeal to the notion of naturalness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne's analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kell…
Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness
Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton
The future that may (or may not) come
Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions? 1
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds
"Langton and Lewis on "Intrinsic
Langton and Lewis on “Intrinsic”
The future that may (or may not) come
Langton and Lewis on “Intrinsic”
Intrinsicality and Grounding
A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theori…
Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions? 1
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds
Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness
Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton
The Varieties of Intrinsicality
Intrinsicality is a central notion in metaphysics that can do important work in many areas of philosophy. It is not widely appreciated, however, that there are in fact a number of different notions of intrinsicality, and that these different notions differ in what work they can do. This paper discusses what these notions are, describes how they are related to each other, and argues that each of them can be analysed in terms of a single notion of …
Analyses of Intrinsicality without Naturalness
Over the last 30 years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don't appeal to the notion of naturalness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne's analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kell…
"Langton and Lewis on "Intrinsic
Langton and Lewis on “Intrinsic”
Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions? 1
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds
The future that may (or may not) come
Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness
Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton
Intrinsicality and Grounding
A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theori…
Analyses of Intrinsicality without Naturalness
Over the last 30 years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don't appeal to the notion of naturalness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne's analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kell…
The Varieties of Intrinsicality
Intrinsicality is a central notion in metaphysics that can do important work in many areas of philosophy. It is not widely appreciated, however, that there are in fact a number of different notions of intrinsicality, and that these different notions differ in what work they can do. This paper discusses what these notions are, describes how they are related to each other, and argues that each of them can be analysed in terms of a single notion of …
Intrinsicality and the classification of uninstantiable properties
Causation and fact granularity
The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory
The modal theory holds that facts (properties) are identical iff they are necessarily equivalent (coextensive). One of the most prominent arguments against the modal theory is Elliot Sober’s dual-detector argument. According to this argument, the fact that some particular thing is a triangle is distinct from the necessarily equivalent fact that it is a trilateral, since it is only the former fact that causes an output of a certain machine. I argu…
A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism
When we use quantifier expressions such as ‘every’ and ‘some’, we often tacitly restrict what we are quantifying over. For example, when assertively uttering ‘Every bottle of beer is empty’, I might tacitly restrict quantification so that this sentence quantifies only over bottles in my fridge rather than over all the bottles there are. As a result, by uttering this sentence, I might assert that every bottle in my fridge is empty, rather than ass…
Objectual aboutness
A de re objectual subject matter is a subject matter of the form how a1, a2 ... are, whereas a de dicto objectual subject matter is a subject matter of the form how Fs are. An objectual subject matter is either a de re or de dicto objectual subject matter. This paper provides a systematic theory of aboutness towards objectual subject matters which, if correct, illuminates both the nature of intrinsicality and the general nature of aboutness. In a…
Plate's account of intrinsicality
Jan Plate has recently proposed a highly sophisticated account of intrinsicality which, if successful, would analyse intrinsicality purely in terms of broadly logical notions. I argue that Plate's account is unsuccessful, since it falsely classifies as non-intrinsic the intuitively intrinsic property of being such that no part of one is non-self-identical
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (13 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works)