Jeremy Goodman
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866142 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeremy Goodman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeremy |
| FAMILY NAME | Goodman |
| SIGNATURE | GOODMAN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Southern California |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1293-0243 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The myth of full belief
Belief is typically understood to be the success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge. But there is no success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge
Epistemology Normalized
We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one’s evidence. The guiding idea is that, if a possibility is sufficiently less normal than one’s actual situation, then one can know that that possibility does not obtain. This explains how people can have inductive knowledge that goes beyond what is strictly entailed by their evidence. We mo…
Against Disquotation
We argue against the disquotational meaning schema—‘φ’ means that φ—and suggest that rejecting it is the key to resolving further intensional paradoxes about the limits of thought
Thinking and being sure
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, …
Classical Opacity
An Argument For Necessitism
Thinking and being sure
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, …
Epistemology Normalized
We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one’s evidence. The guiding idea is that, if a possibility is sufficiently less normal than one’s actual situation, then one can know that that possibility does not obtain. This explains how people can have inductive knowledge that goes beyond what is strictly entailed by their evidence. We mo…
An Argument For Necessitism
Classical Opacity
An Argument For Necessitism
Classical Opacity
Against Disquotation
We argue against the disquotational meaning schema—‘φ’ means that φ—and suggest that rejecting it is the key to resolving further intensional paradoxes about the limits of thought
Thinking and being sure
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, …
The myth of full belief
Belief is typically understood to be the success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge. But there is no success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge
Epistemology Normalized
We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one’s evidence. The guiding idea is that, if a possibility is sufficiently less normal than one’s actual situation, then one can know that that possibility does not obtain. This explains how people can have inductive knowledge that goes beyond what is strictly entailed by their evidence. We mo…
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Citation (2 works) · Library science (2 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (2 works)