Baron Reed
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866289 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Baron Reed |
| GIVEN NAMES | Baron |
| FAMILY NAME | Reed |
| SIGNATURE | REED B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northern Illinois University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6721-4554 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Skepticism
Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present is an authoritative and up-to-date survey of the entire history of skepticism. Divided chronologically into ancient, medieval, renaissance, modern, and contemporary periods, and featuring 50 specially-commissioned chapters from leading philosophers, this comprehensive volume is the first of its kind. By exploring each of the distinct traditions and providing expert insights, this extensive reference work:…
Epistemic Authority
It is an exceptionally rare book that can be both a cutting-edge work on recently hot topics in epistemology—for example, rationality, disagreement, trust, and testimony—and also, under the surface, the latest defense of Catholicism in its centuries-long dispute with Protestantism over fundamental epistemic principles. Linda Zagzebski's highly ambitious book on epistemic authority manages to be both.The ultimate aim is to vindicate epistemic auth…
Knowledge, doubt, and circularity
Resisting Encroachment
Fallibilism
Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements - e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists - there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject's being mi…
Self-Knowledge and Rationality
There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent’s intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first…
Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless
Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense
Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subje…
Accidentally Factive Mental States
Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. the moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to…
The Stoics’ Account Of The Cognitive Impression
According to the story we have from Cicero’s Academica, Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, began by defining the cognitive impression as one that is ‘impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its reality’.1 Arcesilaus, the Academic Sceptic, then asked Zeno if this could be so even if a true impression ‘was of exactly the same form as a false one’-that is, would an impression count as cognitive if one could have, …
Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification
The presence of accidentality in a subject's holding a belief is generally thought to be incompatible with that belief7apos;s being an instance of know‐ledge. Epistemologists have tended to focus on the accidentality of the truth of a belief. I argue (a) that it is also possible that there be accidentality in the justification of a belief, and (b) that the consequences of this type of accidentality are potentially much more harmful than accidenta…
Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense
Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subje…
Resisting Encroachment
Fallibilism
Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements - e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists - there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject's being mi…
Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification
The presence of accidentality in a subject's holding a belief is generally thought to be incompatible with that belief7apos;s being an instance of know‐ledge. Epistemologists have tended to focus on the accidentality of the truth of a belief. I argue (a) that it is also possible that there be accidentality in the justification of a belief, and (b) that the consequences of this type of accidentality are potentially much more harmful than accidenta…
Accidentally Factive Mental States
Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. the moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to…
Knowledge, doubt, and circularity
Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless
Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification
The presence of accidentality in a subject's holding a belief is generally thought to be incompatible with that belief7apos;s being an instance of know‐ledge. Epistemologists have tended to focus on the accidentality of the truth of a belief. I argue (a) that it is also possible that there be accidentality in the justification of a belief, and (b) that the consequences of this type of accidentality are potentially much more harmful than accidenta…
The Stoics’ Account Of The Cognitive Impression
According to the story we have from Cicero’s Academica, Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, began by defining the cognitive impression as one that is ‘impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its reality’.1 Arcesilaus, the Academic Sceptic, then asked Zeno if this could be so even if a true impression ‘was of exactly the same form as a false one’-that is, would an impression count as cognitive if one could have, …
Accidentally Factive Mental States
Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. the moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to…
Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless
Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense
Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subje…
Self-Knowledge and Rationality
There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent’s intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first…
Knowledge, doubt, and circularity
Resisting Encroachment
Fallibilism
Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements - e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists - there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject's being mi…
Epistemic Authority
It is an exceptionally rare book that can be both a cutting-edge work on recently hot topics in epistemology—for example, rationality, disagreement, trust, and testimony—and also, under the surface, the latest defense of Catholicism in its centuries-long dispute with Protestantism over fundamental epistemic principles. Linda Zagzebski's highly ambitious book on epistemic authority manages to be both.The ultimate aim is to vindicate epistemic auth…
Skepticism
Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present is an authoritative and up-to-date survey of the entire history of skepticism. Divided chronologically into ancient, medieval, renaissance, modern, and contemporary periods, and featuring 50 specially-commissioned chapters from leading philosophers, this comprehensive volume is the first of its kind. By exploring each of the distinct traditions and providing expert insights, this extensive reference work:…
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Skepticism (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy of mind (4 works)