Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351579 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Baron Reed (0000-0001-6721-4554, John Brown University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 198 |
| Pages | 57-67 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00167 |
| OpenAlex | W1981525463 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 2 |
The presence of accidentality in a subject's holding a belief is generally thought to be incompatible with that belief7apos;s being an instance of know‐ledge. Epistemologists have tended to focus on the accidentality of the truth of a belief. I argue (a) that it is also possible that there be accidentality in the justification of a belief, and (b) that the consequences of this type of accidentality are potentially much more harmful than accidentality only in the truth of a belief
Accidental · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Physics · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
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| Citations per year | 0.48 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2005 - 2021 (17) |
| Highly cited | No |