Max Lewis
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873232 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Max Lewis |
| GIVEN NAMES | Max |
| FAMILY NAME | Lewis |
| SIGNATURE | LEWIS M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7317-9051 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Right Reason Accounts of the Norm of Assertion
Moral deference and morally worthy attitudes
Doxastic Partiality and the Puzzle of Enticing Right Action
It is common to think that our intimates are required to help us. But it can be problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice them to help us—even when those facts provide them with sufficient or decisive reason to help us. This is puzzling because, in these cases, our intimates have sufficient or decisive reason to act in the way we are trying to entice them to act. More…
Gratitude: Its Nature and Normativity
Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed to an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then cons…
On Gratitude to Nature
In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest …
The knowledge norm of assertion: Keep it simple
The simple knowledge norm of assertion (SKNA) holds that one may (epistemically permissibly) assert that p only if one knows that p . Turri (Aust J Philos 89(1):37–45, 2011) and Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) both argue that more is required for epistemically permissible assertion. In particular, they both think that the asserter must assert on the basis of her knowledge. Turri calls this the express …
Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics
The New Puzzle of Moral Deference
Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements (e.g., acting with moral worth or being virtuous). First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods (e.g., abduction, r eductio ad absurdum , and intuition)…
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Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics
The New Puzzle of Moral Deference
Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements (e.g., acting with moral worth or being virtuous). First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods (e.g., abduction, r eductio ad absurdum , and intuition)…
The knowledge norm of assertion: Keep it simple
The simple knowledge norm of assertion (SKNA) holds that one may (epistemically permissibly) assert that p only if one knows that p . Turri (Aust J Philos 89(1):37–45, 2011) and Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) both argue that more is required for epistemically permissible assertion. In particular, they both think that the asserter must assert on the basis of her knowledge. Turri calls this the express …
On Gratitude to Nature
In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest …
Doxastic Partiality and the Puzzle of Enticing Right Action
It is common to think that our intimates are required to help us. But it can be problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice them to help us—even when those facts provide them with sufficient or decisive reason to help us. This is puzzling because, in these cases, our intimates have sufficient or decisive reason to act in the way we are trying to entice them to act. More…
Gratitude: Its Nature and Normativity
Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed to an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then cons…
Right Reason Accounts of the Norm of Assertion
Moral deference and morally worthy attitudes
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Assertion (3 works) · Deference (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works)