Gratitude

Its Nature and Normativity

Bibliographic Data

ID4079459
AuthorsMax Lewis (0000-0002-7317-9051, Yale University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume19
Issue8
Publication date2024-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.13015
OpenAlexW4401681764
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited62

Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed to an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then consider its normativity, i.e., when it is fitting, owed, a directed duty, or a virtue. We then turn to impersonal gratitude, i.e., gratitude for something without gratitude to any agent for it. We consider the normativity of this attitude, i.e., when it is fitting. We end by considering whether personal gratitude and impersonal gratitude are two species of the same genus-as their names suggest-or whether they are distinct attitudes

Gratitude · Mindfulness and Compassion Interventions · Optimism, Hope, and Well-being · Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction · Psychology · Social Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access