Sharon Street
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873348 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sharon Street |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sharon |
| FAMILY NAME | Street |
| SIGNATURE | STREET S |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics
Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive meta…
Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.- Quine (1969) We think that some facts - for example, the fact that someone is suffering, or the fact that all previously encountered tigers were carnivorous – supply us with normative reasons for action and belief. The former fact, we think, is a reason to help the suffering person; the latter fact is a reason to belie…
Constructivism about Reasons
Do valuable things possess their value independently of our valuing them? Or does their value always depend, at least ultimately, on our taking them to be valuable? I have argued elsewhere that Darwinian considerations settle this debate in favor of the latter, antirealist view.1 Things are valuable ultimately because we take them to be. But the ultimately in this statement is important. While there are, ultimately, no normative truths that hold …
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics
Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive meta…
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Constructivism about Reasons
Do valuable things possess their value independently of our valuing them? Or does their value always depend, at least ultimately, on our taking them to be valuable? I have argued elsewhere that Darwinian considerations settle this debate in favor of the latter, antirealist view.1 Things are valuable ultimately because we take them to be. But the ultimately in this statement is important. While there are, ultimately, no normative truths that hold …
Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.- Quine (1969) We think that some facts - for example, the fact that someone is suffering, or the fact that all previously encountered tigers were carnivorous – supply us with normative reasons for action and belief. The former fact, we think, is a reason to help the suffering person; the latter fact is a reason to belie…
What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics
Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive meta…
Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Normative (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Moral psychology (2 works) · Moral realism (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Realism (2 works)