What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5124649 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sharon Street |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 363-384 |
| Publication date | 2010-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.x |
| OpenAlex | W1586394940 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 88 |
| References cited | 26 |
Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is inadequate, and I propose what I call the 'practical standpoint characterization' in its place. I then offer a general taxonomy of constructivist positions in ethics. Since constructivism's standing as a family of substantive normative positions is relatively uncontested, I devote the remainder of the paper to addressing skeptics' worries about the distinctiveness of constructivism understood as a metaethical view. I compare and contrast constructivism with three other standard metaethical positions with which it is often confused or mistakenly thought to be compatible: realism; naturalist reductions in terms of an ideal response; and expressivism. In discussing the contrast with expressivism, I explain the sense in which, according to the constructivist, the distinction between substantive normative ethics and metaethics breaks down. I conclude by distinguishing between two importantly different debates about the mind-dependence of value. I argue that a failure to make this distinction is part of what explains why the possibility of constructivism as a metaethical view is often overlooked
Constructivism (international relations · Epistemology · Expressivism · International relations · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Naturalism · Normative · Political science · Politics · Realism · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Law · Philosophy
É a teoria do sentimentalismo construtivo de Jesse Prinz de fato construtivista
The “Intrinsic” Bit
Axiology and Time
Idealization
A Defense of Subjectivism
Real Ethics
Temporal Neutrality and The Demandingness of Prudence
Deontic and Maximizing
The “Prudential” Bit
The Possibility of Temporal Bias
Scoreism and the Constitution of Prudential Reasons
The Valuing Attitude
Project-Oriented Subjectivism
Moral Realism and Objectivity
Response-Dependent Realism
What Is a Theory of Prudential Intrinsic Value?
The Rule of Law in the Real World
Debunking Arguments in Ethics
Critique of Halakhic Reason
Incentives, Conventionalism, and Constructivism
Nietzsche on creating and discovering values
Nietzschean Constructivism
Capabilities in a Just Society
Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons
Moral subjectivism and the semantics of disagreements
Rainer Forst leitor de John Rawls
Death as the extinction of the source of value
Humean Moral Realism Without Irony
Metaetik Nedir? Ahlaki Bir Hayat Görüşü Sunabilir mi
How to decide what to do
Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism
Social Reasons
Greatest Good for the Greatest Number – the Role of Managers’ Ethical Meaning-Making and Subjective Wellbeing Complexity
The Reliable Route from Nonmoral Evidence to Moral Conclusions
Is it Good Enough to be Good Qua Human? The Normative Independence of Attributive Goodness
Magistrates, Mobs, and Moral Disagreement
Internal and External Paternalism
Wiggins on Ethical Objectivity and ‘Des Cannibales’
Evaluative disagreement and knowing the good
Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence
Evolutionary debunking arguments, moral knowledge and underdetermination
Was Kant a ‘Kantian Constructivist’
A Frankfurter in Königsberg
Constructivism, moral realism, and the possibility of Kant's rational religion
Reason monolithism
Democracy despite Itself
Inescapability and Normativity
Good work
The Priority of Legitimacy in Times of Political Transition
A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory
Mill's Metaethical Non-cognitivism
Being Your Best Self
O contratualismo e a metáfora da construção em John Rawls
Open-textured moral concepts
Constructivismo, contractualismo y teoría política animal
Artifactual normativity
Whose purposes? Biological teleology and intentionality
The internal morality of medicine
Humean constructivism and the authoritative ought
Un Rawls republicain ou un Rawls radical
Fondamentalisme ou constructivisme des raisons? Les limites du réalisme normatif de Thomas Scanlon
Context, Intersubjectivism, and Value
What Can a Constructivist Say About Animal Ethics — Or Any Other Normative Question, for That Matter
Qu'est-ce qu'un constructiviste peut dire sur la question animale — ou toute autre question normative, d'ailleurs
Practical reason not as such
Re-constructing Kant
A Theory of Prudence
Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem
Constructing Practical Reasons
The Varieties of Moral Improvement, or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress
Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity
Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement
Starting Points
Why Care about Being an Agent
Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma
Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Constitutivism
Constitutivism about Practical Reasons
A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism
Love, Reasons, and Desire
Democracy, Undeluded
L'avenir contextualiste du constructivisme métaéthique
Normative Reasons, Epistemic Autonomy, and Accountability to God
Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1)
John Rawls métaéthicien
Les explications par un troisième facteur permettent-elles aux réalistes moraux de relever le défi épistémologique
Le quasi-réalisme et l'argument de la coïncidence
The Heart-Mind as the Medium of Transcendence and Virtue
The Reflective Life
How We Get Along
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Facts and Values
Constructivism about Reasons
A Theory of Justice
The Sources of Normativity
Full-Information Theories of Individual Good
"Brandt's Definition of "Good
Agency, Shmagency
Toward Fin de siecle Ethics
Moral Realism
Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best
Moral Constructivism
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason
| Unique citing works | 88 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,18 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 87 |