Death as the extinction of the source of value

The constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status

Bibliographic Data

ID21702344
AuthorsPiotr Nowak (0000-0001-8631-5705, Jagiellonian University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume45
Issue2
Pages109-131
Publication date2024-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueMetamedicine (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0166-2031 • E-ISSN: 1573-1200
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11017-023-09656-w
PMID38332427
OpenAlexW4391658211
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited95

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins’ view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins’ argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything

Epistemology · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Philosophy of medicine · Transitive relation · Utilitarianism · Grief, Bereavement, and Mental Health · Mathematics · Organ Donation and Transplantation · Palliative Care and End-of-Life Issues · Philosophy · Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access