A Theory of Prudence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8069865 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dale Dorsey (0000-0002-7184-6703, University of Kansas, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Publication date | 2021-04-08 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Theory of Prudence (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198823759.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W3160252692 |
| Open Library | OL34699656M |
| ISBN | 9780198823759 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
| References cited | 36 |
Much of knowing what to do is knowing what to do for ourselves. But knowing how to act in our best interest is complex‐‐‐we must know what benefits us, what burdens us, and how these facts present and constitute considerations in favor of action. Not only this, we must know how we should weigh our interests at different times‐‐‐past, present, and future. What is needed, then, is a theory of prudence: a theory of how we ought to act when we are acting for ourselves. In this book, Dale Dorsey provides a comprehensive account of prudence, including the metaethics of prudential value, the nature of the personal good, the reasons of prudence, and the structure of prudential normativity over time
Action (physics · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Positive economics · Prudence · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Ethics · Philosophy
The Prudential Rationality of Risking Traumatic Brain Injury in Dangerous Sport
Prudential Perfectionism
Integrating the Philosophy and Psychology of Well-Being
The Power of Belief
The Circularity of Welfare Judgements
Resonance, Alienation, and Cognitive Subjectivism about Well-Being
Desire versus judgment subjectivism about welfare
The (im)possibility of prudence
Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing
On fellowship
The quest for a qualitative hedonism
The Subjective/Objective Distinction in Well-Being
The Trouble with Genuine-Attraction Desires
Against the Normativity of Welfare
Desire Satisfaction and Temporal Well-Being
Remaining True to Ourselves
Scheduling Deliberation 1
Political liberalism and the metaphysics of languages
Fit and Well-Being
Felt-Quality Hedonism, Alienation, and the Spirit of Resonance
Promotionalism, orthogonality, and instrumental convergence
The new internalism about prudential value
Prudential value and impersonal value
Once more, without feeling
Well-being, part 1
Well-being, part 2
An analysis of knowledge and valuation .
Belief, Truth and Knowledge
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being
Well-being
Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice
"Brandt's Definition of "Good
Subjectivism without Desire
R. B. Perry on Value and Existence
Meaningfulness and Time
The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended
Internalism and the Good for a Person
Preferences, Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias
The Nature of Intrinsic Value
Reasonable Partiality and the Agent’s Point of View
A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics
Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration
Subjectivism and Idealization
Internalism about a person’s good
The problem of defective desires
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring
Prospects for Temporal Neutrality
Asymmetrism about Desire Satisfactionism and Time
Well-Being as Value Fulfillment
Against Absolute Goodness
Comparing Harms
Women and Human Development
What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics
| Unique citing works | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 26 |