Well-Being as Value Fulfillment
How We Can Help Each Other to Live Well
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8068070 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Valerie Tiberius (0000-0002-3048-1998, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Pages | 176 |
| Publication date | 2018-11-22 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Well-Being As Value Fulfillment (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198809494.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W2901024544 |
| Open Library | OL28691113M |
| ISBN | 9780198809494 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 31 |
We don’t always know how to help people, even when those people are our friends. This is not just a problem about how to provide the help we know others need. It is also the problem of what help they need in the first place, and this is a problem that requires ethical thinking. The theory of well-being defended in this book—the value fulfillment theory—provides a solution to this problem. In short, the theory says that our lives go well to the extent that we succeed in terms of what matters to us emotionally, reflectively, and over the long term. In other words, well-being consists in fulfilling or realizing our appropriate values over time. Therefore, according to the value fulfillment theory, when we want to help others achieve greater well-being, we should pay attention to their values. This means attending to how others’ values fit together, how they understand what it means to succeed in terms of these values, and how things could change for them over time. Being a good and helpful friend, then, requires cultivating some habits of humility that overcome our tendency to think we know what’s good for other people without really understanding what it’s like to be them. This work presents the first book-length defense of value fulfillment theory. It is aimed at philosophers and psychologists, and anyone with an interest in philosophical research on human well-being
Epistemology · Humility · Intrinsic value (animal ethics · Political science · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Value theory · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Happiness · Values · Law · Philosophy · Social Psychology
The “Intrinsic” Bit
Axiology and Time
Idealization
A Defense of Subjectivism
Temporal Neutrality and The Demandingness of Prudence
Deontic and Maximizing
The “Prudential” Bit
The Possibility of Temporal Bias
Scoreism and the Constitution of Prudential Reasons
The Valuing Attitude
Project-Oriented Subjectivism
Response-Dependent Realism
What Is a Theory of Prudential Intrinsic Value?
Wellbeing Competence
Improving Interdisciplinary Research in Well-Being—A Review with Further Comments of Michael Bishop’s The Good Life
Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing
The many faces of hedonic adaptation
Mental integrity, autonomy, and fundamental interests
Judicial Power and the Intrinsic Normativity of Law
Capabilitarian well-being and the limits of contextualism
A Hedonic Subjectivism
Remaining True to Ourselves
Doxastic Partiality and the Puzzle of Enticing Right Action
The Interesting and the Pleasant
Assessment of post-traumatic stress disorder and well-being among Sudanese during the ongoing war
Changes and Conflicts of What We Value
The Virtues of Reactive Attitudes
Subjectivism without Idealization and Adaptive Preferences
No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy
Desire and Goodness
A Theory of Prudence
| Unique citing works | 31 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |