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An analysis of knowledge and valuation .

Bibliographic Data

ID24203232
AuthorsClarence Irving Lewis
Year1962
Pages568
Publication date1962-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenueAn analysis of knowledge and valuation . (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOpen Court (PUBLISHER)
Open LibraryOL23314494M
LanguageEN
Citations received172

08.32 epistemology · Erkenntnis · Handlung · Kennis · Sociology of Knowledge · Theory of knowledge · Valeurs (Philosophie) · Values · Waardering · Wertphilosophie · Wissen

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Unique citing works172
Citations per year2,23
Citation span1949 - 2026 (78)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedYes
Citation typesNeutral: 158
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