Constitutivism about Practical Reasons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8091982 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Katsafanas (0000-0003-2588-0342, corresponding author) |
| Editors | Daniel Star (0009-0002-9447-8867) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Publication date | 2018-07-10 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.17 |
| OpenAlex | W2823161630 |
| ISBN | 9780199657889 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 11 |
This chapter introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature—a constitutive aim, principle, or standard—that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain normative claims arises from the bare fact that we are agents. This chapter explains the constitutivist strategy, surveys the extant attempts to generate constitutivist theories, and considers the problems and prospects for the theory
Action (physics · Epistemology · Extant taxon · Law and economics · Normative · Sociology · Virtue · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2024 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |