Daniel Star
Biographic Data
| ID | 982593 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Star |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Star |
| SIGNATURE | STAR D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Boston University |
| ORCID | 0009-0002-9447-8867 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 9 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity contains forty-four commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics. It will appeal especially to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology, but also to those with an interest in philosophy of mind or philosophy of language. Both students and academics will benefit from the fact that the Handbook combines helpful overviews with innovative contributions to current debates. A diverse selection…
Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning
This chapter concerns the connection between knowledge of a logical principle, such as Modus Ponens, and actions of reasoning with it. Contemporary discussions of this issue typically mention Lewis Carroll’s regress. There is widespread agreement that the regress shows something important about the connection between knowing logical principles and reasoning with them—and, more generally, between knowing epistemic or practical principles and actio…
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
In some circumstances, a wedge may be driven between what is advantageous or beneficial to believe and what is true. Cases range from the exotic—with diabolical forces conspiring to punish a hapless victim for believing the truth—to the mundane—with excessive optimism increasing one’s chances of success at some tasks. In contemporary discussions about normative reasons for belief, it is often argued or assumed that all reasons for belief arise on…
The Unity of Normativity
What is normativity? It is argued here that normativity is best understood as a property of certain concepts: normative thoughts are those involving these normative concepts; normative statements are statements that express normative thoughts; and normative facts are the facts (if such there be) that make such normative thoughts true. Many philosophers propose that there is a single basic normative concept—perhaps the concept of a reason for an a…
The Metaphysics of Reasons
This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go bey…
Constitutivism about Practical Reasons
This chapter introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature—a constitutive aim, principle, or standard—that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to …
Instrumental Reasons
Often our reason for doing something is an “instrumental reason”: that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this “instrumental transmission” of reasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, “General Transmission,” which answers to two intuitive desiderata:…
Reasons and Moral Principles
Moral particularism and generalism are families of views united by their denial or affirmation (respectively) that general moral principles play some fundamental role in morality. In this survey of the generalism/particularism debate, I distinguish between contributory and overall moral principles and between two distinct roles, standards and guides, which either sort of principles might be claimed to play. Next I describe three different forms w…
Reason Fundamentalism and What Is Wrong With It
Is there a fundamental feature of normativity, to which other features can be reduced? One defensible view is that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person has reason to F. (“F” stands for any verb phrase, such as “run for the bus” or “hope for relief” or “believe Kampala is in Ghana.”) Another defensible view is that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing…
Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and Littlejohn
Précis of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics
Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics
Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics. Normative ethics is a sophisticated, open-ended philosophical enterprise that attempts to articulate and defend highly general ethical principles. Such principles aspire to specify our reasons, and tell us what it is right to do. However, it is not plausible to suppose that virtuous people in gener…
Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics
Book Review| April 01 2010 Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. viii + 216 pp. Daniel Star Daniel Star Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 259–263. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-042 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn …
Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li
Chenyang Li argues, in an article originally published in Hypatia, that the ethics of care and Confucian ethics constitute similar approaches to ethics. The present paper takes issue with this claim. It is more accurate to view Confucian ethics as a kind of virtue ethics, rather than as a kind of care ethics. In the process of criticizing Li's claim, the distinctiveness of care ethics is defended, against attempts to assimilate it to virtue ethic…
Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li
Chenyang Li argues, in an article originally published in Hypatia, that the ethics of care and Confucian ethics constitute similar approaches to ethics. The present paper takes issue with this claim. It is more accurate to view Confucian ethics as a kind of virtue ethics, rather than as a kind of care ethics. In the process of criticizing Li's claim, the distinctiveness of care ethics is defended, against attempts to assimilate it to virtue ethic…
Instrumental Reasons
Often our reason for doing something is an “instrumental reason”: that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this “instrumental transmission” of reasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, “General Transmission,” which answers to two intuitive desiderata:…
The Unity of Normativity
What is normativity? It is argued here that normativity is best understood as a property of certain concepts: normative thoughts are those involving these normative concepts; normative statements are statements that express normative thoughts; and normative facts are the facts (if such there be) that make such normative thoughts true. Many philosophers propose that there is a single basic normative concept—perhaps the concept of a reason for an a…
Constitutivism about Practical Reasons
This chapter introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature—a constitutive aim, principle, or standard—that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to …
Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and Littlejohn
Reasons and Moral Principles
Moral particularism and generalism are families of views united by their denial or affirmation (respectively) that general moral principles play some fundamental role in morality. In this survey of the generalism/particularism debate, I distinguish between contributory and overall moral principles and between two distinct roles, standards and guides, which either sort of principles might be claimed to play. Next I describe three different forms w…
Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li
Chenyang Li argues, in an article originally published in Hypatia, that the ethics of care and Confucian ethics constitute similar approaches to ethics. The present paper takes issue with this claim. It is more accurate to view Confucian ethics as a kind of virtue ethics, rather than as a kind of care ethics. In the process of criticizing Li's claim, the distinctiveness of care ethics is defended, against attempts to assimilate it to virtue ethic…
Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li
Chenyang Li argues, in an article originally published in Hypatia, that the ethics of care and Confucian ethics constitute similar approaches to ethics. The present paper takes issue with this claim. It is more accurate to view Confucian ethics as a kind of virtue ethics, rather than as a kind of care ethics. In the process of criticizing Li's claim, the distinctiveness of care ethics is defended, against attempts to assimilate it to virtue ethic…
Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li
Chenyang Li argues, in an article originally published in Hypatia, that the ethics of care and Confucian ethics constitute similar approaches to ethics. The present paper takes issue with this claim. It is more accurate to view Confucian ethics as a kind of virtue ethics, rather than as a kind of care ethics. In the process of criticizing Li's claim, the distinctiveness of care ethics is defended, against attempts to assimilate it to virtue ethic…
Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics
Book Review| April 01 2010 Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. viii + 216 pp. Daniel Star Daniel Star Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 259–263. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-042 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn …
Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics
Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics. Normative ethics is a sophisticated, open-ended philosophical enterprise that attempts to articulate and defend highly general ethical principles. Such principles aspire to specify our reasons, and tell us what it is right to do. However, it is not plausible to suppose that virtuous people in gener…
Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and Littlejohn
Précis of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity contains forty-four commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics. It will appeal especially to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology, but also to those with an interest in philosophy of mind or philosophy of language. Both students and academics will benefit from the fact that the Handbook combines helpful overviews with innovative contributions to current debates. A diverse selection…
Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning
This chapter concerns the connection between knowledge of a logical principle, such as Modus Ponens, and actions of reasoning with it. Contemporary discussions of this issue typically mention Lewis Carroll’s regress. There is widespread agreement that the regress shows something important about the connection between knowing logical principles and reasoning with them—and, more generally, between knowing epistemic or practical principles and actio…
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
In some circumstances, a wedge may be driven between what is advantageous or beneficial to believe and what is true. Cases range from the exotic—with diabolical forces conspiring to punish a hapless victim for believing the truth—to the mundane—with excessive optimism increasing one’s chances of success at some tasks. In contemporary discussions about normative reasons for belief, it is often argued or assumed that all reasons for belief arise on…
The Unity of Normativity
What is normativity? It is argued here that normativity is best understood as a property of certain concepts: normative thoughts are those involving these normative concepts; normative statements are statements that express normative thoughts; and normative facts are the facts (if such there be) that make such normative thoughts true. Many philosophers propose that there is a single basic normative concept—perhaps the concept of a reason for an a…
The Metaphysics of Reasons
This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go bey…
Constitutivism about Practical Reasons
This chapter introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature—a constitutive aim, principle, or standard—that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to …
Instrumental Reasons
Often our reason for doing something is an “instrumental reason”: that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this “instrumental transmission” of reasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, “General Transmission,” which answers to two intuitive desiderata:…
Reasons and Moral Principles
Moral particularism and generalism are families of views united by their denial or affirmation (respectively) that general moral principles play some fundamental role in morality. In this survey of the generalism/particularism debate, I distinguish between contributory and overall moral principles and between two distinct roles, standards and guides, which either sort of principles might be claimed to play. Next I describe three different forms w…
Reason Fundamentalism and What Is Wrong With It
Is there a fundamental feature of normativity, to which other features can be reduced? One defensible view is that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person has reason to F. (“F” stands for any verb phrase, such as “run for the bus” or “hope for relief” or “believe Kampala is in Ghana.”) Another defensible view is that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing…
Epistemology (13 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Normative (8 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Free Will and Agency (7 works)