Anna‐sofia Maurin
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3873372 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Anna‐sofia Maurin |
| NOMBRES | Anna‐sofia |
| APELLIDO | Maurin |
| FIRMA | MAURIN A S |
| AFILIACIONES | Lund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1797-4245 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2001 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
The Routledge Handbook of Properties
Some of our mental states are such that there is something it's like to have them. There is something it's like to have a visual experience of a predominantly red and orange scene, and that is different from what it's like to have a visual experience of a predominantly black and blue scene. We can say that a mental state is phenomenally conscious just in case there is something it's like to have that mental state, and take qualia to be the proper…
Bradley's Regress
Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his (in)famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized
To the Editor of Theoria
Trope theory and the Bradley regress
Revisionary Metaphysics An interview with D. M. Armstrong
Realistic Metaphysics An interview with D. H. Mellor
Trope theory and the Bradley regress
Bradley's Regress
Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his (in)famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized
The Routledge Handbook of Properties
Some of our mental states are such that there is something it's like to have them. There is something it's like to have a visual experience of a predominantly red and orange scene, and that is different from what it's like to have a visual experience of a predominantly black and blue scene. We can say that a mental state is phenomenally conscious just in case there is something it's like to have that mental state, and take qualia to be the proper…
Realistic Metaphysics An interview with D. H. Mellor
Revisionary Metaphysics An interview with D. M. Armstrong
Trope theory and the Bradley regress
To the Editor of Theoria
Bradley's Regress
Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his (in)famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized
The Routledge Handbook of Properties
Some of our mental states are such that there is something it's like to have them. There is something it's like to have a visual experience of a predominantly red and orange scene, and that is different from what it's like to have a visual experience of a predominantly black and blue scene. We can say that a mental state is phenomenally conscious just in case there is something it's like to have that mental state, and take qualia to be the proper…
Philosophy and History of Science (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Citation (3 obras) · Epistemology (3 obras) · Library science (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 obras)