Raffaella De Rosa
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873380 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Raffaella De Rosa |
| GIVEN NAMES | Raffaella |
| FAMILY NAME | De Rosa |
| SIGNATURE | DE ROSA R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The self-luminousness of consciousness: Locke’s awareness principle as a defence of an empiricist account of the origin of ideas
Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas
Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate (Claim A) and caused in us by bodies (Claim B). Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating…
Cartesian Sensations
Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reas…
Descartes on Mathematical Essences
A teleological account of Cartesian sensations
Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes
Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxy type theory of concepts provides what he calls the ‘intentionality’ and ‘cognitive content’ desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the …
Locke's Essay, Book I: The Question‐Begging Status of the Anti‐Nativist Arguments
In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti‐nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz. , the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then arg…
On Fodor’s Claim that Classical Empiricists and Rationalists Agree on the Innateness of Ideas
A teleological account of Cartesian sensations
Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes
Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxy type theory of concepts provides what he calls the ‘intentionality’ and ‘cognitive content’ desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the …
Locke's Essay, Book I: The Question‐Begging Status of the Anti‐Nativist Arguments
In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti‐nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz. , the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then arg…
On Fodor’s Claim that Classical Empiricists and Rationalists Agree on the Innateness of Ideas
Locke's Essay, Book I: The Question‐Begging Status of the Anti‐Nativist Arguments
In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti‐nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz. , the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then arg…
Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes
Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxy type theory of concepts provides what he calls the ‘intentionality’ and ‘cognitive content’ desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the …
A teleological account of Cartesian sensations
Descartes on Mathematical Essences
Cartesian Sensations
Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reas…
Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas
Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate (Claim A) and caused in us by bodies (Claim B). Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating…
The self-luminousness of consciousness: Locke’s awareness principle as a defence of an empiricist account of the origin of ideas
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Empiricism (3 works) · History of Science and Medicine (3 works) · Cartesian coordinate system (2 works)