Cartesian Sensations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4975874 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Raffaella De Rosa (Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 780-792 |
| Publication date | 2009-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00252.x |
| OpenAlex | W4232909669 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on sensory representation
Attribution · Cartesian coordinate system · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Linguistics · Political science · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · History of Science and Medicine · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |