Spencer Paulson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873877 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Spencer Paulson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Spencer |
| FAMILY NAME | Paulson |
| SIGNATURE | PAULSON S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5794-1387 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Knowledge and Argument
I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument. This makes knowledge well‐suited to facilitate epistemic social coordination. Since executive‐level belief revision works by running offline simulations tha…
A social model of cognitive integration
In this article, I draw on the social intentionality hypothesis to develop an account of cognitive integration. My account sheds light on the variety of cognitive integration that has been of most interest to epistemologists by arguing that it is best understood as the intrapersonal analogue of a paradigmatically interpersonal problem. Furthermore, the intrapersonal version of the problem is solved by simulating the solution to the interpersonal …
Epistemically Vicious Knowledge
Internalizing rules
The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process. We internalize rules by simulating instru…
Epistemic Normativity & Epistemic Autonomy
Reflective naturalism
Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject
The very idea of rational irrationality
I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We lik…
The very idea of rational irrationality
I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We lik…
Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject
Epistemic Normativity & Epistemic Autonomy
Reflective naturalism
Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject
The very idea of rational irrationality
I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We lik…
Internalizing rules
The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process. We internalize rules by simulating instru…
A social model of cognitive integration
In this article, I draw on the social intentionality hypothesis to develop an account of cognitive integration. My account sheds light on the variety of cognitive integration that has been of most interest to epistemologists by arguing that it is best understood as the intrapersonal analogue of a paradigmatically interpersonal problem. Furthermore, the intrapersonal version of the problem is solved by simulating the solution to the interpersonal …
Epistemically Vicious Knowledge
Knowledge and Argument
I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument. This makes knowledge well‐suited to facilitate epistemic social coordination. Since executive‐level belief revision works by running offline simulations tha…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works)