The very idea of rational irrationality

Bibliographic Data

ID7354375
AuthorsSpencer Paulson (0000-0001-5794-1387, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume23
Issue1
Pages3-21
Publication date2023-05-25
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1470594x231177640
OpenAlexW4378191632
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited62

I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We like to see ourselves as members of certain groups (e.g. “rugged individualists”) and being part of those groups depends on having certain beliefs (e.g. about welfare spending). Even if a decrease in welfare spending would be bad for me, I might still benefit by believing in and, consequently, voting for a decrease since my vote is unlikely to make a difference but getting to see myself as a rugged individualist will make a noticeable difference to my wellbeing. It is sometimes argued that this hypothesis fails for empirical reasons. I will argue that things are worse: it is conceptually incoherent. I will do so by first showing that it is a rationalizing explanation and then argue that rationalizing explanations must be reflectively stable from the agent's perspective. The rational irrationality hypothesis is not

Economics · Individualism · Irrationality · Law and economics · Market economy · Methodological individualism · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Rationality · Voting · Voting behavior · Welfare · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology

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