Evidentialism and the Numbers Game1
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143346 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Reisner (0000-0001-5303-3752, McGill University, corresponding author), ANDREW E REISNER |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 304-316 |
| Publication date | 2007-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01210.x |
| OpenAlex | W2099848887 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 6 |
This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evidentialism. Evidentialism is the highly intuitive view that the only normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. I shall argue that in certain circumstances, evidentialism is unable to generate the correct reasons for belief; these reasons can only be provided by other kinds of epistemic reasons apart from evidential ones. I am not arguing that reasons in ordinary cases for belief are non‐evidential, but that evidentialism is too narrow an account of normative reasons for belief to serve as a complete theory of epistemic reasons
Epistemology · Normative · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 0.64 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |