Andrew Reisner
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281711 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Reisner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Reisner |
| SIGNATURE | REISNER A |
| AFFILIATIONS | McGill University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5303-3752 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Trends in pediatric firearm-related injuries and disparities in acute outcomes
Background Firearm-related injuries (FRI) are an increasing cause of death and injury in children. The etiology for this rise is multifactorial and includes socioeconomic factors. Despite its prevalence and documented increase over COVID-19, there is a paucity of research on disparities and the influence of social determinants of health (SDH) in pediatric FRI. This study aims to explore the epidemiology of this vulnerable population in Atlanta, t…
Welfarist Pluralism
This paper outlines a new pluralistic theory of normative reasons for belief, welfarist pluralism, which aims to explain how there can be basic alethic/epistemic reasons for belief and basic pragmatic/non-alethic reasons for belief that can combine to determine what one ought to believe. The paper shows how this non-derivative first-order pluralism arises from a purely welfarist account of the foundations of theoretical normativity, thereby combi…
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
In some circumstances, a wedge may be driven between what is advantageous or beneficial to believe and what is true. Cases range from the exotic—with diabolical forces conspiring to punish a hapless victim for believing the truth—to the mundane—with excessive optimism increasing one’s chances of success at some tasks. In contemporary discussions about normative reasons for belief, it is often argued or assumed that all reasons for belief arise on…
Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity
In a tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, it has become common for contemporary philosophers to treat practical and theoretical normativity as constituting two genuinely distinct domains. Despite this, it remains unclear what it is, or would be, for practical and theoretical normativity to in fact be distinct domains. This chapter considers the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct and proposes that there are two differen…
Weighing and Reasoning
Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes
Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
The Domain of Reasons
As in Helene Hanff's (1970) England, one can find in John Skorupski's book The Domain of Reasons whatever one is looking for. And like Hanff's England, what one finds is as worth the search as one might have hoped. For example, if you are principally interested in practical reason, you need look no further. If traditional metaethics is your concern, you have the right book. If you are interested in normative epistemology, value, the will, moral t…
Evidentialism and the Numbers Game1
This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evidentialism. Evidentialism is the highly intuitive view that the only normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. I shall argue that in certain circumstances, evidentialism is unable to generate the correct reasons for belief; these reasons can only be provided by other kinds of epistemic reasons apart from evidential ones. I am not arguing tha…
Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes
Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
Evidentialism and the Numbers Game1
This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evidentialism. Evidentialism is the highly intuitive view that the only normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. I shall argue that in certain circumstances, evidentialism is unable to generate the correct reasons for belief; these reasons can only be provided by other kinds of epistemic reasons apart from evidential ones. I am not arguing tha…
The Domain of Reasons
As in Helene Hanff's (1970) England, one can find in John Skorupski's book The Domain of Reasons whatever one is looking for. And like Hanff's England, what one finds is as worth the search as one might have hoped. For example, if you are principally interested in practical reason, you need look no further. If traditional metaethics is your concern, you have the right book. If you are interested in normative epistemology, value, the will, moral t…
Weighing and Reasoning
Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes
Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
In some circumstances, a wedge may be driven between what is advantageous or beneficial to believe and what is true. Cases range from the exotic—with diabolical forces conspiring to punish a hapless victim for believing the truth—to the mundane—with excessive optimism increasing one’s chances of success at some tasks. In contemporary discussions about normative reasons for belief, it is often argued or assumed that all reasons for belief arise on…
Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity
In a tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, it has become common for contemporary philosophers to treat practical and theoretical normativity as constituting two genuinely distinct domains. Despite this, it remains unclear what it is, or would be, for practical and theoretical normativity to in fact be distinct domains. This chapter considers the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct and proposes that there are two differen…
Welfarist Pluralism
This paper outlines a new pluralistic theory of normative reasons for belief, welfarist pluralism, which aims to explain how there can be basic alethic/epistemic reasons for belief and basic pragmatic/non-alethic reasons for belief that can combine to determine what one ought to believe. The paper shows how this non-derivative first-order pluralism arises from a purely welfarist account of the foundations of theoretical normativity, thereby combi…
Trends in pediatric firearm-related injuries and disparities in acute outcomes
Background Firearm-related injuries (FRI) are an increasing cause of death and injury in children. The etiology for this rise is multifactorial and includes socioeconomic factors. Despite its prevalence and documented increase over COVID-19, there is a paucity of research on disparities and the influence of social determinants of health (SDH) in pediatric FRI. This study aims to explore the epidemiology of this vulnerable population in Atlanta, t…
Epistemology (5 works) · Normative (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Value (mathematics) (2 works)