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Andre Kukla

Biographic Data

ID3874236
NAMEAndre Kukla
GIVEN NAMESAndre
FAMILY NAMEKukla
SIGNATUREKUKLA A
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Toronto
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS25
TOTAL CITATIONS30
AUTHOR COUNT25
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1982
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2008
H-INDEX3
  • The One World, One Science Argument

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2008•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    The one world, one science argument (so named by Rescher) is advanced by Carl Sagan and others to support the thesis that we will be able to learn to converse with intelligent extraterrestrials if and when we encounter them. The prima facie obstacle to extraterrestrial communication is that the aliens’ culture and geography are bound to be so different from ours that we would find it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to find a c…

  • Inefability and philosophy

    Andre Kukla•BOOK•Inefability and philosophy•2004

    This book provides an analysis of the idea of what can't be said. As the author states, he cannot tell us directly what it is that can't be said, but he can tell us a lot about what can't be said. The book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion and the author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't b…

  • Seti

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2001•Cited by: 2•References: 4

  • Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2001•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their re…

  • Methods of theoretical psychology

    Andre Kukla•BOOK•Methods of theoretical psychology•2001

  • Studies in Scientific Realism

    Jarrett Leplin, Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

  • Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science (Philosophical Issues in Science)

    Andre Kukla•BOOK•Social Constructivism and the…•2000

  • Larry Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1997•Cited by: 1

  • Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplin’s contention that neither van Fraassen’s Darwinist explanation nor Laudan’s methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fine’s suggestion— that the empirical adequacy of our th…

  • The Theory-Observation Distinction

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1996•Cited by: 1

    What do Jerry Fodor and Bas van Fraassen, the archetypical scientific realist and his antirealist shadow, have in common? They're both defenders of the theory-observation distinction.' It isn't surprising that a realist and an antirealist should agree about something; but it is curious that van Fraassen's and Fodor's defenses of the theory-observation distinction play diametrically opposite roles in their philosophical agendas. Van Fraassen needs…

  • The two antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 10

  • Forster and Sober on the Curve-Fitting Problem

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1995•Cited by: 6•References: 2

    Forster and Sober present a solution to the curve-fitting problem based on Akaike's Theorem. Their analysis shows that the curve with the best epistemic credentials need not always be the curve that most closely fits the data. However, their solution does not, without further argument, avoid the two difficulties that are traditionally associated with the curve-fitting problem: (1) that there are infinitely many equally good candidate-curves relat…

  • The Structure of Self-Fulfilling and Self-Negating Prophecies

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Theory & Psychology•1994

    A formal system based on the sentential calculus is constructed to explore the logical properties of autogenetic (self-fulfilling and self-negating) beliefs. The language enables us to distinguish among types of autogenesis which have previously been regarded as identical, and to describe new types which have not yet been discussed in the experimental literature. The analysis proceeds in three stages. The first stage deals with individual autogen…

  • Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1994•Cited by: 8•References: 6

    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of t…

  • Unification as a goal for psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1992

  • Unification as a goal for psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1992

  • Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1991•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth

  • Theoretical psychology, artificial intelligence, and empirical research

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1990

  • Theoretical psychology, artificial intelligence, and empirical research

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1990

  • Nonempirical issues in psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1989

  • Nonempirical issues in psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1989

  • On social constructionism

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1986

  • On social constructionism

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1986

  • Objectivity revisited

    Andre Kukla, Andr Kukla et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Personality and Social…•1984

  • Logical incoherence of value-free science

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Journal of Personality and Social…•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1994•Cited by: 8•References: 6

    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of t…

  • Forster and Sober on the Curve-Fitting Problem

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1995•Cited by: 6•References: 2

    Forster and Sober present a solution to the curve-fitting problem based on Akaike's Theorem. Their analysis shows that the curve with the best epistemic credentials need not always be the curve that most closely fits the data. However, their solution does not, without further argument, avoid the two difficulties that are traditionally associated with the curve-fitting problem: (1) that there are infinitely many equally good candidate-curves relat…

  • Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2001•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their re…

  • Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1991•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth

  • Seti

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2001•Cited by: 2•References: 4

  • The One World, One Science Argument

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2008•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    The one world, one science argument (so named by Rescher) is advanced by Carl Sagan and others to support the thesis that we will be able to learn to converse with intelligent extraterrestrials if and when we encounter them. The prima facie obstacle to extraterrestrial communication is that the aliens’ culture and geography are bound to be so different from ours that we would find it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to find a c…

  • Larry Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1997•Cited by: 1

  • Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplin’s contention that neither van Fraassen’s Darwinist explanation nor Laudan’s methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fine’s suggestion— that the empirical adequacy of our th…

  • The Theory-Observation Distinction

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1996•Cited by: 1

    What do Jerry Fodor and Bas van Fraassen, the archetypical scientific realist and his antirealist shadow, have in common? They're both defenders of the theory-observation distinction.' It isn't surprising that a realist and an antirealist should agree about something; but it is curious that van Fraassen's and Fodor's defenses of the theory-observation distinction play diametrically opposite roles in their philosophical agendas. Van Fraassen needs…

  • The two antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 10

  • Logical incoherence of value-free science

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Journal of Personality and Social…•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Logical incoherence of value-free science

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Journal of Personality and Social…•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 1

  • Objectivity revisited

    Andre Kukla, Andr Kukla et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Personality and Social…•1984

  • On social constructionism

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1986

  • On social constructionism

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1986

  • Nonempirical issues in psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1989

  • Nonempirical issues in psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1989

  • Theoretical psychology, artificial intelligence, and empirical research

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1990

  • Theoretical psychology, artificial intelligence, and empirical research

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1990

  • Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1991•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth

  • Unification as a goal for psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1992

  • Unification as a goal for psychology

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1992

  • The Structure of Self-Fulfilling and Self-Negating Prophecies

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Theory & Psychology•1994

    A formal system based on the sentential calculus is constructed to explore the logical properties of autogenetic (self-fulfilling and self-negating) beliefs. The language enables us to distinguish among types of autogenesis which have previously been regarded as identical, and to describe new types which have not yet been discussed in the experimental literature. The analysis proceeds in three stages. The first stage deals with individual autogen…

  • Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1994•Cited by: 8•References: 6

    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of t…

  • The two antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 10

  • Forster and Sober on the Curve-Fitting Problem

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1995•Cited by: 6•References: 2

    Forster and Sober present a solution to the curve-fitting problem based on Akaike's Theorem. Their analysis shows that the curve with the best epistemic credentials need not always be the curve that most closely fits the data. However, their solution does not, without further argument, avoid the two difficulties that are traditionally associated with the curve-fitting problem: (1) that there are infinitely many equally good candidate-curves relat…

  • Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplin’s contention that neither van Fraassen’s Darwinist explanation nor Laudan’s methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fine’s suggestion— that the empirical adequacy of our th…

  • The Theory-Observation Distinction

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1996•Cited by: 1

    What do Jerry Fodor and Bas van Fraassen, the archetypical scientific realist and his antirealist shadow, have in common? They're both defenders of the theory-observation distinction.' It isn't surprising that a realist and an antirealist should agree about something; but it is curious that van Fraassen's and Fodor's defenses of the theory-observation distinction play diametrically opposite roles in their philosophical agendas. Van Fraassen needs…

  • Larry Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1997•Cited by: 1

  • Studies in Scientific Realism

    Jarrett Leplin, Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2000

  • Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science (Philosophical Issues in Science)

    Andre Kukla•BOOK•Social Constructivism and the…•2000

  • Seti

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2001•Cited by: 2•References: 4

  • Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses

    Open Access•Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2001•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their re…

  • Methods of theoretical psychology

    Andre Kukla•BOOK•Methods of theoretical psychology•2001

  • Inefability and philosophy

    Andre Kukla•BOOK•Inefability and philosophy•2004

    This book provides an analysis of the idea of what can't be said. As the author states, he cannot tell us directly what it is that can't be said, but he can tell us a lot about what can't be said. The book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion and the author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't b…

  • The One World, One Science Argument

    Andre Kukla•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2008•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    The one world, one science argument (so named by Rescher) is advanced by Carl Sagan and others to support the thesis that we will be able to learn to converse with intelligent extraterrestrials if and when we encounter them. The prima facie obstacle to extraterrestrial communication is that the aliens’ culture and geography are bound to be so different from ours that we would find it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to find a c…

Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Psychology (13 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Applied Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works)

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