Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses

Bibliographic Data

ID10706680
AuthorsAndre Kukla (University of Toronto, corresponding author)
Year2001
Volume68
Issue1
Pages21-35
Publication date2001-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/392864
OpenAlexW1991852064
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited9

The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their repudiation of the thesis of underdetermination. I argue that the attempt to provide criteria of theoreticity fails, that there is a Bayesian solution to the problem of scientific disregard that fares better, and that this successful solution supports a distinctively Bayesian version of the underdetermination thesis

Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Property (philosophy) · Scientific theory · Underdetermination · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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