Samuel Schindler
Biographic Data
| ID | 3874435 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Samuel Schindler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Samuel |
| FAMILY NAME | Schindler |
| SIGNATURE | SCHINDLER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5656-9840 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 54 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Two Types of Natural Kind Discovery: Nobel meets Kuhn
Philosophers have spilled much ink over the discovery of ideas in the classical “context of discovery”. However, there has been little engagement with the question of what constitutes a discovery of “things in the world”. A much-overlooked answer to this question is provided by T.S. Kuhn. In this paper, I show that discoveries awarded with a Nobel Prize in Physics in the past 53 years accord with a basic premise of Kuhn's account and his distinct…
Explanatory Stabilization in Situations of Evidential Uncertainty
In this article I issue a challenge to what I call the Independence Thesis of Theory Assessment (ITTA). According to ITTA, the evidence for (or against) a theory must be assessed independently from the theory explaining the evidence. I argue that ITTA is undermined by cases of evidential uncertainty, in which scientists have been guided by the explanatory power of their theories in the assessment of the evidence. Instead, I argue, these cases spe…
Armchair physics and the method of cases
The method of cases, i.e. the informal elicitation of judgements in thought experiments for the purpose of philosophical theorising, has been much criticised in recent years. In this paper we point out that the method of cases is not peculiar to philosophy: it can also be found in physics, where it has made a more limited, but still valuable contribution to the probing and formulation of theories. The method of cases per se should therefore not b…
Normal science: Not uncritical or dogmatic
When Kuhn first published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators sympathetic to Kuhn. I argue not only that there is …
Predictivism and avoidance of ad hoc-ness: An empirical study
Predictivism is the thesis that evidence successfully predicted by a scientific theory counts more (or ought to count more) in the confirmation of that theory than already known evidence would. One rationale that has been proposed for predictivism is that predictive success guards against ad hoc hypotheses. Despite the intuitive attraction of predictivism, there is historical evidence that speaks against it. As valuable as the historical evidence…
Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test
The so-called expertise defence against sceptical challenges from experimental philosophy has recently come under attack: there are several studies claiming to have found direct evidence that philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments are susceptible to erroneous effects. In this paper, we distinguish between the customary ‘immune experts’ version of the expertise defence and an ‘informed experts’ version. On the informed expertise defence, w…
Historical Case Studies: The “Model Organisms” of Philosophy of Science
Theoretical Virtues: Do Scientists Think What Philosophers Think They Ought to Think
Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought not to influence one’s acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social sciences and compares their views to those held by philosophers. Some of the more surprisin…
Theoretical Virtues in Science: Uncovering Reality through Theory
What are the features of a good scientific theory? Samuel Schindler's book revisits this classical question in the philosophy of science and develops new answers to it. Theoretical virtues matter not only for choosing theories 'to work with', but also for what we are justified in believing: only if the theories we possess are good ones (qua virtues) can we be confident that our theories' claims about nature are actually correct. Recent debates ha…
A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses
Theoretical Virtues in Science: Uncovering Reality Through Theory
Kuhnian theory-choice and virtue convergence: Facing the base rate fallacy
Explanatory fictions—for real
Novelty, coherence, and Mendeleev’s periodic table
History and philosophy of science: Coherent programme at last
The Kuhnian mode of HPS
Theory-laden experimentation
Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data
Conceptions of Causality
Use-novel predictions and Mendeleev’s periodic table: Response to
Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure
In this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to disc…
Rehabilitating theory: Refusal of the ‘bottom-up’ construction of scientific phenomena
Theory-laden experimentation
Theoretical Virtues: Do Scientists Think What Philosophers Think They Ought to Think
Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought not to influence one’s acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social sciences and compares their views to those held by philosophers. Some of the more surprisin…
Novelty, coherence, and Mendeleev’s periodic table
Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure
In this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to disc…
Rehabilitating theory: Refusal of the ‘bottom-up’ construction of scientific phenomena
A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses
Explanatory fictions—for real
The Kuhnian mode of HPS
Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data
Use-novel predictions and Mendeleev’s periodic table: Response to
Normal science: Not uncritical or dogmatic
When Kuhn first published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators sympathetic to Kuhn. I argue not only that there is …
Rehabilitating theory: Refusal of the ‘bottom-up’ construction of scientific phenomena
Use-novel predictions and Mendeleev’s periodic table: Response to
Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure
In this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to disc…
Conceptions of Causality
Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data
History and philosophy of science: Coherent programme at last
The Kuhnian mode of HPS
Theory-laden experimentation
Explanatory fictions—for real
Novelty, coherence, and Mendeleev’s periodic table
Kuhnian theory-choice and virtue convergence: Facing the base rate fallacy
Theoretical Virtues in Science: Uncovering Reality through Theory
What are the features of a good scientific theory? Samuel Schindler's book revisits this classical question in the philosophy of science and develops new answers to it. Theoretical virtues matter not only for choosing theories 'to work with', but also for what we are justified in believing: only if the theories we possess are good ones (qua virtues) can we be confident that our theories' claims about nature are actually correct. Recent debates ha…
A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses
Theoretical Virtues in Science: Uncovering Reality Through Theory
Historical Case Studies: The “Model Organisms” of Philosophy of Science
Theoretical Virtues: Do Scientists Think What Philosophers Think They Ought to Think
Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought not to influence one’s acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social sciences and compares their views to those held by philosophers. Some of the more surprisin…
Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test
The so-called expertise defence against sceptical challenges from experimental philosophy has recently come under attack: there are several studies claiming to have found direct evidence that philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments are susceptible to erroneous effects. In this paper, we distinguish between the customary ‘immune experts’ version of the expertise defence and an ‘informed experts’ version. On the informed expertise defence, w…
Armchair physics and the method of cases
The method of cases, i.e. the informal elicitation of judgements in thought experiments for the purpose of philosophical theorising, has been much criticised in recent years. In this paper we point out that the method of cases is not peculiar to philosophy: it can also be found in physics, where it has made a more limited, but still valuable contribution to the probing and formulation of theories. The method of cases per se should therefore not b…
Normal science: Not uncritical or dogmatic
When Kuhn first published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators sympathetic to Kuhn. I argue not only that there is …
Predictivism and avoidance of ad hoc-ness: An empirical study
Predictivism is the thesis that evidence successfully predicted by a scientific theory counts more (or ought to count more) in the confirmation of that theory than already known evidence would. One rationale that has been proposed for predictivism is that predictive success guards against ad hoc hypotheses. Despite the intuitive attraction of predictivism, there is historical evidence that speaks against it. As valuable as the historical evidence…
Two Types of Natural Kind Discovery: Nobel meets Kuhn
Philosophers have spilled much ink over the discovery of ideas in the classical “context of discovery”. However, there has been little engagement with the question of what constitutes a discovery of “things in the world”. A much-overlooked answer to this question is provided by T.S. Kuhn. In this paper, I show that discoveries awarded with a Nobel Prize in Physics in the past 53 years accord with a basic premise of Kuhn's account and his distinct…
Explanatory Stabilization in Situations of Evidential Uncertainty
In this article I issue a challenge to what I call the Independence Thesis of Theory Assessment (ITTA). According to ITTA, the evidence for (or against) a theory must be assessed independently from the theory explaining the evidence. I argue that ITTA is undermined by cases of evidential uncertainty, in which scientists have been guided by the explanatory power of their theories in the assessment of the evidence. Instead, I argue, these cases spe…
Philosophy and History of Science (20 works) · Epistemology (18 works) · Philosophy (18 works) · Mathematics (10 works) · Philosophy of science (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Physics (7 works) · Science and Climate Studies (5 works) · Sociology (5 works)