Jonathan N Brown
Biographic Data
| ID | 3876541 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan N Brown |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan N |
| FAMILY NAME | Brown |
| SIGNATURE | BROWN J N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Sam Houston State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Much in the Wrong’: A New History of British Involvement in the Belmonte Letter Incident
No One Knows – Or Will Say’: Revisiting the State Department’s Handling of the Belmonte-Wendler Letter
Embedded Deception: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperative Expectations, and the Sharing of Fabricated Intelligence
When and why do friendly states deliberately share and unwittingly accept fabricated intelligence about others? Recent work on the interpersonal foundations of security cooperation suggests intelligence liaison is a type of embedded relationship that requires a dependable route for exchange (close personal ties) and a consistent record of exchange (reliably meeting expectations). We extend this argument to show that the relational embeddedness un…
Is more institutional coup-proofing better or worse for regime protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987
Is more institutional coup-proofing (ICP) better or worse for leaders' chances of political survival? Are coups less or more likely to occur and succeed as a state's military structure becomes increasingly divided into rival branches, organizations, and factions? The article evaluates two competing perspectives on the effectiveness of counterbalancing as a regime protection measure. Seeing strength in numbers and the prospects for divide-and-conq…
Overthrowing the “Loyalty Norm: The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999
This article examines two competing theories that link variation in the size of a winning coalition to its members’ incentives and ability to orchestrate coups d’état against authoritarian leaders. Selectorate theory’s “loyalty norm” focuses on the incumbent’s ability to buy support and the challenger’s inability to guarantee inclusion in a future coalition. It suggests that, in small-coalition systems, the probability of coup attempts and succes…
American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry
When the United States perceives a threat to international security and calls on its allies for military assistance, how do they respond to such requests? A conventional view of alliances as instruments of control wielded by powerful states would suggest that secondary partners are likely to fall in step with U.S. plans or suffer the consequences of disappointing their patron superpower. Yet, since World War II, U.S. allies have pursued varying l…
Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations
The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations
Why do leaders draw attention to some cooperative security negotiations but shroud others in secrecy? Previous scholarship focuses on leaders’ efforts to gain better terms of agreement either by playing their cards close to the vest at the bargaining table or by leveraging/avoiding aroused public opinion at home. Yet, in many cases, it is neither dyadic nor domestic political pressures that motivate leaders’ decisions to publicly acknowledge or c…
Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy
We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coali…
Consensus and Divergence in International Studies: Survey Evidence from 140 International Studies Curriculum Programs
There is a growing debate over the extent of consensus or divergence found within interdisciplinary International Studies (IS) programs. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, this debate has taken place in the absence of empirical data. This article advances our understanding of the current state of IS curricula through an analysis of data generated from a survey of 140 interdisciplinary undergraduate IS majors across the United States. The surve…
Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy
We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coali…
The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations
Why do leaders draw attention to some cooperative security negotiations but shroud others in secrecy? Previous scholarship focuses on leaders’ efforts to gain better terms of agreement either by playing their cards close to the vest at the bargaining table or by leveraging/avoiding aroused public opinion at home. Yet, in many cases, it is neither dyadic nor domestic political pressures that motivate leaders’ decisions to publicly acknowledge or c…
Overthrowing the “Loyalty Norm: The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999
This article examines two competing theories that link variation in the size of a winning coalition to its members’ incentives and ability to orchestrate coups d’état against authoritarian leaders. Selectorate theory’s “loyalty norm” focuses on the incumbent’s ability to buy support and the challenger’s inability to guarantee inclusion in a future coalition. It suggests that, in small-coalition systems, the probability of coup attempts and succes…
Consensus and Divergence in International Studies: Survey Evidence from 140 International Studies Curriculum Programs
There is a growing debate over the extent of consensus or divergence found within interdisciplinary International Studies (IS) programs. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, this debate has taken place in the absence of empirical data. This article advances our understanding of the current state of IS curricula through an analysis of data generated from a survey of 140 interdisciplinary undergraduate IS majors across the United States. The surve…
Embedded Deception: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperative Expectations, and the Sharing of Fabricated Intelligence
When and why do friendly states deliberately share and unwittingly accept fabricated intelligence about others? Recent work on the interpersonal foundations of security cooperation suggests intelligence liaison is a type of embedded relationship that requires a dependable route for exchange (close personal ties) and a consistent record of exchange (reliably meeting expectations). We extend this argument to show that the relational embeddedness un…
Is more institutional coup-proofing better or worse for regime protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987
Is more institutional coup-proofing (ICP) better or worse for leaders' chances of political survival? Are coups less or more likely to occur and succeed as a state's military structure becomes increasingly divided into rival branches, organizations, and factions? The article evaluates two competing perspectives on the effectiveness of counterbalancing as a regime protection measure. Seeing strength in numbers and the prospects for divide-and-conq…
Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations
Consensus and Divergence in International Studies: Survey Evidence from 140 International Studies Curriculum Programs
There is a growing debate over the extent of consensus or divergence found within interdisciplinary International Studies (IS) programs. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, this debate has taken place in the absence of empirical data. This article advances our understanding of the current state of IS curricula through an analysis of data generated from a survey of 140 interdisciplinary undergraduate IS majors across the United States. The surve…
Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy
We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coali…
The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations
Why do leaders draw attention to some cooperative security negotiations but shroud others in secrecy? Previous scholarship focuses on leaders’ efforts to gain better terms of agreement either by playing their cards close to the vest at the bargaining table or by leveraging/avoiding aroused public opinion at home. Yet, in many cases, it is neither dyadic nor domestic political pressures that motivate leaders’ decisions to publicly acknowledge or c…
Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations
American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry
When the United States perceives a threat to international security and calls on its allies for military assistance, how do they respond to such requests? A conventional view of alliances as instruments of control wielded by powerful states would suggest that secondary partners are likely to fall in step with U.S. plans or suffer the consequences of disappointing their patron superpower. Yet, since World War II, U.S. allies have pursued varying l…
Overthrowing the “Loyalty Norm: The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999
This article examines two competing theories that link variation in the size of a winning coalition to its members’ incentives and ability to orchestrate coups d’état against authoritarian leaders. Selectorate theory’s “loyalty norm” focuses on the incumbent’s ability to buy support and the challenger’s inability to guarantee inclusion in a future coalition. It suggests that, in small-coalition systems, the probability of coup attempts and succes…
Is more institutional coup-proofing better or worse for regime protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987
Is more institutional coup-proofing (ICP) better or worse for leaders' chances of political survival? Are coups less or more likely to occur and succeed as a state's military structure becomes increasingly divided into rival branches, organizations, and factions? The article evaluates two competing perspectives on the effectiveness of counterbalancing as a regime protection measure. Seeing strength in numbers and the prospects for divide-and-conq…
Embedded Deception: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperative Expectations, and the Sharing of Fabricated Intelligence
When and why do friendly states deliberately share and unwittingly accept fabricated intelligence about others? Recent work on the interpersonal foundations of security cooperation suggests intelligence liaison is a type of embedded relationship that requires a dependable route for exchange (close personal ties) and a consistent record of exchange (reliably meeting expectations). We extend this argument to show that the relational embeddedness un…
No One Knows – Or Will Say’: Revisiting the State Department’s Handling of the Belmonte-Wendler Letter
Much in the Wrong’: A New History of British Involvement in the Belmonte Letter Incident
Political science (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Accountability (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (2 works)