Overthrowing the “Loyalty Norm
The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284587 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony S Marcum (Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA), Anthony Marcum (University of Maryland, College Park), Jonathan N Brown (Sam Houston State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 256-282 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002714540469 |
| OpenAlex | W2312197181 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 49 |
This article examines two competing theories that link variation in the size of a winning coalition to its members’ incentives and ability to orchestrate coups d’état against authoritarian leaders. Selectorate theory’s “loyalty norm” focuses on the incumbent’s ability to buy support and the challenger’s inability to guarantee inclusion in a future coalition. It suggests that, in small-coalition systems, the probability of coup attempts and successes decreases as coalition size decreases. We develop an alternative theory of political accountability that focuses on a coalition’s capacity to coordinate sanctions against a leader. It generates a rival expectation—in small-coalition systems, the probability of coup attempts and successes increases as coalition size decreases. We evaluate these hypotheses through quantitative tests on coup attempts and successes during 1950 to 1999 and with an illustrative case study of the Saint-Sylvestre Coup in the Central African Republic. These analyses provide strong support for our theory of political accountability
Accountability · Authoritarianism · Democracy · Economics · Incentive · Loyalty · Microeconomics · Norm (philosophy · Opportunism · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · Sociology · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,82 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |