Ramzi Suleiman
Biographic Data
| ID | 3889600 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ramzi Suleiman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ramzi |
| FAMILY NAME | Suleiman |
| SIGNATURE | SULEIMAN R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Haifa |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9848-7475 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 92 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Sleeping on the enemy’s couch
This paper discusses the impact of the Jewish-Arab conflict on overt and covert layers of therapeutic encounters that take place across boundaries between the two nationalities. We refer mainly to the prevalent case of Arab patients treated by Jewish therapists. We discuss the implications of intergroup tension, cultural differences, and status disparities on the therapeutic dynamics. Our focus is on the effect of these variables on the processes…
The Sharing Dilemma
The “social insurance” hypothesis posits that individuals join cooperative groups and share resources in order to reduce environmental risk. Despite its significance for explaining cooperative groups' formation, in small‐scale and in developing societies, the hypothesis has been subjected to little experimental testing. The present research is designed to examine the relative weight of the motivation for social insurance compared with other psych…
When scowling may be a good thing
Emotion displays do not only signal emotions but also have social signal value. A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that expressing anger when complaining may lead to positive outcomes for the complainant because anger signals goal obstruction and hence the presence of real harm. The results suggest that the social signal value of anger enhances the credibility of the complainant and hence leads to better compensation, but only when the …
Cooperative, pure, and selfish trusting
Three types of trusting have been distinguished conceptually and empirically. In cooperative trusting the trust giver explicitly expects a reaction from the trust recipient that fits with the equality norm. In pure trusting, no explicit expectation is expressed by the giver. In selfish trusting the giver explicitly expects a reaction that benefits himself or herself at the expense of the recipient. We asked whether the three types of trust elicit…
Planned Encounters Between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis
Several ideas derived from Social Identity Theory are used to analyze intergroup processes taking place in planned encounters between Jews and Palestinians in Israel. In addition to the interpersonal dimension of such encounters, the article focuses on the importance of intergroup variables (e.g., power and status differences) in understanding psychological and behavioral reactions of majority and minority group members. The theoretical analysis …
Perception of the Minority's Collective Identity and Voting Behavior
The author investigated how Palestinian (n = 130) and Jewish (n = 153) Israeli university students perceived the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel. The Palestinian and Jewish respondents perceived the "identity space" of the minority as linear, or bipolar, with 1 pole defined by the national (Palestinian) identity and the other defined by the civic (Israeli) label. The Palestinian respondents defined their collective ident…
Minority self-categorization
This article summarizes basic principles derived from Social Identity Theory for the case of minorities. It then uses them as a theoretical framework to discuss research findings on the self-categorization of the Palestinian minority in Israel. Based on recent findings, a double marginality model is proposed, according to which members of this minority internalize a marginal civic identity, alongside a marginal ethnic identity. It is argued that …
Tools and Techniques for Social Science Simulation
Simulations as Tools for Modeling and Theory Building: N. Gilbert: Models, Processes and Algorithms: Towards a Simulation Toolkit.- J. Doran: Questions in the Methodology of Artificial Societies.- G. Muller: Computer Assisted Interfacing: On the Use of Computer Simulation for Theory Construction.- C. Stoica: Interactive Neural Networks as Tools for Modeling Social Systems.- Multi-Agent Based Simulations: W. Balzer: SMASS: A Serial Multi-Agent Sys…
Election Frequency and the Emergence of Cooperation in a Simulated Intergroup Conflict
The present study simulates an enduring intergroup conflict in which each of two interacting groups is represented by a single representative elected for a given period. The authors assume that the conflict between the two groups can be modeled as an iterated prisoner's dilemma game played by the groups' representatives, and that the performance of each representative influences her constituents which, in turn, affects her prospects for reelectio…
Provision of Step-Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty
In a typical game examining voluntary contribution to the provision of step-level public goods, each member of a group of size n receives an endowment and then decides privately and anonymously how much of it to contribute for the provision of the good. The good is provided to all group members if and only if their total contribution is equal to, or larger than some threshold. While previous research assumed that group members have complete infor…
Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game
Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution
Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco‐operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show tha…
Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players
Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff w…
Planned Encounters Between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis
Several ideas derived from Social Identity Theory are used to analyze intergroup processes taking place in planned encounters between Jews and Palestinians in Israel. In addition to the interpersonal dimension of such encounters, the article focuses on the importance of intergroup variables (e.g., power and status differences) in understanding psychological and behavioral reactions of majority and minority group members. The theoretical analysis …
Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution
Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco‐operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show tha…
Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game
Minority self-categorization
This article summarizes basic principles derived from Social Identity Theory for the case of minorities. It then uses them as a theoretical framework to discuss research findings on the self-categorization of the Palestinian minority in Israel. Based on recent findings, a double marginality model is proposed, according to which members of this minority internalize a marginal civic identity, alongside a marginal ethnic identity. It is argued that …
Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players
Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff w…
Tools and Techniques for Social Science Simulation
Simulations as Tools for Modeling and Theory Building: N. Gilbert: Models, Processes and Algorithms: Towards a Simulation Toolkit.- J. Doran: Questions in the Methodology of Artificial Societies.- G. Muller: Computer Assisted Interfacing: On the Use of Computer Simulation for Theory Construction.- C. Stoica: Interactive Neural Networks as Tools for Modeling Social Systems.- Multi-Agent Based Simulations: W. Balzer: SMASS: A Serial Multi-Agent Sys…
Provision of Step-Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty
In a typical game examining voluntary contribution to the provision of step-level public goods, each member of a group of size n receives an endowment and then decides privately and anonymously how much of it to contribute for the provision of the good. The good is provided to all group members if and only if their total contribution is equal to, or larger than some threshold. While previous research assumed that group members have complete infor…
When scowling may be a good thing
Emotion displays do not only signal emotions but also have social signal value. A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that expressing anger when complaining may lead to positive outcomes for the complainant because anger signals goal obstruction and hence the presence of real harm. The results suggest that the social signal value of anger enhances the credibility of the complainant and hence leads to better compensation, but only when the …
Election Frequency and the Emergence of Cooperation in a Simulated Intergroup Conflict
The present study simulates an enduring intergroup conflict in which each of two interacting groups is represented by a single representative elected for a given period. The authors assume that the conflict between the two groups can be modeled as an iterated prisoner's dilemma game played by the groups' representatives, and that the performance of each representative influences her constituents which, in turn, affects her prospects for reelectio…
The Sharing Dilemma
The “social insurance” hypothesis posits that individuals join cooperative groups and share resources in order to reduce environmental risk. Despite its significance for explaining cooperative groups' formation, in small‐scale and in developing societies, the hypothesis has been subjected to little experimental testing. The present research is designed to examine the relative weight of the motivation for social insurance compared with other psych…
Sleeping on the enemy’s couch
This paper discusses the impact of the Jewish-Arab conflict on overt and covert layers of therapeutic encounters that take place across boundaries between the two nationalities. We refer mainly to the prevalent case of Arab patients treated by Jewish therapists. We discuss the implications of intergroup tension, cultural differences, and status disparities on the therapeutic dynamics. Our focus is on the effect of these variables on the processes…
Cooperative, pure, and selfish trusting
Three types of trusting have been distinguished conceptually and empirically. In cooperative trusting the trust giver explicitly expects a reaction from the trust recipient that fits with the equality norm. In pure trusting, no explicit expectation is expressed by the giver. In selfish trusting the giver explicitly expects a reaction that benefits himself or herself at the expense of the recipient. We asked whether the three types of trust elicit…
Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players
Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff w…
Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution
Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco‐operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show tha…
Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game
Election Frequency and the Emergence of Cooperation in a Simulated Intergroup Conflict
The present study simulates an enduring intergroup conflict in which each of two interacting groups is represented by a single representative elected for a given period. The authors assume that the conflict between the two groups can be modeled as an iterated prisoner's dilemma game played by the groups' representatives, and that the performance of each representative influences her constituents which, in turn, affects her prospects for reelectio…
Provision of Step-Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty
In a typical game examining voluntary contribution to the provision of step-level public goods, each member of a group of size n receives an endowment and then decides privately and anonymously how much of it to contribute for the provision of the good. The good is provided to all group members if and only if their total contribution is equal to, or larger than some threshold. While previous research assumed that group members have complete infor…
Tools and Techniques for Social Science Simulation
Simulations as Tools for Modeling and Theory Building: N. Gilbert: Models, Processes and Algorithms: Towards a Simulation Toolkit.- J. Doran: Questions in the Methodology of Artificial Societies.- G. Muller: Computer Assisted Interfacing: On the Use of Computer Simulation for Theory Construction.- C. Stoica: Interactive Neural Networks as Tools for Modeling Social Systems.- Multi-Agent Based Simulations: W. Balzer: SMASS: A Serial Multi-Agent Sys…
Perception of the Minority's Collective Identity and Voting Behavior
The author investigated how Palestinian (n = 130) and Jewish (n = 153) Israeli university students perceived the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel. The Palestinian and Jewish respondents perceived the "identity space" of the minority as linear, or bipolar, with 1 pole defined by the national (Palestinian) identity and the other defined by the civic (Israeli) label. The Palestinian respondents defined their collective ident…
Minority self-categorization
This article summarizes basic principles derived from Social Identity Theory for the case of minorities. It then uses them as a theoretical framework to discuss research findings on the self-categorization of the Palestinian minority in Israel. Based on recent findings, a double marginality model is proposed, according to which members of this minority internalize a marginal civic identity, alongside a marginal ethnic identity. It is argued that …
Cooperative, pure, and selfish trusting
Three types of trusting have been distinguished conceptually and empirically. In cooperative trusting the trust giver explicitly expects a reaction from the trust recipient that fits with the equality norm. In pure trusting, no explicit expectation is expressed by the giver. In selfish trusting the giver explicitly expects a reaction that benefits himself or herself at the expense of the recipient. We asked whether the three types of trust elicit…
Planned Encounters Between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis
Several ideas derived from Social Identity Theory are used to analyze intergroup processes taking place in planned encounters between Jews and Palestinians in Israel. In addition to the interpersonal dimension of such encounters, the article focuses on the importance of intergroup variables (e.g., power and status differences) in understanding psychological and behavioral reactions of majority and minority group members. The theoretical analysis …
When scowling may be a good thing
Emotion displays do not only signal emotions but also have social signal value. A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that expressing anger when complaining may lead to positive outcomes for the complainant because anger signals goal obstruction and hence the presence of real harm. The results suggest that the social signal value of anger enhances the credibility of the complainant and hence leads to better compensation, but only when the …
The Sharing Dilemma
The “social insurance” hypothesis posits that individuals join cooperative groups and share resources in order to reduce environmental risk. Despite its significance for explaining cooperative groups' formation, in small‐scale and in developing societies, the hypothesis has been subjected to little experimental testing. The present research is designed to examine the relative weight of the motivation for social insurance compared with other psych…
Sleeping on the enemy’s couch
This paper discusses the impact of the Jewish-Arab conflict on overt and covert layers of therapeutic encounters that take place across boundaries between the two nationalities. We refer mainly to the prevalent case of Arab patients treated by Jewish therapists. We discuss the implications of intergroup tension, cultural differences, and status disparities on the therapeutic dynamics. Our focus is on the effect of these variables on the processes…
Psychology (11 works) · Social Psychology (11 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (7 works) · Social Psychology (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (4 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works)