Cooperative, pure, and selfish trusting

Their distinctive effects on the reaction of trust recipients

Bibliographic Data

ID10902111
AuthorsOren Eilam (Tel Aviv University, corresponding author), Ramzi Suleiman (0000-0001-9848-7475, University of Haifa)
Year2004
Volume34
Issue6
Pages729-738
Publication date2004-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0046-2772 • E-ISSN: 1099-0992
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1002/ejsp.227
OpenAlexW1974312122
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited25

Three types of trusting have been distinguished conceptually and empirically. In cooperative trusting the trust giver explicitly expects a reaction from the trust recipient that fits with the equality norm. In pure trusting, no explicit expectation is expressed by the giver. In selfish trusting the giver explicitly expects a reaction that benefits himself or herself at the expense of the recipient. We asked whether the three types of trust elicit distinctive reactions from trust recipients. Each participant was paired with a fictitious player who ostensibly enabled him or her to divide money between them. As hypothesized, both cooperative and pure trusting elicited more equal allocations than did selfish trusting. A second hypothesis, that cooperative trust would yield more equal allocations than pure trust, was not supported. Results are discussed in terms of equality norm, self‐interest norm, reciprocity norm, reactance theory, social sanctioning, and the need to comply with others' expectations. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Dictator game · Epistemology · Norm (philosophy) · Norm of reciprocity · Reactance · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology) · Social capital · Sociology · Cultural Differences and Values · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology

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