B Brewer
Biographic Data
| ID | 38972 |
|---|---|
| NAME | B Brewer |
| GIVEN NAMES | B |
| FAMILY NAME | Brewer |
| SIGNATURE | BREWER B |
| AFFILIATIONS | St. Catherine University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6258-8802 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 24 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 38 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 24 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Anil Gomes's The Practical Self
Gomes's rich and compelling book revolves around an extended line of argument for the thesis that a self-conscious subject must be one object amongst many in an objective world: self-consciousness entails objectivity. Others have offered arguments for the same conclusion; but, in contrast with his own, Gomes finds all of these wanting. After setting out my own understanding of Gomes's central argument, I will raise a series of concerns about each…
The metaphysics and epistemology of conscious perception
Some metaphysical disjunctivists about conscious perceptual experience argue that their position has attractive, anti-sceptical, epistemological consequences. Perceiving a particular round red ball is a matter of being in a conscious condition, which serves as the ground for judgement that that thing is round and red, that is inconsistent with the falsity of that judgement. For it consists in a relation of acquaintance with that very thing and it…
Effects of a psychological and physiotherapeutic intervention on the occurrence of injuries (Efectos de una intervención psicológica y fisioterapeútica sobre la ocurrencia de lesiones)
This study aims to analyse the effects of a psychological intervention focused on motivation and anxiety, in combination with a physiotherapy program, upon the occurrence of injuries. The participants were 22 male soccer players (age = 23.31, SD = 4.24). The instruments used were injury protocol, Competitive State Anxiety Inventory 2 (CSAI-2) and Behavioral Regulation in Sport Questionnaire (BRSQ). The program lasted twelve sessions a periodicity…
Consciousness and Content in Perception
Normal perception involves conscious experience of the world. What I call the Content View, (CV), attempts to account for this in terms of the representational content of perception. I offer a new argument against this view. Personal level perceptual content involves the determination of a fineness of grain in the predicational information conveyed to the subject. This depends on her exercise of personal level capacities such as categorization an…
Perception and its Objects
"Bill Brewer presents, motivates, and defends a bold new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should we best understand the most fundamental nature of our perceptual relation with the physical objects in the world around us? Most theorists today analyse perception in terms of its representational content, in large part in order to avoid fata…
Executive Function, Working Memory, and Medication Adherence Among Older Adults
The purpose of this study was to investigate the association between cognitive processes and medication adherence among community-dwelling older adults. Ninety-five participants (M = 78 years) completed a battery of cognitive assessments including measures of executive function, working memory, cued recall, and recognition memory. Medication adherence was examined over 8 weeks for one prescribed medicine by use of an electronic medication-monitor…
Stroud's Quest for Reality
Reasons Require Conceptual Contents
Argues that reasons require conceptual contents. That is to say, a person has a reason for believing something only if he is in some mental state or other with a representational content that is characterizable only in terms of concepts that the subject himself must possess and that is of a form that enables it to serve as a premiss or the conclusion of a deductive argument, or of an inference of some other kind (e.g. inductive or abductive).
Belief and Experience
Offers the Strawson Argument for the claim, (1), that the most basic beliefs about the spatial world have their contents only in virtue of their standing in certain relations with perceptual experiences. Only an experiential presentation of the particular mind‐independent thing in question suffices to tie down knowledgeable reference to spatial particulars in the face of the permanent epistemic possibility of massive qualitative reduplication of …
Epistemological Consequences and Criticisms
Draws out the fatal consequences of thesis (R) for any reliabilist account of perceptual knowledge; also contains extended critical discussions of the classical foundationalistand classical coherentistattempts to elucidate the truth of (R). Both of these are attempts to give what I call a second‐orderaccount, on which perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs only in virtue of the subject's second‐order reflection upon the reli…
Historical‐Epistemological Context
Sets out the epistemological context for my enquiry, by outlining the key moves in a formative phase of its historical development: the writings of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Reid, and Kant. My purpose here is not to engage in the detailed exegesis and interpretation of these philosophers’ views, but to delineate the space of live options in the area, and to point out some dead ends.
Developments and Consequences
Discusses a number of developments and consequences of my position. Firstly, there is the very important issue of the relation between the basic, essentially experiential, perceptual demonstrative contents that I have been considering up to this point, and the more detached, linguistically articulated and categorized judgements that a person more standardly makes on the basis of perception, and that constitute the normal expression of his percept…
Experience and Reason
Offers the Switching Argument for the claim, (2), that only reason‐giving relations between perceptual experiences and empirical beliefs could possibly serve the content‐determining role required by (1). Non‐reason‐giving relations between perceptual experiences and basic empirical beliefs would necessarily leave the subject quite ignorant of which mind‐independent object his belief is supposed to be about, in a way that is incompatible with his …
The Epistemological Outlook
Aims to clarify the epistemological outlook that arises from my positive elucidation of the truth of (R), and also to offer further defence against a number of key objections. Firstly, I explain the position of my own views in the context of the standard opposition between foundationalist and coherentist theories of perceptual knowledge. This brings out precisely the sense in which I succeed in capturing the ‘undeniable datum’ with which I begin …
The Rational Role of Perceptual Experiences
Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is that they furnish the subject with certain essentially experiential demonstrative contents—‘that is thus’ (fully conceptual, as they must be)—his grasp of which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. For a person's grasp of such contents, as referring to the mind‐independent objects that they do, and predicating the mind‐independent prope…
Perception and Reason
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any de…
Perception and Reason
Prkis of Perception and Reason' 1
precis-of-perception-andreason(aaf6088f-74ff-4f1c-b9de-16521e104024).html][The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com] 1 References to Brewer, 1999, are indicated throughout simply by 'P&R'. 2 See Evans, 1982, pp.104 ff. for elucidation of this notion of a person's Idea of an object.-2 -he cannot knowledgeably rule out the possibility of a massive qualitative reduplication elsewhere in the universe of the relevant sector o…
Brewer, Direct Realism, and Acquaintance with Acquaintance
Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought
Overintellectualizing the Mind
Precis of Perception and Reason
precis-of-perception-andreason(aaf6088f-74ff-4f1c-b9de-16521e104024).html][The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com] 1 References to Brewer, 1999, are indicated throughout simply by 'P&R'. 2 See Evans, 1982, pp.104 ff. for elucidation of this notion of a person's Idea of an object.-2 -he cannot knowledgeably rule out the possibility of a massive qualitative reduplication elsewhere in the universe of the relevant sector o…
Replies
Epistemic Openness and Perceptual Defeasibility
Perception and Reason
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any de…
Executive Function, Working Memory, and Medication Adherence Among Older Adults
The purpose of this study was to investigate the association between cognitive processes and medication adherence among community-dwelling older adults. Ninety-five participants (M = 78 years) completed a battery of cognitive assessments including measures of executive function, working memory, cued recall, and recognition memory. Medication adherence was examined over 8 weeks for one prescribed medicine by use of an electronic medication-monitor…
Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought
Replies
Perception and Reason
Prkis of Perception and Reason' 1
precis-of-perception-andreason(aaf6088f-74ff-4f1c-b9de-16521e104024).html][The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com] 1 References to Brewer, 1999, are indicated throughout simply by 'P&R'. 2 See Evans, 1982, pp.104 ff. for elucidation of this notion of a person's Idea of an object.-2 -he cannot knowledgeably rule out the possibility of a massive qualitative reduplication elsewhere in the universe of the relevant sector o…
Brewer, Direct Realism, and Acquaintance with Acquaintance
Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought
Overintellectualizing the Mind
Precis of Perception and Reason
precis-of-perception-andreason(aaf6088f-74ff-4f1c-b9de-16521e104024).html][The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com] 1 References to Brewer, 1999, are indicated throughout simply by 'P&R'. 2 See Evans, 1982, pp.104 ff. for elucidation of this notion of a person's Idea of an object.-2 -he cannot knowledgeably rule out the possibility of a massive qualitative reduplication elsewhere in the universe of the relevant sector o…
Replies
Epistemic Openness and Perceptual Defeasibility
Reasons Require Conceptual Contents
Argues that reasons require conceptual contents. That is to say, a person has a reason for believing something only if he is in some mental state or other with a representational content that is characterizable only in terms of concepts that the subject himself must possess and that is of a form that enables it to serve as a premiss or the conclusion of a deductive argument, or of an inference of some other kind (e.g. inductive or abductive).
Belief and Experience
Offers the Strawson Argument for the claim, (1), that the most basic beliefs about the spatial world have their contents only in virtue of their standing in certain relations with perceptual experiences. Only an experiential presentation of the particular mind‐independent thing in question suffices to tie down knowledgeable reference to spatial particulars in the face of the permanent epistemic possibility of massive qualitative reduplication of …
Epistemological Consequences and Criticisms
Draws out the fatal consequences of thesis (R) for any reliabilist account of perceptual knowledge; also contains extended critical discussions of the classical foundationalistand classical coherentistattempts to elucidate the truth of (R). Both of these are attempts to give what I call a second‐orderaccount, on which perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs only in virtue of the subject's second‐order reflection upon the reli…
Historical‐Epistemological Context
Sets out the epistemological context for my enquiry, by outlining the key moves in a formative phase of its historical development: the writings of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Reid, and Kant. My purpose here is not to engage in the detailed exegesis and interpretation of these philosophers’ views, but to delineate the space of live options in the area, and to point out some dead ends.
Developments and Consequences
Discusses a number of developments and consequences of my position. Firstly, there is the very important issue of the relation between the basic, essentially experiential, perceptual demonstrative contents that I have been considering up to this point, and the more detached, linguistically articulated and categorized judgements that a person more standardly makes on the basis of perception, and that constitute the normal expression of his percept…
Experience and Reason
Offers the Switching Argument for the claim, (2), that only reason‐giving relations between perceptual experiences and empirical beliefs could possibly serve the content‐determining role required by (1). Non‐reason‐giving relations between perceptual experiences and basic empirical beliefs would necessarily leave the subject quite ignorant of which mind‐independent object his belief is supposed to be about, in a way that is incompatible with his …
The Epistemological Outlook
Aims to clarify the epistemological outlook that arises from my positive elucidation of the truth of (R), and also to offer further defence against a number of key objections. Firstly, I explain the position of my own views in the context of the standard opposition between foundationalist and coherentist theories of perceptual knowledge. This brings out precisely the sense in which I succeed in capturing the ‘undeniable datum’ with which I begin …
The Rational Role of Perceptual Experiences
Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is that they furnish the subject with certain essentially experiential demonstrative contents—‘that is thus’ (fully conceptual, as they must be)—his grasp of which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. For a person's grasp of such contents, as referring to the mind‐independent objects that they do, and predicating the mind‐independent prope…
Perception and Reason
Discusses the role of conscious experiences in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Most epistemology of perception takes a person's possession of beliefs about the mind‐independent world for granted and goes on to ask what further conditions these beliefs must meet if they are to be cases of knowledge. I argue that this approach is completely mistaken. Perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any de…
Stroud's Quest for Reality
Executive Function, Working Memory, and Medication Adherence Among Older Adults
The purpose of this study was to investigate the association between cognitive processes and medication adherence among community-dwelling older adults. Ninety-five participants (M = 78 years) completed a battery of cognitive assessments including measures of executive function, working memory, cued recall, and recognition memory. Medication adherence was examined over 8 weeks for one prescribed medicine by use of an electronic medication-monitor…
Perception and its Objects
"Bill Brewer presents, motivates, and defends a bold new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should we best understand the most fundamental nature of our perceptual relation with the physical objects in the world around us? Most theorists today analyse perception in terms of its representational content, in large part in order to avoid fata…
Consciousness and Content in Perception
Normal perception involves conscious experience of the world. What I call the Content View, (CV), attempts to account for this in terms of the representational content of perception. I offer a new argument against this view. Personal level perceptual content involves the determination of a fineness of grain in the predicational information conveyed to the subject. This depends on her exercise of personal level capacities such as categorization an…
Effects of a psychological and physiotherapeutic intervention on the occurrence of injuries (Efectos de una intervención psicológica y fisioterapeútica sobre la ocurrencia de lesiones)
This study aims to analyse the effects of a psychological intervention focused on motivation and anxiety, in combination with a physiotherapy program, upon the occurrence of injuries. The participants were 22 male soccer players (age = 23.31, SD = 4.24). The instruments used were injury protocol, Competitive State Anxiety Inventory 2 (CSAI-2) and Behavioral Regulation in Sport Questionnaire (BRSQ). The program lasted twelve sessions a periodicity…
The metaphysics and epistemology of conscious perception
Some metaphysical disjunctivists about conscious perceptual experience argue that their position has attractive, anti-sceptical, epistemological consequences. Perceiving a particular round red ball is a matter of being in a conscious condition, which serves as the ground for judgement that that thing is round and red, that is inconsistent with the falsity of that judgement. For it consists in a relation of acquaintance with that very thing and it…
Anil Gomes's The Practical Self
Gomes's rich and compelling book revolves around an extended line of argument for the thesis that a self-conscious subject must be one object amongst many in an objective world: self-consciousness entails objectivity. Others have offered arguments for the same conclusion; but, in contrast with his own, Gomes finds all of these wanting. After setting out my own understanding of Gomes's central argument, I will raise a series of concerns about each…
Philosophy (19 works) · Epistemology (18 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (17 works) · Psychology (17 works) · Computer Science (15 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (15 works) · Perception (13 works) · Citation (8 works) · Library science (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works)