Precis of Perception and Reason

precis-of-perception-andreason(aaf6088f-74ff-4f1c-b9de-16521e104024).html][The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com] 1 References to Brewer, 1999, are indicated throughout simply by 'P&R'. 2 See Evans, 1982, pp.104 ff. for elucidation of this notion of a person's Idea of an object.-2 -he cannot knowledgeably rule out the possibility of a massive qualitative reduplication elsewhere in the universe of the relevant sector of his environment. 3 So there is a possible world in which 'F' is multiply satisfied and everything which S actually knows is true.Thus, there is a possible world in which 'F' is multiply satisfied and S refers as he does to a; for that he does so is something which he knows.This is a contradiction.For in that case, 'The F' fails to refer.Hence S's Idea of a cannot be purely descriptive after all.It must involve some kind of demonstrative component, with respect to which his experience is essential to his grasp of which object is in question. 4 Perceptual reference of this kind is therefore essentially experiential.In the absence of experience of that thing, S has no understanding of what it would be for 'That is φ' to be true.For he has no conception whatsoever of which thing it is who's being φ or not determines the truth or falsity of that content.So he cannot have any such belief.Hence the most basic beliefs about the empirical world have the contents which they do -that a particular mind-independent thing is determinately thus and so -only in virtue of their standing in certain relations with various perceptual experiences. 5 What kinds of relations between perceptual experiences and beliefs are required to meet this condition upon determinate empirical content?I claim that these must be reasongiving relations, providing the subject with reasons, which he recognizes as such, for the relevant beliefs.The following Switching Argument is intended to establish this. 6 Suppose that the relevant content-determining relations are not reason-giving relations.Consider a 3 The underlying equivalence here can be demonstrated as follows.Suppose that S is a person, p a proposition, and K S the conjunction of every proposition which S knows.It is epistemically possible for S that p ⇔ it is logically possible that [ K S & p ] ⇔ { K S , p } is consistent ⇔ ' K S , therefore not-p ' is invalid ⇔ S cannot argue validly from what he actually knows to not-p ⇔ S is not in a position knowledgeably to rule out that p

Epistemology · Perception · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Psychology

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