Lukas Beck
Biographic Data
| ID | 3943466 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lukas Beck |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lukas |
| FAMILY NAME | Beck |
| SIGNATURE | BECK L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cambridge |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6364-2332 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Strategic ignorance, and the management of performative effects
It is a well-known predicament of the social sciences that predictions can sometimes intervene on the very processes the predictions concern. The purpose of this paper is to address the question of how modelers or scientists should act in the presence of such performative effects with a specific focus on the example of climate economics. Specifically, we will argue that two strategies for managing performative effects recently defended in the lit…
Endogenous preferences, environmental economics, and welfare
This article targets the problems of endogenous preferences for welfare assessment in the context of large-scale interventions that, for instance, concern us in environmental economics. Prominent economists have argued that the problem of endogenous preferences is particularly pressing in these cases. However, I argue that while there are promising solutions to deal with this problem when it comes to small-scale interventions (e.g. nudging), thos…
The Specter of Revealed Preference Theory
My aim in this paper is to argue that the recent philosophical defenses of revealed preference theory do not withstand scrutiny. Towards this aim, I will first outline revealed preference theory. I will then briefly present the two most common arguments that the received view offers against it. Afterwards, I will outline three argumentative strategies for rehabilitating revealed preference theory, and successively rebut each of them
Dual process theory and the challenges of functional individuation
Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a popular framework for theorizing about human cognition. Its central hypothesis is that cognitive processing can be subsumed under two generic types. In this paper, we argue that the putative success and popularity of this framework remains overstated and gives rise to certain misunderstandings. If DPT has predictive and/or explanatory power, it is th…
Why We Need to Talk About Preferences
When economists perform experiments, they do so typically in one of two traditions: cognitive psychology experiments in the heuristics and biases tradition (H&B-experiments) and experimental economics in the tradition of Vernon Smith. What sets these two traditions apart? In this paper, I offer a novel conceptualization of their pervasive disagreements. Focusing on how each camp approaches preferences, one of the most fundamental concepts in econ…
The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification
Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to pro…
Do you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuing
In this paper, we explicate an underappreciated distinction between two conceptions of valuing. According to the first conception, which we call the surface-account, valuing something is exclusively a matter of having certain behavioral, cognitive, and emotional dispositions. In contrast, the second conception, which we call the layer-account, posits that valuing is constituted by the presence of certain representational mental states underlying …
Normative Models and Their Success
In this paper, we explore an under-investigated question concerning the class of formal models that aim at providing normative guidance. We call such models normative models. In particular, we examine the question of how normative models can successfully exert normative guidance. First, we highlight the absence of a discussion of this question—which is surprising given the extensive debate about the success conditions of descriptive models—and mo…
Normative Models and Their Success
In this paper, we explore an under-investigated question concerning the class of formal models that aim at providing normative guidance. We call such models normative models. In particular, we examine the question of how normative models can successfully exert normative guidance. First, we highlight the absence of a discussion of this question—which is surprising given the extensive debate about the success conditions of descriptive models—and mo…
Do you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuing
In this paper, we explicate an underappreciated distinction between two conceptions of valuing. According to the first conception, which we call the surface-account, valuing something is exclusively a matter of having certain behavioral, cognitive, and emotional dispositions. In contrast, the second conception, which we call the layer-account, posits that valuing is constituted by the presence of certain representational mental states underlying …
Normative Models and Their Success
In this paper, we explore an under-investigated question concerning the class of formal models that aim at providing normative guidance. We call such models normative models. In particular, we examine the question of how normative models can successfully exert normative guidance. First, we highlight the absence of a discussion of this question—which is surprising given the extensive debate about the success conditions of descriptive models—and mo…
The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification
Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to pro…
Do you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuing
In this paper, we explicate an underappreciated distinction between two conceptions of valuing. According to the first conception, which we call the surface-account, valuing something is exclusively a matter of having certain behavioral, cognitive, and emotional dispositions. In contrast, the second conception, which we call the layer-account, posits that valuing is constituted by the presence of certain representational mental states underlying …
The Specter of Revealed Preference Theory
My aim in this paper is to argue that the recent philosophical defenses of revealed preference theory do not withstand scrutiny. Towards this aim, I will first outline revealed preference theory. I will then briefly present the two most common arguments that the received view offers against it. Afterwards, I will outline three argumentative strategies for rehabilitating revealed preference theory, and successively rebut each of them
Dual process theory and the challenges of functional individuation
Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a popular framework for theorizing about human cognition. Its central hypothesis is that cognitive processing can be subsumed under two generic types. In this paper, we argue that the putative success and popularity of this framework remains overstated and gives rise to certain misunderstandings. If DPT has predictive and/or explanatory power, it is th…
Why We Need to Talk About Preferences
When economists perform experiments, they do so typically in one of two traditions: cognitive psychology experiments in the heuristics and biases tradition (H&B-experiments) and experimental economics in the tradition of Vernon Smith. What sets these two traditions apart? In this paper, I offer a novel conceptualization of their pervasive disagreements. Focusing on how each camp approaches preferences, one of the most fundamental concepts in econ…
Strategic ignorance, and the management of performative effects
It is a well-known predicament of the social sciences that predictions can sometimes intervene on the very processes the predictions concern. The purpose of this paper is to address the question of how modelers or scientists should act in the presence of such performative effects with a specific focus on the example of climate economics. Specifically, we will argue that two strategies for managing performative effects recently defended in the lit…
Endogenous preferences, environmental economics, and welfare
This article targets the problems of endogenous preferences for welfare assessment in the context of large-scale interventions that, for instance, concern us in environmental economics. Prominent economists have argued that the problem of endogenous preferences is particularly pressing in these cases. However, I argue that while there are promising solutions to deal with this problem when it comes to small-scale interventions (e.g. nudging), thos…
Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Positive economics (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (2 works)