Francesco Parisi
Biographic Data
| ID | 3948936 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Francesco Parisi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Francesco |
| FAMILY NAME | Parisi |
| SIGNATURE | PARISI F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Minnesota |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9977-1355 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 46 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 35 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 42 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 4 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Fairness in contract law
Scholars have long debated whether contract law should prioritize maximizing efficiency and social welfare or, instead, prioritize justice, fairness and other deontological values. The debate is partly prescriptive (what should we try to do with contract law rules) and partly conceptual (how should we understand contract law). This article surveys central positions in this debate, distinguishing between the corrective and redistributive functions…
From Waste to Value
With increasing geopolitical risks, environmental pressures, and regulatory demands, the sustainable sourcing of raw materials has become a global priority for achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), and SDG 13 (Climate Action). This study presents a data‐driven framework for assessing the substitution of impor…
Juries in flux
While the right to a trial by an impartial jury remains a cornerstone of the Anglo-American legal tradition, the modus operandi of a “trial by jury” in the United States has been in constant flux. During the last 125 years, twenty-eight states in the U.S. reduced the size of their juries, while three others allowed non-unanimous verdicts in felony and/or misdemeanor cases. Blackstonian ratios and burdens of proof exhibited similar variations acro…
Toward a (Dis)equilibrium Theory of Crime?
critiques traditional models that view crime as a stable equilibrium. It proposes a dynamic perspective highlighting how institutional and economic factors prevent equilibrium, aligning with JITE's focus on institutional analysis.
In Memoriam
Opportunistic Breach of Contract
Law and economics scholarship has traditionally analyzed efficient breach cases monolithically. By grouping efficient breach cases together, this literature treats the subjective motives and the distributive effects of the breach as immaterial. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment introduced a distinction based on the intent and the effects of the breach, allowing courts to use disgorgement remedies in cases of ‘opportunis…
Institutional flexibility in tax law and enforcement
This paper examines how governments can optimally audit to discourage tax avoidance. We assume that an accounting firm designs and promotes strategies for tax avoidance. This firm adapts the quality and diversity of these strategies in response to shifts in government policies. We investigate when it is more effective to approve some methods while cracking down on others, rather than targeting all tax-avoidance activities uniformly. We find that …
Linking Terrorist Network Structure to Lethality
Without measures of the lethality of terrorist networks, it is very difficult to assess if capturing or killing a terrorist is effective. We present the predictive lethality analysis of terrorist organization () algorithm, which merges machine learning with techniques from graph theory and social network analysis to predict the number of attacks that a terrorist network will carry out based on a network structure alone. We show that is highly acc…
Access to evidence in private international law
This Article analyzes the interaction between the burden of proof and evidentiary discovery rules. Both sets of rules can affect incentives for prospective injurers to invest in evidence technology (i.e., ex ante investments that increase the quantity and quality of evidence in case an accident occurs). This interaction becomes acutely important in the private international law setting, where jurisdictions are split on the question whether the bu…
Do presumptions of negligence incentivize optimal precautions
In most jurisdictions, the burden of producing evidence on a contested issue traditionally falls on plaintiffs. In a tort claim, this de facto creates a presumption of non-negligence in favor of injurers. Some legal systems in Europe placed renewed attention on “presumed liability” rules, which instead create a presumption of negligence against injurers. In this paper, we analyze the effects of alternative legal presumptions on parties’ care ince…
Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: the market tends to disappear from the bottom rather than from the top. In contrast to the traditional model, it is the high-value goods (gems) that are traded on t…
The Role of Comparative Law in the Social Sciences
Comparative law is undergoing a rapid evolution, particularly when compared to the descriptive methodology that characterized the field prior to the 1950s. Beginning around that time, comparative law scholars began to embrace more analytical approaches in their studies, and as a result drew novel conclusions about causes and consequences of legal rules. In moving beyond mere description, comparativists showed that common elements behind what appe…
Multiple Causes and Stacked Inferences
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Economics of Criminal Law
This chapter discusses the economic approach to crime. By applying the tools of economic analysis and econometric methodology, it serves as a unified approach for understanding illegal behaviour as part of human behaviour in general. It offers new insights about the relative efficiency and desirability of means of crime control and components of the law enforcement system. The economic approach, and the “market model” linking it to the general me…
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics covers over one hundred topics on issues ranging from law and neuroeconomics to European Union law and economics to feminist theory and law and economics. The book gathers together scholars and experts in law and economics to create the most inclusive and current work on law and economics. It looks at the origins of the field of law and economics, tracks its progression and increased importance to both law…
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics covers over one-hundred topics on issues ranging from law and neuroeconomics to European Union law and economics to feminist theory and law and economics. The book gathers together scholars and experts in law and economics to create the most inclusive and current work on law and economics. It begins at the origins of the field of law and economics, tracks its progression and increased importance to both la…
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics covers over one-hundred topics on issues ranging from law and neuroeconomics to European Union law and economics to feminist theory and law and economics. The book gathers together scholars and experts in law and economics to create the most inclusive and current work on law and economics. It looks at the origins of the field of law and economics, tracks its progression and increased importance to both law…
Methodology and Concepts
Law and Economics
Public Law and Legal Institutions
Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics Vol. 1
Productive and unproductive competition
Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics
Loss-Sharing between Nonnegligent Parties
Shavell (1980) established that tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level; however, the nonbearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level. We explore alternative liability rules, which distribute the cost of accidents between nonnegligent parties, effectively rendering injurer and victim partial residual bearers of loss. We introduce a bilateral accident m…
Biasing, Debiasing, and the Law
In this chapter, we build on the existing literature on the use of legal strategies for addressing problems of biased judgment and behavior, exploring how heuristics and biases may be exploited to foster efficiency in the presence of other incentive alignment problems. We also introduce two new categories: the hitherto unnoticed counterparts to debiasing and insulating strategies, which we will call “benevolent biasing,” and “cognitive leveraging…
Political Coase Theorem
Entropy in Property
Journal Article Entropy in Property Get access Francesco Parisi Francesco Parisi 1Francesco Paeisi is Professor of Law & Co-Director, J.M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Program in Economics and the Law, George Mason University. I would like to thank Jody Kraus for an insightful suggestion and Catherine Sevcenko for her valuable research assistance Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journ…
Rents, dissipation and lost treasures
Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies
Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics
Litigation and legal evolution
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking
This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively …
The paradox of legal harmonization
The Disunity of Unanimity
Toward a theory of spontaneous law
Toward a theory of spontaneous law
Floor versus Screen Trading in the Stock Market
Floor versus Screen Trading in the Stock Market
Fragmentation in Property
This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. Using several related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized to develop a model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Our model suggests that the results of underutilization of join…
Entropy in Property
Journal Article Entropy in Property Get access Francesco Parisi Francesco Parisi 1Francesco Paeisi is Professor of Law & Co-Director, J.M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Program in Economics and the Law, George Mason University. I would like to thank Jody Kraus for an insightful suggestion and Catherine Sevcenko for her valuable research assistance Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journ…
Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation
Many legal systems foster metarules of reciprocity to facilitate cooperative outcomes. This paper considers the role of reciprocity rules in various strategic environments. We start by considering the effect of reciprocity constraints in a classic prisoners' dilemma with two symmetric parties and linear payoffs. We extend the analysis to continuous strategies and then further extend the basic model of reciprocity to (a) asymmetric players and (b)…
The Disunity of Unanimity
Political Coase Theorem
Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies
Liability for Pure Financial Loss in Europe
Symeon C. Symeonides; Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth Annual Survey, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 51, Issue 1, 1
The Harmonization of Legal Warranties in European Sales Law
Journal Article The Harmonization of Legal Warranties in European Sales Law: an Economic Analysis Get access Francesco Parisi Francesco Parisi 1Francesco Parisi is Professor of Law & Director, Law and Economics Program, George Mason University, School of Law. This paper was presented at the 1st International Congress of the Society of European Contract Law, Rome (Italy), June 8-9, 2001. I would like to thank Peter Irvine for his valuable editoria…
Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition
Rents, dissipation and lost treasures
A law and economics perspective on terrorism
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking
This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively …
The paradox of legal harmonization
Legal Institutions and Economic Development
This insightful collection of classic papers explores the effects of various legal institutions and policies on economic development. The editors include analysis of the historical, current, and future conditions of numerous legal traditions and strategies, both nationally and globally. The volume will enhance understanding of how legal policies influence economic growth. It will also contribute to the selection and advancement of those legal pol…
Choice of law and legal evolution
Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase
In this paper, we study a two-stage rent-seeking game. In the first stage, contestants compete à-la-Tullock; in the second stage, the winner can resell the rent à-la-Coase. We consider a complete information Tullock game in which the contestants have different valuations for the rent. The analysis focuses on the ex ante effects of a secondary market on efforts, payoffs, rent-dissipation and rent-misallocation. We show that the secondary market, w…
Litigation and legal evolution
Markets, votes, and The Calculus of Consent
Loss-Sharing between Nonnegligent Parties
Shavell (1980) established that tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level; however, the nonbearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level. We explore alternative liability rules, which distribute the cost of accidents between nonnegligent parties, effectively rendering injurer and victim partial residual bearers of loss. We introduce a bilateral accident m…
Biasing, Debiasing, and the Law
In this chapter, we build on the existing literature on the use of legal strategies for addressing problems of biased judgment and behavior, exploring how heuristics and biases may be exploited to foster efficiency in the presence of other incentive alignment problems. We also introduce two new categories: the hitherto unnoticed counterparts to debiasing and insulating strategies, which we will call “benevolent biasing,” and “cognitive leveraging…
Returns to effort in rent-seeking games
Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics
Economics of Criminal Law
This chapter discusses the economic approach to crime. By applying the tools of economic analysis and econometric methodology, it serves as a unified approach for understanding illegal behaviour as part of human behaviour in general. It offers new insights about the relative efficiency and desirability of means of crime control and components of the law enforcement system. The economic approach, and the “market model” linking it to the general me…
Economics (31 works) · Political science (26 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (25 works) · Law (23 works) · Law and economics (19 works) · Microeconomics (16 works) · Computer Science (12 works) · Business (11 works) · Incentive (8 works) · Law (8 works)