Fragmentation in Property

Towards a General Model

Bibliographic Data

ID24037795
AuthorsNorbert Schulz (0000-0002-3547-2572, University of Würzburg), Ben Depoorter (George Mason University), Francesco Parisi (0000-0001-9977-1355, Ghent University)
Year2002
Volume158
Issue4
Pages594-613
Publication date2002-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559
PublisherMohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1628/0932456022975196
OpenAlexW2571092454
LanguageEN
Citations received8

This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. Using several related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized to develop a model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increase monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation and (b) the forgone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. We explore some important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.

Economics · Fragmentation (computing) · Incentive · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Property (philosophy) · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Property Rights and Legal Doctrine

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